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This thesis examines three distinct but interrelated topics that are centered on two 
important concepts in corporate finance, namely, organization capital and firm life 
cycle. Organization capital encompasses business practices, processes, systems, 
designs, and culture that affect firms’ fundamental efficiency and future operating, 
investment, and innovation performance. On the other hand, firm life cycle theory 
proposes that firms pass through a series of predictable patterns of development, and 
that the resources, capabilities, strategies, structures, and functioning of the firm vary 
significantly with the corresponding stages of development. In light of recent 
advances in developing appropriate constructs for these two concepts at the firm- 
level, this thesis aims to examine the relationship between these two seemingly 
unrelated concepts and their effect on some firm-level variables, such as risks and 
cost of capital. In particular, the first topic is to explore the relationship between 
organization capital and firm life cycle, the second topic is to distinguish different 
types of organization capital and disentangle their differential impacts on 
idiosyncratic, systematic, and total risk, and the third topic is to examine the 
relationship between firm life cycle and cost of capital. These three new topics are 
largely unexplored in the literature. The thesis contributes to extending the frontier of 
corporate finance literature on these topics. 
The first chapter in this thesis presents the introduction of the thesis. This 
chapter discusses the motivation for and structure of the thesis, presents a summary 
of the main findings, and outlines the contribution of the thesis. 
The second chapter, entitled, “Organization Capital and Firm Life Cycle,” 
focuses on the association between organization capital and firm life cycle stages. 
The results of the paper suggest that firms with higher organization capital are more 
likely to be in the introduction or decline stage, whereas firms with a lower level of 
organization capital are more likely to be in the growth or mature stage. The findings 
of this chapter also show that firms with a higher organization capital in the 
introduction and decline stages are more likely to progress to the growth and mature 




The third chapter of the thesis entitled, “Management-Specific Organization 
Capital vs. Firm-Specific Organization Capital – Are They the Same? Evidence from 
an Analysis on Firm Risks,” examines the role of management-specific and firm- 
specific organization capital on firm risks. This also investigates the relative role of 
management-specific and firm-specific organization capital in influencing risks. The 
results of this chapter suggest that the impact of management-specific and firm- 
specific organization capital on risks differs quite remarkably. In particular, 
management-specific organization capital increases (decreases) systematic 
(idiosyncratic and total) risk, while firm-specific organization capital increases 
(decreases) idiosyncratic and total (systematic) risk. This paper also shows that 
management-specific organization capital plays a dominant role in affecting firm 
risks.  
The fourth chapter, “Firm Life Cycle and Cost of Equity Capital,” 
investigates the association between firm life cycle and cost of equity capital. The 
findings of this chapter show that  cost of equity is higher in the introduction and 
decline stages but lower in the growth and mature stages, resembling a U-shaped 
pattern. 
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1.1 Background and Motivation 
Organization capital and the firm life cycle have received considerable research 
interest in the contemporary finance, accounting, and economics literature. Extant 
studies suggest that organization capital plays a crucial role in improving firm (and 
national) innovation, growth, and competitiveness (Brynjolfsson, Hitt, & Shinkyu, 
2002; Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005). Studies on firm life cycle show that firm life 
cycle has an immense impact on operating performance (Warusawitharana, 2014), 
financing (Bender & Ward, 1993; Berger & Udell, 1998), investment (Richardson, 
2006), and dividend decisions (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz, 2006; Fama & 
French, 2001; Grullon, Michaely, & Swaminathan, 2002). The predominant role of 
organization capital and firm life cycle in influencing the productivity, efficiency, 
and performance of the firm, and recent advances in developing appropriate 
constructs for these two concepts at the firm level have motivated me to investigate 
three distinct but interrelated aspects of corporate finance that are centered around 
organization capital and the firm life cycle. 
  Organization capital, as defined by Lev and Radhakrishnan  (2005, p. 75), is 
“an agglomeration of technologies—business practices, processes and designs, and 
incentive and compensation systems—that together enable some firms to consistently 
and efficiently extract from a given level of physical and human resources a higher 
value of product than other firms find possible to attain.”  Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 
(2014) argue that organization capital is an increasingly important part of United 
States (U.S.) and global capital stock. Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2009) show that 
organization capital, the single largest category of intangible business capital, 
accounts for about 30% of all intangible assets in the U.S. Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) 
document that the payments that owners receive from organization capital are more 
than one-third of the payments they receive from physical capital. Furthermore, they 
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show that organization capital represents more than 40% of the cash flows generated 
by all intangible assets in the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts. Likewise, 
Black and Lynch (2005) notes that changes in organizational capital account for 
approximately 30% of output growth in manufacturing over the period 1993–1996.  
Adopting a firm-level analysis, Lev, Radhakrishnan, and Zhang (2009) show 
that organization capital is associated with future operating and stock return 
performance, and it captures firms’ fundamental ability to generate abnormal 
performance. According to Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), firms with more 
organization capital are associated with 4.6% higher average returns. They also 
provide evidence that firms with more organization capital are more productive, have 
higher Tobin’s Q, and exhibit higher executive compensation. Attig and Cleary 
(2014a) demonstrate that organization capital decreases investment sensitivity to 
internal cash flows, implying that superior management practices reduce the firm’s 
financing frictions. Carlin, Chowdhry, and Garmaise (2012) find that firms with 
more organization capital have lower employee turnover and higher diversity in 
skills. 
Corporate life cycle theory proposes that firms pass through a series of 
predictable patterns of development, and that the resources, capabilities, strategies, 
structures, and functioning of the firm vary significantly with the corresponding 
stage of development (Miller & Friesen, 1980, 1984; Quinn & Cameron, 1983). 
Recent research in finance and accounting also confirms the unique role of the firm 
life cycle stages. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) demonstrate that the 
corporate life cycle has a significant influence on the probability that a firm will 
engage in secondary equity offerings. Other studies (e.g., Bulan, Subramanian, & 
Tanlu, 2007; DeAngelo et al., 2006; Fama & French, 2001) acknowledge the role of 
the firm life cycle in determining dividend payout policy. Evidence in the accounting 
literature also suggests that investors’ valuation of firms and pricing of accruals and 




The resource-based theory of Wernerfelt (1984) suggests that resources are 
the ultimate source for establishing and maintaining competitive advantage. The 
dynamic resource-based view articulates the notion that general patterns and paths in 
the evolution of organizational capabilities change over time (Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 
1984; Wernerfelt, 1984). This theory proposes that the growth of a firm depends on 
the efficient and effective interaction between its resources and its management. 
Thus, the evolution of a firm’s competitiveness, in terms of its resource base and 
capabilities, is the foundation of the firm’s life cycle.  
 Numerous studies provide evidence that organization capital is a valuable 
resource base and source of competitive advantage. Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) 
show that organization capital is a persistent creator of value and growth for business 
enterprises. They also suggest that the contribution made by organization capital is 
generally manifested in sustained growth in sales, earnings, and market value. 
Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) show that firms with more organization capital are 
more productive, and have higher Tobin’s Q. Carlin et al. (2012) also view 
organization capital as a significant source of firm value. The strategic management 
literature, on the other hand, suggests that the resource base and competitive 
advantage are the foundations of the growth, development and success of a firm 
(Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). Thus, given that organization capital is a valuable 
resource base and source of sustainable competitive advantage, and that the firm life 
cycle is driven by production efficiency, performance, and firm-specific resources, I 
posit that the accumulation of firm-specific knowledge, business practices, processes, 
and overall systems is an important driving force that can explain firm progression 
across life cycle stages. Surprisingly, no study to date has empirically investigated 
the association between organization capital and firm life cycle. The first paper in 
this thesis addresses this gap in the literature and provides some intriguing findings 
on the association between organization capital and firm life cycle. 
Despite the outstanding role played by organization capital in improving the 
productivity and efficiency of the firm, there remains debate in the academic 
literature concerning the adhesiveness of such organization capital. Some studies 
view organization capital as rooted in the business practices, processes and culture of 
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the firm, and hence as firm specific (Lev et al., 2009; Atkeson & Kehoe, 2005; 
Tomer, 1987). Some studies, however, posit that organization capital is embodied in 
the efficiency and network of the employees of the firm, and, therefore executive 
specific (Jovanovic, 1979; Prescott & Visscher, 1980; Becker, 1993). Adding another 
context to this debate, some studies view the efficiency of organization capital as 
partly firm specific and embodied in the key talents of the firm, implying that it is a 
combination of both firm-specific and executive-specific organization capital 
(Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013). These divergences of opinion show that extant 
studies cannot clearly differentiate or precisely estimate management-specific and 
firm-specific organization capital, and therefore use these terms interchangeably, 
implicitly assuming that they have identical implications for firm outcome. The 
second paper in this thesis attempts to fill this void in the literature, disentangling 
firm-specific organization capital from management-specific organization capital and 
examining their (differential) impact on a wide range of firm risks. 
Firms in different life cycle stages differ in their ability to raise funds from 
the market (Berger & Udell, 1998). Firms in the earlier stages of the life cycle are 
relatively small, unknown, and are less closely followed by analysts and investors. 
Hence, these firms suffer from substantial information asymmetry. On the other 
hand, mature firms have a longer existence in the market and they are more closely 
followed by analysts and investors. Hence, these firms suffer from less information 
asymmetry and are less risky. Easley and O’Hara (2004) note that firms with a long 
operating history are better known by investors, improving the precision of 
information about the firm and lowering the cost of capital. Resource-based theory 
also suggests that the resource base and capabilities of mature firms are large, 
diverse, and rich, whereas those of young and declining firms are small, 
concentrated, and limited. The resource base, together with its accompanying 
superior competitive advantage and capacities, may help mature firms to benefit 
from cheaper and easier sources of finance. However, research efforts examining the 
association between firm life cycle and cost of equity are scant. The third paper in 




1.2 Structure of Thesis and Summary of Findings 
The thesis is structured around a three-paper format. These papers examine three 
distinct but interrelated aspects of corporate finance related to organization capital 
and firm life cycle. As a whole, the thesis consists of five chapters including this 
chapter. The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents the first paper of this thesis, which investigates the 
association between organization capital and firm life cycle. Extant studies show that 
organization capital is the source of productivity, performance, efficiency, 
competitiveness, and a valuable resource base for the firm. The strategic 
management literature suggests that a firm’s movement through the life cycle 
depends on its valuable resource base and competitive advantage. Therefore, this 
paper argues that idiosyncratic and intangible organization capital may have valuable 
implications for firm life cycle progression.   
 The empirical evidence in this paper suggests that firms with more 
organization capital are likely to be in the introduction, shake-out, or decline stage, 
whereas firms with less organization capital are likely to be in growth or mature 
stage. The results also show that firms with higher organization capital in the 
introduction or decline stages are more likely to progress to the growth and mature 
stages in the subsequent five years. Taken together, this paper documents a 
significant impact of organization capital in influencing firm life cycle stages.   
Chapter 3 presents the second paper of the thesis, which distinguishes 
different types of organization capital and disentangles their differential impacts on 
idiosyncratic, systematic, and total risk. Despite the considerable evidence that 
organization capital affects firm productivity, efficiency and performance, there 
remains a clear divergence of opinion regarding the adhesiveness of such 
organization capital. Some research argues that organization capital is firm-specific 
as it is rooted in the business practices, processes, and culture of the firm, whereas 
another line of research argues that organization capital is embodied in an 
organization’s employees and their social networks, and yet other studies view the 
efficiency of organization capital as partly firm-specific and partly embodied in the 
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key talents of the firm. These studies, however, do not empirically differentiate 
between management-specific and firm-specific organization capital, implicitly 
assuming that they have identical implications for firm-level outcomes and thus 
using both forms of organizational capital interchangeably. However, I argue that 
this assumption is questionable. Therefore, in this chapter, I first disentangle firm- 
specific organization capital from management-specific organization capital and then 
investigate whether both forms of organization capital affect firm risks identically. I 
argue that firm-specific organization capital and management-specific organization 
capital, owing to their idiosyncratic nature, should affect idiosyncratic, systematic, 
and total risk distinctively.   
Using data from U.S. publicly listed firms from 1980 to 2012, this paper 
shows that the impact of organization capital on idiosyncratic, systematic, and total 
risk depends on whether organization capital is firm-specific or management- 
specific. The empirical evidence in this paper shows that management-specific 
organization capital reduces (increases) idiosyncratic and total (systematic) risk, 
whereas firm-specific organization capital reduces (increases) systematic 
(idiosyncratic and total) risk. Furthermore, management-specific organization 
capital, when interacting with firm-specific organization capital, negatively affects 
idiosyncratic, systematic and total risk, suggesting the dominant role of management-
specific organization capital in reducing a wide range of firm risks. 
Chapter 4 presents the third paper in this thesis, investigating the association 
between firm life cycle and cost of equity capital. An extensive body of literature 
suggests that investors’ valuation of a firm is a function of the life cycle stage of the 
firm. I argue that as the life cycle has a significant influence on the firm’s ability to 
attract investors, this should have implications for the cost of equity capital of the 
firm. 
Using a sample of Australian firms between 1990 and 2012, I find that the 
cost of equity capital varies over the life cycle of the firm. In particular, this paper 
shows that the cost of equity is higher in the introduction and decline stages, and 
lower in the growth and mature stages, resembling a U-shaped pattern. 
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  Chapter 5 provides a summary of major findings from the empirical analysis 
in this thesis. The chapter also presents overall conclusions and policy implications.  
In addition, it discusses directions for future research. 
 
Table 1.1: Summary of the Findings 
Chapter Hypothesis Findings 
   
Two Organization capital is associated with firms’ 
progression through the life cycle stages. 
Strong support 
   
Three i. Management-specific and firm-specific 
organization capital do not affect firm 
risk identically.  
ii. Management-specific organization 
capital, when interacting with firm- 
specific organization capital, plays a 






Four Cost of equity varies with the firm’s stage in 
the life cycle.  
Strong support 
 
1.3 Contribution to the Literature 
The thesis investigates three aspects of organization capital and corporate life cycle 
that have largely been unexplored in the corporate finance literature. The findings of 
the thesis contribute to the literature in the following ways: 
Chapter 2 of the thesis contributes to the corporate finance literature by 
examining the association of organization capital with the corporate life cycle stages. 
This chapter contributes to the area of research that stresses the importance of 
organization capital as a major driver of firms’ (and national) growth and 
competitiveness (e.g., Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2014; Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005; 
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Youndt, Subramaniam, & Snell, 2004). While prior research shows that organization 
capital has a valuable impact on the growth, productivity, and competitiveness of the 
firm, little has hitherto been known about the role of organization capital in driving 
the corporate life cycle. This paper fills this gap in the literature. The findings in this 
chapter suggest that organization capital can greatly benefit the firm in remaining 
competitive in successive stages (i.e., the growth and mature stages). In particular, 
this study indicates that organization capital could be a channel through which 
managers can lead the firm to attain and maintain growth and mature, the prime 
stages, in their life cycle.   
Chapter 3 of this thesis extends the corporate finance literature by directly 
examining the role of management-specific and firm-specific organization capital in 
influencing idiosyncratic, systematic and total risk. While prior research has 
investigated the association between organization capital and cross-sectional stock 
returns (Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013), future operating and stock return 
performance (Lev et al., 2009), investment cash flow sensitivity (Attig & Cleary, 
2014a), and production possibility (Prescott & Visscher, 1980), little attention has 
been paid to the role of organization capital in influencing a wide range of risks. This 
paper bridges this gap in the literature. A further contribution of this chapter is that, 
to the best of my knowledge, it is the first to isolate firm-specific organization capital 
systematically from management-specific organization capital and examine whether 
both forms of organization capital affect firm-level outcomes identically. This 
chapter empirically shows that the effects of organization capital on idiosyncratic, 
systematic, and total risk differ considerably based on whether organizational capital 
is management-specific or firm-specific. Thus, this study makes an important 
contribution in resolving the competing views on the embodiments and effects of 
different forms of organization capital.  
 Chapter 4 extends the corporate finance literature by providing empirical 
evidence that the firm life cycle has significant implications for the cost of equity of 
the firm. While prior research has investigated the role of the firm life cycle in 
decision making regarding dividends (DeAngelo et al., 2006; Fama & French, 2001) 
and capital structure (Berger & Udell, 1998), little attention has been paid to the role 
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of the firm life cycle in determining the cost of equity capital. This chapter attempts 
to fill this gap in the literature. It thus augments our understanding of the role of the 
corporate life cycle in major financial policies. The findings of this chapter may help 
managers to understand the effect of the life cycle on the financing costs of firms and 





ORGANIZATION CAPITAL AND FIRM LIFE CYCLE 
2.1 Introduction 
Firm-level organization capital, which “enables superior operating, investment and 
innovation performance, represented by the agglomeration of technologies—business 
practices, processes and designs” according to Lev et al. (2009, p. 277), has received 
immense interest in the recent finance and accounting literature. Studies in these 
areas show that organization capital affects a firm’s fundamental ability to generate 
superior performance (Lev et al., 2009). The remarkable contribution of organization 
capital to entrepreneurial dynamics and productive capacity, as evidenced by recent 
studies, motivates corporations to invest a substantial amount of their capital in 
developing organization capital. Corrado et al. (2009) show that organization capital 
(firm-specific resources) is the single largest category of intangible capital, 
accounting for about 30% of all intangible assets in the United States. However, the 
role of organization capital in influencing the progression of a firm in its life cycle 
stages remains unclear and deserves more detailed study. This paper concentrates on 
how firm-specific organization capital, evidenced by business practices, processes, 
systems, designs and the unique corporate culture, contributes to the life cycle 
transition. 
A growing body of literature suggests that organization capital affects firms’ 
fundamental efficiency and future operating performance (Lev et al., 2009). Attig 
and Cleary (2014a) document that organization capital reduces the firm’s financing 
frictions and contributes to value-maximizing behavior. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 
(2013) show that firms with more organization capital are more productive, have 
higher Tobin’s Q and higher risk-adjusted returns, and display higher levels of 
                                                             
 This chapter of the thesis was presented at the Financial Markets and Corporate Governance 
Conference 2015, CRAE annual research forum, Curtin University, 2015, and the Finance and 
Financial Planning Seminar at Griffith University, 2014.   
11 
 
executive compensation. Other studies (e.g., Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005) suggest 
that organization capital is a valuable resource base that provides firms with 
sustainable competitive advantage and drives firm growth and outcomes. The 
strategic management literature, on the other hand, suggests that the ability of a firm 
to capitalize the benefits from scarce and non-imitable firm-specific resources 
underpins its growth and development. Dickinson (2011) also suggests that firm life 
cycle (FLC) stages are distinct and identifiable phases that are determined by the key 
internal resources and/or external factors. Since organization capital is an important 
firm-specific resource base and source of sustainable competitive advantage, I argue 
that organization capital serves as one of the precursors that allow firms to 
progressively move from one stage to another. 
The organization science literature suggests that firms in early stages of the 
life cycle should maximize growth opportunities to create permanent advantage over 
competitors and to make the product market unattractive to potential entrants (Porter, 
1980; Spence, 1979). Therefore, firms are likely to have more organization capital in 
the introduction stage of the life cycle because they are willing to invest a substantial 
amount of resources in developing organization processes, practices, culture, 
language, know-how, etc. – commonly known as organization capital. firms in the 
growth and mature stages are more concerned with maximizing the benefits from the 
stock of organization capital (Atkeson & Kehoe, 2005). Since the cost incurred in 
developing organization capital in the introduction stage is not expected to increase 
significantly in the growth and mature stages during which firms also have incentives 
to acquire tangible assets,
1
 I expect that firms in these stages are likely to be 
associated with less organization capital. In sum, I posit that organization capital is a 
determinant of the firm life cycle. 
  This study is motivated by some recent findings in the finance, accounting 
and economics literature that organization capital plays an important role in 
improving the efficiency and productivity of the firm. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 
(2014) note that organization capital is an increasingly important part of the US and 
global capital stock. Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) show that payments from 
                                                             
1 See Section II for a discussion of these incentives. 
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organization capital are more than one-third of payments from physical capital, net of 
new investment. Prior studies (Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005; Lev et al., 2009) also 
show that investment in organization capital form the basis of sustainable 
competitive advantage. This study is also inspired by the dynamic resource-based 
view (RBV) of the firm, which articulates that the general patterns and paths in the 
evolution of organization capabilities depend on the existence and application of the 
bundle of valuable, interchangeable, immobile and imitable resources
2
 that generate 
the basis of the competitive advantage of a firm. Prior studies suggest that 
competitive advantage and capabilities influence transition of firms stages across the 
life cycle, which has profound effect on investment (Richardson, 2006), financing 
(Bender and Ward, 1993), dividend (Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo et al., 2006), 
risk taking decision (Habib and Hasan, 2015) and choices of distress restructuring 
strategies (Koh et al, 2015). Therefore, it is important to assess real managerial 
decisions in the context of life cycle dynamism. Thus, by taking both the role of 
organization capital in forming the resource base and the role of the resource base in 
influencing the life cycle stages, I posit that organization capital can drive transition 
in a firm’s life cycle stages. 
  To test the association between organization capital and firm life cycle 
(hereafter FLC), I examine how firms’ organization capital is associated with the 
progression of the life cycle. I follow Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) to measure 
firm-specific organization capital based on selling, general and administrative 
(SG&A) expenses. The life cycle proxy is based on the methodology of Dickinson 
(2011). By using a large sample of U.S. public firms from 1987 to 2013, I find firms 
with a higher organization capital are more likely to be in the introduction or decline 
stages compared with their possibility of being in the shake-out stage. However, 
firms in the growth and mature stages are more likely to have a lower organization 
capital, as these firms concentrate more on exploiting benefits from the existing stock 
of organization capital and have incentives to acquire tangible assets. These results 
are robust after controlling for other predictors of FLC as well as alternative 
                                                             
2 ‘Resource’ refers to any assets or input (tangible and intangible) to production that help the firm 
implement strategies to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Examples of resources include brand 
names, in-house knowledge of technology, employment of skilled personnel, trade contacts, 




specifications of organization capital and life cycle proxies. To mitigate the 
endogeneity concern, I use a two-stage instrumental variable approach, and the 
results suggest that endogeneity cannot explain the relationship between organization 
capital and FLC. 
In addition, I track the subsequent transition of introduction- and decline-
stage firms based on their organization capital. My results reveal that introduction 
(decline) firms with high organization capital move to (move back to) the growth and 
mature stages at a higher rate than do firms with less organization capital. This result 
is consistent with the view that firms’ investment in organization capital in the early 
stages of the life cycle enables them to develop the resource base and thus progress 
to the growth and mature stages. Moreover, firms’ organization capital in the decline 
stage helps them revive and come back to favorable life cycle stages in subsequent 
years. My results are consistent with the findings of Lev et al. (2009) that upfront 
investment in organization capital serves as a subsequent source of competitive 
advantage, as evidenced by higher future firm performance in their study. Overall, 
the evidence in my study supports the notion that organization capital (i.e., business 
practices, processes, systems, designs and unique corporate culture) is a decisive 
resource that influences the effectiveness of the firm and progression of a firm’s 
stage in the life cycle. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper 
extends the organization capital literature by directly examining the role of 
organization capital in influencing FLC stages. While prior research investigates the 
association of organization capital with cross sectional stock return (Eisfeldt & 
Papanikolaou, 2013) and future operating and stock return performance (Lev et al., 
2009), little attention has been paid to the role of organization capital in driving FLC 
stages. Even though using a quantitative growth model of the life cycle of plants, 
Atkeson and Kehoe (2005, p. 1027) redefine the concept of  “life cycle” in terms  of 
organization rent which in turn hinges upon organization capital: “young plants tend 
to have low organization rents and older plants higher ones… an older plant has built 
up a type of intangible capital—organization capital—that entitles the owner to high 
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organization rents”, but they do not examine the role of organization capital in 
propelling FLC stages. This paper attempts to bridge that gap in the literature. 
Second, this study contributes to the area of research that stresses the 
importance of organization capital as a major driver of firms’ (and national) growth 
and competitiveness (e.g., Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2014; Lev & Radhakrishnan 
2005; Youndt et al., 2004). Prior theoretical (e.g., Carlin et al., 2012) and empirical 
studies (e.g., Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005; Lev et al., 2009) provide evidence that 
organization capital improves the productivity and efficiency of the firm and thus can 
be an alternative source of value creation. This study extends these prior studies by 
empirically establishing a link between organization capital and transition of the FLC 
stages. I show that organization capital is a source of sustainable competitive 
advantage, which can progressively drive FLC stages in an important way. I 
specifically document that firms’ shifting from the introduction to the growth and 
mature stages and moving back from the decline stage to the growth and mature 
stages depends largely on their organization capital. Thus, organization capital can 
greatly benefit the firm to remain competitive in the success stages (i.e., the growth 
and mature stages). 
Third, given that organization capital represents a source of productivity and 
efficiency (Atkeson & Kehoe, 2005; Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005), it is a key factor 
affecting firms’ long-term success and competitiveness. Examining the link between 
organization capital and FLC, therefore, should help managers understand the effect 
of organization capital on firms’ future growth and potential. Hence, this study has 
an important implication for managerial strategic planning:  organization capital 
could be a channel through which managers can lead the firm to reach and maintain 
growth and mature, the prime stages, in their life cycle. Therefore, findings of the 
study make an important contribution to the understanding of the determinants of 
firms’ survival and competitiveness. 
Finally, this study also contributes to the life cycle literature that focuses on 
the determinants of firms’ position in the life cycle stages. Although research efforts 
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to understand the effect of FLC on financial performance and outcome are numerous, 
little is known as to whether organization capital is a new determinant of FLC stages. 
 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section two reviews 
studies of organization capital and life cycle theory and develops testable hypotheses. 
Section three focuses on research design, data collection and sample selection. 
Section four documents the results of the study, while Section five concludes the 
paper. 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 Organization Capital 
The economics and management literature has long recognized the importance of 
organization capital in improving firm-level (and national-level) efficiency and 
productivity. The early management literature defines organization capital in terms 
of firm-specific management practice such as decentralization (Caroli & Reenen, 
2001), high performance work systems (Bailey, Berg, & Sandy, 2000) and the 
opportunity to communicate with employees outside the work group, while the 
economics literature defines organization capital in terms of information assets 
(Prescott & Visscher, 1980; Squicciarini & Mouel, 2012) and estimates its effect on 
firm performance (e.g., Lev et al., 2009; Miyagawa & Kim, 2008). Furthermore, 
there are two views regarding the existence of organization capital in the firm. One 
school of thought views it as something embodied in an organization’s employees 
and their social networks (Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013; Prescott & Visscher, 
1980). On the contrary, another school of thought considers organization capital 
embodied in the organization itself, since this is rooted in organization practices, 
processes and systems, which do not change even if the employees of the 
organization are replaced (Atkeson & Kehoe, 2005; Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005; 
Lev et al., 2009; Ludewig & Sadowski, 2009; Tomer, 1987).
3
 In this regard, I take 
the second view and define it as sets of standardized practices, processes, designs, 
                                                             
3 See Lev et al. (2009) and Ludewig and Sadowski (2009) for a detailed explanation of how 
organization capital is embodied in the organizational process. 
16 
 
culture and know-how that develop systems of production and effectively and 
efficiently integrate human skills and physical capital to consistently and efficiently 
generate a higher level of returns from a given resource endowment. The models 
developed by Rosen (1972) and Ericson and Pakes (1995) show that organization 
capital is acquired by endogenous learning by doing. Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) also 
follow this theme and consider organization capital to be embodied in the plant. 
Evenson and Westphal (1995, p. 2213) emphasize that “much of the knowledge 
about how to perform elementary processes and about how to combine them in 
efficient systems is tacit … neither codified nor readily transferable”. Moreover, 
motivated by prior studies (e.g., Autor, Kerr, & Kugler, 2007; Bozkaya & Kerr, 
2009) that suggest that employment protection regulations make it expensive to fire 
incumbents and hire new employees, I posit that organization capital is embodied in 
the firm. The study of Carlin et al. (2012) also suggests that firms with more 
organization capital are associated with higher employee retention and more frequent 
insider CEO succession. Prior studies show that investment in organization capital 
enables the firm to achieve higher productivity (Black & Lynch, 2005) and thus 
generate super-normal performance (Evenson & Westphal, 1995; Lev et al., 2009). 
Recent studies in finance and accounting also acknowledge the implication of 
organization capital in the cost of capital (Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013), 
investment cash flow sensitivity (Attig & Cleary, 2014a), corporate social 
responsibility (Attig & Cleary, 2014b) and employee turnover and diversity in skill 
and wages (Carlin et al., 2012). 
  Prior studies clearly differentiate organization capital from other intangibles. 
Blair and Wallman (2000) suggest that intangible assets such as copyrights, brand 
and trade names can be owned and sold, whereas organization capital is non-tradable 
and idiosyncratic (Ludewig & Sadowski, 2009). In a recent study, Attig and Cleary 
(2014a) differentiate organization capital from human capital in that the former (e.g., 
management practices) is more stable and remains within the firm for a relatively 
long period even after management turnover. However, human capital (e.g., 
management style) may change significantly over a relatively short time due to 
management turnover. Economists also argue that organizations store and 
accumulate knowledge and that this accumulated knowledge (i.e., organization 
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capital) is distinct from the concepts of physical or human capital (Atkeson & Kehoe, 
2005). Black and Lynch (2005) divide organization capital into three broad 
components, workforce training, employee voice and work design (including 
production processes). These components together contribute to the overall value of 
organization capital within a firm. 
2.2.2 Organization Capital as a Source of Resource Base 
Prior studies extensively document that organization capital, in the form of superior 
management practice, is associated with more efficient production and stable 
business operation and transactions, which leads to better firm performance (Attig 
and Cleary, 2014a; Fredrickson, 1986; Riley & Vahter, 2013). Attig and Cleary 
(2014a) document that organization capital reduces firms’ investment sensitivity to 
internal cash flow. They also find that superior management practice lead to 
improvement in firm performance, which also alleviates capital market imperfections 
and capital constraints. By using SG&A expenses as a proxy for organization capital, 
Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) show that firms with more organization capital are 
more productive, have higher Tobin’s Q and higher risk-adjusted returns and display 
a higher level of executive compensation. Lev et al. (2009) also find that 
organization capital is positively associated with long-term operating and stock 
performance. 
 Prior studies also document that organization capital is a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage. The study of Lev et al. (2009) suggests that investment in 
unique structural and organization designs and business processes serves as a source 
of sustainable competitive advantage. Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) estimate that the 
payments from organization capital are more than one-third of the payments from 
physical capital. They also document that organization capital represents more than 
40% of the cash flows generated by all intangible assets in the US National Income 
and Product Accounts. Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) state that organization capital 
enables firms to consistently and efficiently generate a higher level of production 
than other firms. Carlin et al. (2012) also admit that organization capital is a 
significant source of firm value. 
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  The management literature also views organization capital as a firm-specific 
resource and important source of competitive advantage to create and maintain a 
revenue stream (Ludewig & Sadowski, 2009; Squicciarini & Mouel, 2012). Teece, 
Pisano, and Shuen (1997) suggest that organization structure and managerial 
processes determine a firm’s ability to react and adapt to ever-changing business 
environments. This RBV stipulates that the fundamental sources and drivers of 
firms’ competitive advantage and superior performance are associated with resources 
that are valuable and scarce (Barney, 1991; Barney, Wright, & Ketchen, 2001). In 
this regard, Barney (1991) also argues that resources that are difficult to imitate and 
substitute provide firms with sustainable competitive advantage. Organization capital 
is valuable because it allows productive interaction between tangible and intangible 
resources for creating economic value and growth (Lev et al., 2009). Organization 
capital (e.g., business processes, practices etc.) is difficult to imitate by competitors 
because of the adjustment cost. Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) and Lev et al. (2009) 
explain how Wal-Mart’s vendor-managed inventory and supply chains and electronic 
data exchange systems help the firm achieve long-lasting competitive advantage, 
which major competitors (such as K-Mart) have been largely unsuccessful in 
replicating. Carlin et al. (2012) also suggest that organization capital is tied to the 
firm and hence employees departing from the firm cannot carry this. They also argue 
that the learning and experience necessary for generating organization capital makes 
the acquisition and replacement of organization capital difficult and time consuming. 
These features also make organization capital a rare resource. 
Thus, the concepts and lessons drawn from the above economics and 
management literature lend support that organization capital comprises knowledge, 
know-how and business practices and processes that empower firms to integrate 
physical and human capital in the most efficient and effective way to generate 
production efficiency and to gain sustainable competitive advantage. Moreover, from 
a strategic point of view, organization capital is valuable, rare and difficult to 
replicate and replace. Therefore, I conclude that organization capital is a valuable 
resource base that allows firms to achieve sustainable competitive advantage. 
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2.2.3 Resource Base as the Foundation of FLC 
The RBV analyzes firms from the resource side rather than from the product side and 
posits that the existence and application of the bundle of valuable, scarce, immobile 
and inimitable resources generate the basis of sustainable competitive advantage for 
a firm (Barney, 1991). Moreover, this resource base is the root of heterogeneity in 
organization capabilities (Wernerfelt, 1984; Rumelt, 1984; Penrose, 1959). Dynamic 
resource-based theory incorporates the founding, development and maturity of 
capabilities and thereby suggests that competitive advantages and disadvantages in 
terms of resources and capabilities evolve over time in important ways (Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2003). This dynamic resource-based theory is mainly based on The Theory 
of the Growth of the Firm (Penrose, 1959), which proposes that the growth of the 
firm depends on the efficient and effective interaction of its resources and 
management. Thus, the evolution of the firm’s competitiveness, in terms of its 
resource base and capabilities, is the foundation of its life cycle. 
The FLC model suggests that firms, like the organic body, tend to progress in 
a linear fashion through predictable stages of development sequentially from birth to 
decline (Gray & Ariss, 1985; Miller & Friesen, 1984, 1980; Quinn & Cameron, 
1983). Strategy and management researchers have adopted the FLC model from 
biological sciences (Van De Ven & Poole, 1995) and have incorporated it into 
business research since the 1960s. Penrose (1959) provides a general theory of firm 
growth, arguing that it depends on the firm’s resources and productive opportunities. 
She identifies managerial limitations as the main constraint to a firm’s growth rate. 
Chandler (1962), one of the pioneers of life cycle theory, argues that organization 
structure follows the growth strategy of the firm to avail itself of external 
opportunities. Subsequent studies in organization science reveal the grounds behind 
the existence of the FLC. For example, the resource-based theory of Wernerfelt 
(1984) suggests that resources are the ultimate source of establishing and maintaining 
competitive advantage. He argues that firms possess resources, a subset of which 
allows them to achieve competitive advantage over others, and a subset of those 
helps them attain superior long-term performance and thus earn above-average 
profits (Grant, 1991). In a more recent study, Helfat and Peteraf (2003) argue that the 
RBV must incorporate the emergence, development and progression of organization 
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resources and capabilities over time and hence they introduce a more comprehensive 
and vibrant view: ‘the dynamic resource-based theory’. This view suggests that the 
resource base that forms the foundation of competitive advantage and disadvantage 
comes about over a period of time and also may shift over time. They document that 
firms’ portfolios of resources and capacities and their characteristics change over 
time and that this variation results in different stages in the FLC. 
There are several multi-stage life cycle models, which differ in terms of the 
number of stages involved and features that correspond to each stage. For example, 
Greiner (1972) proposes that firms move through five stages of the life cycle in their 
movement from growth through creativity: direction, delegation, coordination, 
monitoring and collaboration. Adizes (1979) proposes that firms evolve through 10 
stages in their life cycle ranging from courtship (where the firm exists only as an 
idea) to death. Kazanjian and Drazin (1990) propose four stages in the FLC, which 
are conception and development, commercialization, growth and stability. Gort and 
Klepper (1982) suggest five stages in the FLC, introduction, growth, mature, shake-
out and decline. Summarizing the prior literature on life cycle models, Miller and 
Friesen (1984) propose a similar classification that separates the FLC into five 
common phases: birth, growth, mature, revival and decline. Based on this, Dickinson 
(2011) provides an empirical methodology to classify firms into different life cycles. 
Recent empirical studies in accounting and finance investigate the impact of 
FLC on corporate financial decisions. Bender and Ward (1993) find that the financial 
structure of firms changes over the firms’ life cycles. Berger and Udell (1998) argue 
that small and young firms generally resort to private equity and debt markets, 
whereas larger and mature firms mainly rely on public markets. Richardson (2006) 
suggests that firms are more likely to undertake relatively large, growth-oriented 
investments in the initial stage, while mature stage investments are more likely to be 
geared towards the maintenance of assets in place. Fama and French (2001), Grullon 
et al. (2002) and DeAngelo et al. (2006) find that mature and profitable firms are 
more likely to pay dividends, while young firms with higher growth options are less 
likely to do so. Koh et al. (2015) provide evidence that lifecycle affect firms’ choices 
of distress restructuring strategies. Although a growing number of studies in 
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accounting and finance investigate the role of FLC in affecting investment, financing 
and dividend decisions, no study to date has examined how FLC is influenced by 
firm’s organization capital, a source of a sustainable resource base. 
2.2.4 Organization Capital as a Determinant of FLC 
The discussion in previous sections reveals that organization capital in terms of 
organization structure, culture and management processes and practices harmonizes 
physical and human capital to improve production efficiency and enhance a firm’s 
ability to react and adapt to ever-changing business environments. Squicciarini and 
Mouel (2012) suggest that superior management qualities and flexible organization 
structures enrich a firm’s capabilities to configure its production to enter new 
markets and upgrade its activity in global value chains, which ensure the growth and 
long-term survival of the firm. Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) in this regard also 
suggest that organization capital determines the value and growth of enterprises and 
captures a firm’s ability to maintain its leadership position. Thus, given that 
organization capital is a valuable resource base and source of sustainable competitive 
advantage and that FLC is driven by the accumulation of firm-specific resources, I 
posit that the accumulation of firm-specific knowledge, practices, processes and 
overall systems is the driving force that can explain firm progression across life cycle 
stages. 
Dickinson (2011) develops a parsimonious firm-specific life cycle measure 
by deploying data from the firm’s cash flow statement. She argues that cash flows 
capture differences in a firm’s profitability, growth and risk and hence one may use 
cash flow from operating (OANCF), investing (IVNCF) and financing (FINCF) to 
group firms into life cycle stages such as ‘introduction’, ‘growth’, ‘mature’, ‘shake-
out’ and ‘decline’.
4
 The methodology is based on the following cash flow pattern 
classification: 
(1) introduction: if OANCF < 0, IVNCF < 0 and FINCF ˃ 0;  
(2) growth: if OANCF ˃ 0, IVNCF < 0 and FINCF ˃ 0;  
                                                             
4 For a detailed justification of classifying firms into different life cycle stages based on cash flow 
statement data, please refer to Dickinson (2011). 
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(3) mature: if OANCF ˃ 0, IVNCF < 0 and FINCF < 0;  
(4) decline: if OANCF < 0, IVNCF ˃ 0 and FINCF ≤ or ≥ 0; and  
(5) shake-out: the remaining firm years will be classified under the shake-out stage. 
Firms in the introduction stage of the life cycle lack an established customer 
base and suffer from knowledge deficits about potential revenues, costs, and industry 
dynamics (Jovanovic, 1982). Managerial optimism in this stage prompts firms to 
invest more to develop a sustainable resource base to deter potential entrants 
(Spence, 1977, 1979, 1981). As a result, firms in the introduction stage incur 
substantial cost in developing organization processes, systems, structures, capacities 
and qualities and employee skills and in adapting themselves to the competitive 
environment (Pérez, Llopis, & Llopis, 2004; Tomer, 2012). Atkeson and Kehoe 
(2005) suggest that owners incur substantial expenditure in organization capital in 
the initial stage of a plant’s life cycle to reap organization rents in the future. Thus, 
the lack of established customers and knowledge base and substantial cost incurred 
for organization capital result in negative operating cash flows (i.e., OANCF<0) for 
introduction-stage firms. Introduction-stage firms also need to decide on financing 
organization capital and the other costs of operation. Prior studies (e.g., Barclay & 
Smith, 2005) show that introduction firms resort to debt financing to avail tax benefit 
(i.e., deductibility of interest expenses), which leads cash flow from financing to be 
positive (i.e., FINCF>0). However, introduction firms must also decide on the 
allocation of resources. In this line, (Tomer, 1987, p. 24) notes that “investment in 
organization capital uses up resources in order to bring about long lasting 
improvement in productivity, worker well-being, or social performance through 
changes in the functioning of the organization”. Owing to resource constraints, firms 
in this stage may need to substitute alternative forms of productive resources with 
organization capital (Carlin et al., 2012). Thus, I expect that firms with a higher 
organization capital (compared with investment in tangible assets) in the introduction 
stage of the life cycle are likely to gain sustainable competitive advantage, to capture 
larger market shares, and to generate profit in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the 
formulation of profit-oriented and sustainable direction (i.e., the optimal combination 
of investment in physical assets and organization capital) resulting from managerial 
optimism in the introduction stage causes cash flow from investment to be negative 
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(i.e., IVNCF<0). The cash flow pattern (OANCF<0, IVNCF<0 and FINCF>0) with 
more organization capital makes these firms a suitable candidate to be in the 
introduction stage. 




 Firms in the growth stage of the life cycle are characterized by dramatic 
increase in sales and in the number of products, while firms in the mature stage are 
characterized by sales stabilization and acute market competition. Growth (mature) 
firms have already overcome the ‘liability of newness’ and initial exit probabilities 
and therefore, these firms have modest (adequate) knowledge regarding the 
competitiveness and these firms focus more on product modification and 
improvement (product differentiation) (Hay & Ginter, 1979; Wind, 1981). 
Organizational efficiency and effectiveness, derived from the accumulated 
organization capital in introduction stage of life cycle, help growth and mature firms 
to achieve productivity, growth, and competitiveness. Since organization capital, in 
the course of  accumulation, store, retain, integrate and institutionalize knowledge 
regarding business process, practice and system within databases, documents, patents 
and manuals (Wright, Dunford, & Snell, 2001; Youndt et al., 2004), it becomes a 
critical component that guide firms’ future actions (Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000). 
Therefore, firm’s ability to exploit advantages from the available stock of 
organization capital critically determines its performance, which in turn influences 
life cycle stage transition. Moreover, the initial cost incurred in the introduction stage 
of the life cycle for developing organization capital is not re-incurred in the growth 
and mature stages, as management processes, practices and know-how are reused in 
business operations (OECD, 2012). Cohen and Levinthal (1990, p. 131) note that, 
“the ability to assimilate information is a function of the richness of the pre-existing 
knowledge structure: learning is cumulative, and learning performance is greatest 
when the object of learning is related to what is already known”. Miyagawa and Kim 
                                                             
5 As Dickinson (2011) remarks, the literature clearly spells out cash flow pattern of the different 
stages of the life cycle except for the shake-out stage. As a result, the impact of organization capital in 
shaping this stage is unclear. Thus, I use the shake-out stage as a basis in developing hypotheses and 
in interpreting the impact of organization capital in determining the other stages of the life cycle. 
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(2008) document that, “the conventional total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate 
decreases when investment in organization capital increases rapidly. After 
organization capital is sufficiently accumulated, it starts to contribute to conventional 
TFP growth”. This implies that organization capital development entails time, 
commitment, and financial resources, which does not yield benefit instantly, rather 
require time to generate the expected pay-off. Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) suggest 
that firms in the growth and mature stages concentrate to reap the benefits from the 
existing stock of organization structure, processes, practices and corporate culture. 
Therefore, increased efficiency in production and sales resulting from the existing 
organization capital, but reduced cost incurred for organization capital, leads growth- 
and mature-stage firms to generate positive operating cash flow (i.e., OANCF>0). 
Growth-oriented firms attempt to expand operation to capitalize on the 
benefits from existing resources (e.g., business practices, processes, designs, culture, 
know-how etc.). Wernerfelt (1985) shows that in the presence of learning curves, 
declining price sensitivity, and declining growth rates, growth maximization early in 
the life cycle can be a means of profit maximization. In achieving this objective, 
firms in the growth stage focus more on investment in physical assets and in the 
efficient use of capabilities and resources-base (Hambrick, MacMillan, & Day, 
1982). In the mature stage, firms also continue to invest in physical assets as some of 
these assets become obsolete (Wernerfelt, 1985). Thus, for both growth- and mature-
stage firms, investing cash flow is expected to be negative (i.e., IVNCF<0).  
Growth firms continue to resort to debt financing for capital investment, and 
further growth and development, resulting in positive financing cash flow (i.e., 
FINCF>0). On the contrary, limited growth opportunity in mature-stage prompts 
firms to focus on debt servicing and distribution of excess funds among shareholders 
(i.e., FINCF<0). In sum, I expect that higher level of organization capital in 
introduction stage of life cycle prompt firms to capitalize productivity and efficiency 
from the available stock of organization capital and to progressively move to growth 
and mature stage. In pursuing this objective, firms in the growth and mature stages of 
the life cycle do not invest more in organization capital further; rather, they tend to 
invest more in tangible assets, and maximize the benefits from existing organization 
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capital. Therefore, the resulting cash flow patterns ((OANCF>0, IVNCF<0 and 
FINCF>0) and (OANCF>0, IVNCF<0 and FINCF<0)) are likely to be associated 
with firms with less organization capital, making these firms suitable candidates to 
be in the growth and mature stages, respectively. 
H2: Firms with less organization capital are more likely to be in the growth and 
mature stages. 
 
Firms in the decline stage are characterized by very low or negative profit 
margins, low levels of efficiency and low capacity utilization (Dickinson, 2011). In 
this stage, other firms begin to adopt and improve upon the innovating entrepreneur’s 
new idea and hence firms’ competitive advantage in terms of resource base and 
organization capital begins to decline (Mueller, 1972). Tomer (1990), in this vein, 
notes that, “organization capital is subject to depreciation, obsolescence, inefficient 
utilization and disuse.” If firms cannot match their innovation and business process, 
practice and culture with that of competitors, functioning of the firms become 
irrelevant to the innovative activities of the other firms in the market. Therefore, the 
‘liability of senescence’ phenomenon also suggests that decline firms face a 
relatively high likelihood of exiting the market due to their internal inefficiencies, 
erosion of technology, products, business concepts and management strategies over 
time. To overcome this limitation and boost their market share, firms in the decline 
stage are likely to concentrate in business process analysis, employee retraining and 
new work procedures that constitute organization capital. The study of Dickinson 
(2011) also depicts that decline-stage firms may increase their R&D as a turnaround 
attempt. Sørensen and Stuart (2000) also argue that, “older firms may innovate more 
frequently, and their innovations may have greater significance than those of younger 
enterprises.” Thus, poor sales performance, together with an increase emphasis to 
reformulate organization capital, results in negative operating cash flow (i.e., 
OANCF<0). On the other hand, the liquidation of assets to serve debt and support 
operations results in positive cash flow from investment (i.e., IVNCF>0).
6
 Moreover, 
decline firms may focus on debt repayment and/or the renegotiation of debt to 
                                                             
6 It is worth noting that investment in organization capital, in an accounting sense, only results in an 
increase in expenses (especially SG&A) but not an increase in assets. 
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finance investment in organization capital and to meet other costs, leading cash flow 
from financing activities to be positive or negative (FINCF≥0 or FINCF≤0). In sum, 
outdated business practice, process and culture may motivate decline stage firms to 
reinforce the lost efficiency and productivity to get back to favorable life cycle stage, 
causing stock of organization capital to increase further. This leads firms with higher 
stock of organization capital more likely to be in decline stage. 
Other studies, however, show that firms can enter the decline stage from any 
other stages. The ‘liability of newness’ phenomenon (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; 
Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983; Jovanovic, 1982; Stinchcombe, 1965) suggests 
that initial endowments (monetary resources, technological or managerial capability, 
etc.) interact with mortality rates. Thus, young and growth-stage firms that succumb 
to initially high mortality rates may switch from the growth stage to the decline 
stage. Firms in this stage prefer to distribute the earnings among investors rather than 
investing in future growth (DeAngelo et al., 2006). Thus, lower level of organization 
capital firms are likely to be in decline stage. 
  Thus, lacking a clear theoretical guidance on the association between 
organization capital and decline-stage firms, I formulate the following two 
competing hypotheses: 
 H3a: There is a positive association between organization capital and the decline 
stage of firm life cycle. 
H3b: There is a negative association between organization capital and the decline 
stage of firm life cycle. 
2.3 Research Design 
2.3.1 Sample and Data 
The sample of this study includes all non-financial (excluding SIC 6000–6799) firms 
traded on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ (EXCHG =11, 12 and 14) that are available 
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from the Compustat fundamentals annual file from 1987 to 2013 and that have the 
required financial information. The sample period begins in 1987 because prior to 
that year cash flow data required to estimate the life cycle are unavailable.
7
 To avoid 





percentiles. I also exclude observations with missing values in the measurement of 
key dependent variables (i.e., life cycle proxies), independent variable and control 
variables. Table 2.1 presents the sample selection (Panel A) and industry distribution 
of the sample (Panel B). Variable definitions are presented in appendix 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Sample Selection and Distribution of the Sample 
  





Data available in Compustat fundamentals annual file from 1987 to 2013  299,612 
Less: 
 Financial firms (75,908) 
  223,704 
Firms listed outside NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ  (105,225) 
  118,479 
Firms for which financial data are not available in USD      (3139) 
  115,340 
Firms with missing values for the variables used in the regression model (47,292) 
Final sample (firm years) 68,048 
 
 Table 2.1, Panel B reports the composition of the sample by the 12 
industry groups. The sample is unevenly distributed across industries (with the 




                                                             
7 Since 1987, firms have been required to disclose cash flow data under the Statement of Financial 




Panel B: Industry Distribution 
Industry Name 




Consumer nondurables  4,740  6.79% 
Consumer durables  2,019   2.97% 
Manufacturing   9,896 14.54% 
Oil, gas and coal extraction and products   4,257   6.26% 
Chemicals and allied products   2,403   3.53% 
Business equipment 17,181 25.25% 
Telephone and television transmission   2,279   3.35% 
Utilities      246   0.36% 
Wholesale, retail and some services   8,733 12.83% 
Healthcare, medical equipment and drugs   7,001 10.29% 
Other   9,293 13.66% 
Total 68,048 100.00% 
 
2.3.2 Empirical Model 
I test the relation between organization capital and FLC with multinomial logistic 
regression model. Multinomial logistic regression is suitable because the dependent 
variable (i.e., firm life cycle) is a categorical variable which contains a set of 
mutually exclusive and unordered categories. Suppose that my data comprises a set 
of n (i = 1,..., n) independent firms where the i
th
 firm consists of Ti observations. Let 
Yit denote the t
th
 life cycle stage in firm i (t = 1, ..., Ti), where this life cycle stage is 
from one of r (r = 1, ..., R) distinct categories. Further, xit denotes a column vector of 
p independent variables for the t
th
 observation in the i
th
 firm. 





) = 𝛼𝑟 +  𝑥𝑖𝑡
′




where 𝜋𝑖𝑡𝑟 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖𝑡= r) are the probability of firm i in the r
th
 stage of firm life cycle 
in year t, 𝛼𝑟  are constant terms,  𝛽𝑟 is a p-vector of regression coefficients that 
capture the impact of regressors xij, and 𝑢𝑖𝑟 is the error term that follows a 
multivariate normal distribution with zero mean and variance-covariance matrix . 
Two groups of regressors are included in xij; they are the main variable of interest 
(𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡) and a set of control variables that are known to be determinants of firm life 
cycle. These control variables include firm size (SIZE), market to book value (MTB) 
ratio, capital structure (LEV), firm profitability (ROE), sales growth (∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡), 
capital expenditure (CAPEX), firm age (AGE), asset turnover (ATO), and 
investment in advertising (ADVERT) and R&D (R&D).
8
 I predict the coefficient of  
𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡 to be positive for H1 but negative for H2. 
The likelihood function of firm i is, 














where I(.) is an indicator function and 𝑓𝑢(𝑢𝑖,) is the multivariate normal density. 
The overall likelihood function is the product of the above likelihood function from 
each firm and cannot be solved in closed form. As a result, maximum likelihood 
estimation of the parameters is done via numerical integration. 
To identify the parameters (namely, 𝛼𝑟, 𝛽𝑟, and ), I impose a normalization 
by restricting 𝛼4= 0,  𝛽4= 0, and 𝑢𝑖4 = 0, so that interpretation of parameters is with 
reference to the fourth category (i.e., shake-out stage). The shake-out stage is chosen 
because its role in the life cycle is ambiguous in theory (Dickinson, 2011). Thus, the 
shake-out stage is used as the base of the comparison and interpretation of results in 
the multinomial logistic regression model. 
Note that because of the normalization, the parameters so estimated are 
generally not directly interpretable. For example, a negative coefficient on xit does 
                                                             
8 See Section 2.3.5 for a discussion of why these control variables are relevant. 
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not imply that a decrease in xit reduces the probability that firm i is in a particular 
firm life cycle stage. Instead, marginal effect (ME) can be computed for firm i for the 
r
th




       (2.3) 
 
Since there are five stages with Dickinson (2011)'s firm cycle measure, five 
corresponding marginal effects can be computed. These marginal effects capture, as 
their definition implies, the extent to which a one-unit change in regressor k 
increases or decreases the probability of firm i being in the r
th
 stage of firm life cycle. 
2.3.3 Dependent Variables: FLC Proxies 
Assessing the life cycle stage at the firm level is difficult because the individual firm 
is composed of many overlapping, but distinct, product life cycle stages. Moreover, 
firms can compete in multiple industries and their product offerings are fairly diverse 
(Dickinson, 2011). To overcome this estimation problem, I follow the methodology 
of Dickinson (2011) to develop proxies for the firms’ stage in the life cycle.
9
 The 
identification of life cycle stages based on Dickinson (2011) combines the 
implications from diverse research areas such as production behavior, 
learning/experience, investment, market share and entry/exit patterns. As a result, 
this process can capture the performance and allocation of the resources of the firm. I 
classify all sample firms into different FLCs based on the following cash flow pattern 
classification: 
(1) introduction: if OANCF < 0, IVNCF < 0 and FINCF ˃ 0;  
(2) growth: if OANCF ˃ 0, IVNCF < 0 and FINCF ˃ 0;  
(3) mature: if OANCF ˃ 0, IVNCF < 0 and FINCF < 0;  
                                                             
9 Anthony and Ramesh (1992) provide one of the first empirical procedures for classifying firms into 
different life cycle stages. However, I do not use their method for two reasons: (1) this classification 
procedure is ‘ad hoc’ and relies on portfolio sorts to classify the firm into different life cycle stages 
and (2) Dickinson (2011) shows that life cycle classification based on Anthony and Ramesh’s (1992) 
procedure leads to an erroneous classification of the stage of firms in the life cycle. 
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(4) decline: if OANCF < 0, IVNCF ˃ 0 and FINCF ≤ or ≥ 0; and  
(5) shake-out: the remaining firm years will be classified under the shake-out stage.  
 I also use DeAngelo et al. (2006)’s life cycle proxies as alternative measures 
in the robustness section of the study. 
2.3.4 Independent Variable: Estimation of Organization Capital 
Organization capital is inherent in firms’ underlying business practices, processes, 
and organization systems. Moreover, investment in organization capital is neither 
fully tracked nor publicly disclosed by the firm. Thus, the implicit and distinctive 
characteristics of organization capital make its estimation difficult at the firm level 
(Lev et al., 2009). 
In this study, I follow the methodology of Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) 
to estimate firm-level organization capital based on SG&A expenses. Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou (2013, p. 1380) argue that “a large part of SG&A consists of expenses 
related to labor and IT (white collar wages, training, consulting, and IT expenses), 
consistent with the idea that any accrued value will be somewhat firm specific…” 
Lev et al. (2009) also argue that SG&A expenses include costs relating to developing 
information systems, employee training, R&D, consultant fees and brand promotion, 
which aid in building organization capital. 
I construct organization capital based on the perpetual inventory method.
10
 
More specifically, I calculate the stock of organization capital (OC) each year by 
accumulating the deflated value of SG&A expenses based on the following equation: 
𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1(1 − 𝛿0) +  
𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡
      (2.4) 
                                                             
10 Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) use a similar process to construct the stock of organization 
capital. Moreover, Zhang et al. (2012) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis use a similar 
methodology to construct R&D stock. 
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where 𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡 (and 𝛿0) denote the firm-specific stock of organization capital at time t 
(and depreciation rate of OC), while SGA and 𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 are SG&A expenses and the 
consumer price index, respectively. 




,        (2.5) 
where 𝑡0 = initial year for the firm in the sample. Following Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou (2013), I use a depreciation rate (𝛿0) of 15% in the estimation of the 
stock of organization capital. Hall and Mairesse (1995), Zhang et al. (2012) and the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis  also use this rate in the estimation of R&D capital. 
Growth (𝑔) in the flow of organization capital is estimated as the average real growth 
of firm-level SG&A expenses, which is 10.31% in my estimates. I replace any 
missing values of SG&A with zero. 
In the sensitivity analysis, I also use Lev et al. (2009)’s approach to check the 
robustness of the result. For details, see Section 2.4.5.3. 
2.3.5 Control Variables 
Prior studies suggest that firms in any stage of the life cycle are impacted by internal 
factors (e.g., firms’ financial resources, performance and growth) and the external 
environment (e.g., industry competitiveness and economic factors). Hence, the above 
regression model incorporates a number of control variables that are likely to affect 
FLC stages. Firm size is one of the important determinants of firms’ life cycle stages. 
Prior studies (e.g., Geroski, 1995; Mata & Portugal, 1994; Pérez et al., 2004) suggest 
that large firms enjoy better access to capital and labor markets, which in turn 
improves the possibility of firms’ survival and growth. On the contrary, small firms 
suffer from the liability of newness and liability of smallness, which increase their 
exit probability (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Pérez et al., 2004). Hence, I control for 
firm size (SIZE) in the regression model. FLC stages depend on the growth and 
progress of the firm. Growth opportunities are plenteous in the introduction and 
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growth stages, while limited in the mature and decline stages (Dickinson, 2011). I 
control for firm growth by using the market to book value (MTB) ratio. The 
availability of capital at favorable terms and rates also affects a firm’s ability to grow 
and expand its operations. Prior studies show that the debt capacity of growth firms 
is higher compared with firms in other stages (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Myers, 
1984). Therefore, I control for a firm’s capital structure (LEV). Profitability is 
frequently used in the business strategy and management accounting literatures in the 
context of life cycle analysis (Anthony & Ramesh, 1992). Profitability in the 
marketplace encourages new entrants in the market. When competition develops and 
other firms adopt and/or improve the innovating entrepreneur’s new idea to gain 
more market control, profit opportunities begin to decline (Mueller, 1972). Since 
profitability conveys an important signal about a firm’s position in the life cycle, I 
control for firm profitability (ROE). Anthony and Ramesh (1992) argue that a firm 
maximizes revenue growth in the early stages of its life cycle to create permanent 
cost or demand advantages over competitors. They also note that in the mature stage 
market growth slows and investments are less rewarding. By taking these views into 
account, I also control for a firm’s sales growth (∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡). 
Anthony and Ramesh (1992) also suggest that capital expenditure can signal 
the strategic emphasis of the firm and explain its position in the life cycle; hence, 
they use this as one of the components in estimating FLC stages. By taking their 
view into consideration, I also control for capital expenditure (CAPEX). Prior studies 
provide inconclusive evidence regarding a firm’s age on survival possibility. Pérez et 
al. (2004) suggest that both younger and older firms face a higher hazard of exit. 
Anthony and Ramesh (1992) use age as one of the components to assess a firm’s life 
cycle stage. Dickinson (2011) documents that a firm’s age is usually at its maximum 
in the mature stage and at its minimum in the introduction and decline stages. 
Therefore, I control for firm age (AGE) in the regression model. I measure firm age 
as the log of the number of years since the firm’s first appearance in the CRSP 
database. Asset turnover (ATO) reflects firms’ capacity utilization, which forms a 
basis of competitive advantage and thus influences firms’ stage in the life cycle. The 
study of Selling and Stickney (1989) suggests that product-differentiating firms 
concentrate on R&D, advertising and capacity growth, all of which are function of 
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business strategy and competitiveness. Investment in R&D and advertising helps 
firms in achieving and retaining market share. Dickinson (2011) also finds that 
advertising intensity and R&D are higher in early-stage firms as they build their 
initial technology. The RBV of the firm (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) also posits 
that a firm’s survival greatly depends on its ability to develop specific capabilities, 
which in turn may be improved by investing in R&D. Kimura and Fujii (2003) and 
Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) find that innovative firms and firms that invest 
more in R&D activities enjoy better survival prospects. To control for these 
determinants, I explicitly use a firm’s investment in advertising (ADVERT) and 
R&D (R&D).
11
 Firms belonging to different industries may experience different 
growth and development, which affect their life cycle transition processes. Hence, to 
take into account these industrial differences, I control for industry effect. I also 
control for year effect to address the concern that firms’ life cycles may be adversely 
(favorably) affected by economic recession (expansion). 
2.4. Results and Analysis 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the recession 
estimates. Panel A reports the pooled and life cycle-wise descriptive statistics for the 
dependent, independent and control variables, Panel B presents the Pearson 
correlations and Panel C shows how organization capital changes as the firm moves 
from one stage to another. Panel A shows that the mean (median) value of 
organization capital as a proportion of total assets (i.e., OC/TA) and that of 
organization capital as a proportion of property, plant and equipment (i.e., OC/PPE) 
are 1.1776 (1.299) and 19.024 (7.087), respectively. Panel A also reveals that, on 
average, OC/TA and OC/PPE are higher in the introduction, shake-out and decline 
stages compared with that in the growth and mature stages. Consistent with the data 
                                                             
11 In the regression model, I do not explicitly control for intangibles as the MTB variable is highly 
correlated with intangibles (ρ = 0.77). Brynjolfsson et al. (2002) and Edmans (2011) note that the 
market value of a firm may differ markedly from the value of its tangible assets alone, as investors 
attempt to incorporate intangible assets into their valuations of firms. In other words, MTB 
incorporates not only anticipated growth opportunities but also intangible assets. 
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of Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), my statistics also reveal that high OC/TA and 
OC/PPE firms tend to have higher  intangible capital of other forms (such as 
ADVERT and R&D). The mean values of MTB, AGE, ROE, SIZE, ADVERT and 
R&D across the life cycle stages are also largely consistent with those of Dickinson 
(2011). For example, similar to the findings of Dickinson (2011), Panel A shows that 
mean MTB (AGE) is at its highest (3.664 and 20.339, respectively) in the 
introduction (mature) stage, while it is at its lowest (2.408 and 10.414, respectively) 
in the shake-out (introduction) stage. The life cycle-wise sample distribution shows 
that around 75% of the firms fall into the growth and mature stages. Further analysis 
reveals that SIZE, ROE and AGE progressively increase as firms move from the 
introduction to the mature stage and that these estimates then drop as firms move 
from the mature to the decline stage; the opposite pattern is observed for R&D and 
ADVERT. The estimates in Panel A of Table 2.2 are also consistent with life cycle 
theory and the pattern of statistics across the life cycle is in line with Dickinson 











Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics 
   
Panel A: Pooled and Life Cycle-wise Descriptive Statistics 




OC/TA Mean 1.776 2.409 1.492 1.696 1.984 2.607 
Median 1.299 1.682 1.094 1.306 1.381 1.826 
Std. Dev. 1.805 2.387 1.540 1.580 2.077 2.526 
OC/PPE Mean 19.024 32.532 14.840 13.896 29.061 43.633 
Median 7.087 14.234 5.466 6.126  11.108 19.026 
Std. Dev. 38.790 54.077 30.860 27.472 53.932 66.922 
SIZE Mean 5.648 4.535 5.855 6.102 5.239 4.564 
Median 5.528 4.433 5.856 6.107 5.142 4.543 
Std. Dev. 2.104 1.669 1.899 2.214 2.134 1.613 
MTB Mean 2.919 3.664 3.125 2.712 2.408 2.850 
Median 2.007 2.181 2.217 1.927 1.620 1.718 
Std. Dev. 3.943 5.576 3.730 3.577 3.615 4.512 
LEV  Mean 0.246 0.306 0.317 0.208 0.164 0.153 
Median 0.188 0.227 0.265 0.174 0.078 0.045 
Std. Dev. 0.270 0.335 0.318 0.203 0.218 0.236 
ROE Mean 0.110 -0.219 0.171 0.203 0.047 -0.280 
Median 0.145 -0.098 0.174 0.188 0.068 -0.205 
Std. Dev. 0.693 1.122 0.528 0.581 0.682 0.980 
ΔSALE  Mean 0.179 0.364 0.277 0.092 0.069 0.134 
Median 0.092 0.149 0.169 0.065 0.020 0.004 
Std. Dev. 0.495 0.865 0.502 0.264 0.455 0.738 
CAPEX Mean 0.074 0.077 0.113 0.059 0.036 0.033 
Median 0.046 0.041 0.070 0.044 0.024 0.021 
Std. Dev. 0.093 0.108 0.127 0.055 0.042 0.043 
AGE Mean 16.736 10.414 14.418 20.339 17.615 11.556 
Median 11.745 6.837 9.795 15.751 12.679 7.748 
Std. Dev. 15.827 10.850 14.294 17.236 16.076 11.868 
ATO Mean 1.326 1.412 1.171 1.380 1.079 0.846 
Median 1.127 1.132 1.223 1.194 0.898 0.667 
Std. Dev. 0.928 1.149 0.942 0.876 0.812 0.736 
ADVERT Mean 0.014 0.022 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.020 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Std. Dev. 0.044 0.076 0.038 0.034 0.042 0.070 
R&D Mean 0.262 0.584 0.257 0.116 0.326 0.781 
Median 0.004 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.301 
Std. Dev. 0.868 1.588 0.726 0.359 0.951 1.751 
  N 68,048 7,020 21,708 29,431 6,587 3,302 
  
% of total 
N 
 100% 10.32% 31.90% 43.25% 9.68% 4.85% 
 
Notes: Variable definitions are provided in appendix 2.1. 
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Table 2.2, Panel B reveals that organization capital and most of the control 
variables are highly correlated with the life cycle proxies. As expected, organization 
capital (OC/TA and OC/PPE) is positively correlated (at p<0.001) with the 
introduction, shake-out and decline stages, while significantly negatively correlated 
(at p<0.001) with the growth and mature stages. Moreover, SIZE and ROE are 
negatively (positively) correlated (p<.001) with the introduction, shake-out and 
decline (growth and mature) stages, while ΔSALE is positively (negatively) 
correlated (p<.001) with the introduction and growth (mature, shake-out and decline) 
stages. Overall, the correlations among organization capital (OC/TA and OC/PPE), 
the life cycle proxies, and the control variables are all in the expected direction and 
thus provide strong support for the validity of the key measures and constructs. 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
  Variables Introduction Growth Mature Shake-Out Decline RE/TA RE/TE 
OC/TA 0.118 -0.108 -0.039 0.038 0.104 -0.391 -0.175 
OC/PPE 0.118 -0.074 -0.116 0.085 0.143 -0.386 -0.194 
SIZE -0.188 0.049 0.166 -0.072 -0.122 0.233 0.152 
MTB 0.064 0.036 -0.046 -0.042 -0.004 -0.084 -0.371 
LEV 0.076 0.181 -0.124 -0.099 -0.078 -0.055 0.033 
ROE -0.161 0.056 0.118 -0.029 -0.127 0.221 0.399 
ΔSALE  0.127 0.135 -0.153 -0.073 -0.021 -0.085 -0.042 
CAPEX 0.009 0.282 -0.146 -0.135 -0.100 0.045 0.035 
AGE  -0.140 -0.100 0.199 0.018 -0.074 0.157 0.121 
ATO 0.032 0.034 0.051 -0.087 -0.117 0.078 0.063 
ADVERT 0.064 -0.031 -0.021 -0.004 0.030 -0.039 -0.012 
R&D 0.126 -0.004 -0.147 0.024 0.135 -0.245 -0.102 
 
Notes: All numbers except those in italics are significant at p<.001 
Variable definitions are provided in appendix 2.1. 
 Panel C of Table 2.2 explains how the changes in the organization capital 
determine the transition of FLC across different stages. The bold numbers refer to the 
OC/TA and OC/PPE of firms in the current stage of the life cycle. The figures in 
Table 2.2, Panel C depict that introduction and decline stage firms with significantly 
lower OC/TA and OC/PPE tend to move to growth or mature stages. On the other 
hand, growth or mature stage firms that move to introduction, shake-out or decline 
stages are associated with significantly higher (p<.001) OC/TA and OC/PPE. 
Finally, shake-out firms with significantly more (less) OC/TA and OC/PPE tend to 
move to introduction or decline (growth or mature) stage. Overall, these results 
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suggest that as investment in organization capital increases (decreases), the firm 
move to the introduction, shake-out and decline (growth and mature) stages. 
Panel C: Organization Capital and Transition in FLC 
Existing Stage Transition OC/TA t (p value) OC/PPE t (p value) 
  Introduction 2.409 - 32.532 - 
 
Growth 2.107 4.841 (0.000) 25.799 4.809 (0.000) 
Introduction Mature 2.117 4.693 (0.000) 22.737 7.793 (0.000) 
 
Shake-out 2.339 0.699 (0.484) 34.668 -0.859 (0.390) 
 
Decline 2.559  -1.617 (0.106) 40.217 -3.404 (0.001) 
 
Introduction 1.999 -9.149 (0.000) 23.489 -7.334 (0.000) 
 
Growth 1.492 - 14.840 - 
Growth Mature 1.493 -0.041 (0.967) 12.371 6.568 (0.000) 
 
Shake-out 1.637 -3.278 (0.001) 21.437 -6.660 (0.000) 
 
Decline 2.094 -5.539 (0.000) 31.738 -6.380 (0.000) 
 
Introduction 2.116 -6.907 (0.000) 23.105 -7.524 (0.000) 
 
Growth 1.536 7.653 (0.000) 11.598 6.880 (0.000) 
Mature Mature 1.696 - 13.896 - 
 
Shake-out 1.831 -3.533 (0.000) 21.410 -8.424 (0.000) 
 
Decline 2.186 -4.879 (0.000) 27.438 -5.898 (0.000) 
 
Introduction 2.468 -4.310 (0.000) 37.894 -3.259 (0.001) 
 
Growth 1.747 4.259 (0.000) 24.847   2.969  (0.003) 
Shake-out Mature 1.820 3.671 (0.000) 20.861 7.876 (0.000) 
 
Shake-out 1.984 - 29.061 - 
 
Decline 2.205 -1.999 (0.046) 38.448 -2.989 (0.003) 
 
Introduction 2.763 -1.476 (0.140) 44.591 -0.345 (0.730) 
 
Growth 2.345 2.194 (0.028) 33.342 3.569 (0.000) 
Decline Mature 2.333 2.187 (0.0292) 30.642 4.315 (0.000) 
 
Shake-out 2.550 0.442 (0.658) 40.959 0.803 (0.422) 
 
Decline 2.607 - 43.633 - 
 
2.4.2 Univariate t-test 
Table 2.3 reports the mean OC/TA and OC/PPE for different stages of the life cycle. 
This table shows that the mean OC/TA and OC/PPE for each stage significantly 
differs from that of the other stages based on the t-test. The average OC/TA and 
OC/PPE decrease significantly (at p<0.001) from the introduction to the growth 
stage, from the growth to the mature stage,
12
 from the introduction to the mature 
stage and from the introduction to the shake-out stage of the FLC. However, the 
mean OC/TA and OC/PPE increase significantly (at p<0.001) from the mature to the 
                                                             
12 However, OC/TA increases from the growth to the mature stage. 
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shake-out stage, from the shake-out to the decline stage, from the introduction to the 
decline stage, from the growth to the shake-out stage and finally from the growth to 
the decline stage. Overall, the fluctuations in OC/TA and OC/PPE imply that 
organization capital is higher in the introduction, shake-out and decline stages but 
lower in the growth and mature stages, resembling a ‘U’ shaped pattern. This 
supports the theoretical argument that introduction- (shake-out- and decline-) stage 
firms with more organization capital can generate (reinforce) the capacity to move to 
the growth and mature stages of the life cycle. 
 Table 2.3: Mean Difference Test of Organization Capital  
Mean Difference Test of Organization Capital Using Dickinson (2011)’s Life Cycle 
Measure 
Estimates  (Stage 1) (Stage 2) 
t statistics for 
differences 
p-values 
 Introduction Growth   
OC/TA 2.409 1.492 -30.217 0.000 
OC/PPE 32.532 14.840 -26.048 0.000 
 Growth Mature   
OC/TA 1.492 1.696 14.591 0.000 
OC/PPE 14.840 13.896 -3.576 0.000 
 Mature Shake-out   
OC/TA 1.696 1.984 10.606 0.000 
OC/PPE 13.896 29.061 22.159 0.000 
 Shake-out Decline   
OC/TA 1.984 2.607 12.248 0.000 
OC/PPE 29.061 43.633 10.857 0.000 
 Introduction Mature   
OC/TA 2.409 1.696 -23.835 0.000 
OC/PPE 32.532 13.896 -27.996 0.000 
 Introduction Shake-out   
OC/TA 2.409 1.984 -11.099 0.000 
OC/PPE 32.532 29.061 -3.743 0.000 
 Introduction Decline   
OC/TA 2.409 2.607   3.779 0.000 
OC/PPE 32.532 43.633 8.329 0.000 
 Growth Shake-out   
OC/TA 1.492 1.984 17.790 0.000 
OC/PPE 14.840 29.061 20.388 0.000 
 Growth Decline   
OC/TA 1.492 2.607 24.673 0.000 




2.4.3 Regression Analysis 
Panel A and Panel B (Panel C) of Table 2.4 show the multinomial logistic regression 
results (marginal effect results) for organization capital (OC/TA and OC/PPE) and 
Dickinson (2011)’s life cycle proxies with clustered standard errors at the firm level. 
As there are five life cycle stages with the dependent variable and I am interested in 
finding out the likelihood of observing a firm in a particular stage, multinomial 
logistic regression can provide me with such probabilities. Dickinson (2011) 
categorizes FLC into five stages: introduction, growth, mature, shake-out and 
decline. Five categorical variables are thus created for each (introduction = 1, growth 
= 2, mature = 3, shake-out = 4 and decline = 5) life cycle stage.  
 Panel A shows that the coefficients of all the control variables have the 
predicted signs and statistical significance, suggesting that the model specification is 
reasonable. For example, consistent with FLC theory and the empirical findings (e.g., 
Anthony & Ramesh, 1992; Dickinson, 2011; Mata & Portugal, 1994; Pérez et al., 
2004), SIZE and ROE are positively (negatively) associated with the growth and 
mature (introduction and decline) stages, implying that large and profitable (small 
and loss-making) firms belong to the growth and mature (introduction and decline) 
stages. The negative associations of AGE with the introduction, growth and decline 
stages support the findings of Pérez et al. (2004) that young and old firms have 
higher exit possibilities. Moreover, the positive (negative) association of ΔSALE with 
the introduction and growth (mature) stages is consistent with the view of Anthony 
and Ramesh (1992) that firms maximize revenue growth in the early stages of their 
life cycles, while in the mature stage market growth slows. Furthermore, the positive 
(negative) coefficient of R&D with the introduction and growth (mature) stages also 
supports FLC in that firms invest in innovation in early stages to maximize growth 
opportunities and deter potential entrants (Kimura & Fujii, 2003; Spence, 1979), 







Table 2.4: Regression Results 
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Log pseudo-
likelihood 
















Notes: This table estimates Equation (2.1) on the sample partitioned by life cycle stage as defined in 
Dickinson (2011). The indicator for the shake-out stage is omitted and thus the intercept term captures 
the effect of the shake-out stage. Other life cycle stage coefficients are compared with the shake-out 
stage. 
Robust z-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Variable definitions are provided in appendix 2.1. 
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The coefficients of organization capital as a proportion of total assets 
(OC/TA) are significant and positive for firms in either the introduction or decline 
stages (at p<.05 and p<.001, respectively), while they are significant and negative for 
those firms in the growth or mature stages (both at p<.001). These results suggest 
that compared with the shake-out stage, firms in the introduction and decline stages 
are likely to be associated with more organization capital, whereas firms in the 
growth and mature stages are likely to be associated with less. Thus, the regression 
coefficients in Model 1 to Model 3 (β1 = 0.036, -0.112 and -0.078, respectively) do 
not reject H1 and H2. The regression result in Model 4 (β1 = 0.108, p<.001) reveals 
that the decline stage is positively associated with organization capital, lending 
support to H3a rather than H3b.   
Table 2.4, Panel B reports the multinomial logistic regression results for the 
alternative measure of organization capital (OC/PPE). Consistent with Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou (2013), in this measure, I scale the stock of organization capital by 
property, plant, and equipment (PPE) instead of book assets.
13
 Overall, Table 2.4, 
Panel B provides results that are consistent with that in Table 2.4, Panel A. In 
particular, the coefficients of organization capital as a proportion of property, plant 
and equipment (OC/PPE) are significant and positive in the introduction and decline 
stages (at p<.10 and p<.05, respectively), while they are significant and negative in 









                                                             
13 For the regression estimates, I scale stock of organization capital (OC) by net PPE (PPENT). 
However, the results are "qualitatively" similar if OC is scaled by gross PPE (PPEGT). 
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Notes: This table estimates Equation (2.1) on the sample partitioned by life cycle stage as defined in 
Dickinson (2011). The indicator for the shake-out stage is omitted and thus the intercept term captures 
the effect of the shake-out stage. Other life cycle stage coefficients are thus compared with the shake-
out stage. 
Robust z-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 




Panel C shows the marginal effects of OC/TA and OC/PPE estimated from 
the above regression models for different stages of firm life cycle. Section I reveals 
that one unit increase in OC/TA may increase the probability of firms being stayed in 
the introduction stage (0.8%), shake-out stage (0.5%) and decline stage (0.6%) but it 
may reduce the probability of firms being stayed in the growth stage (-1.4%) and 
mature stage (-0.5%), respectively. Likewise, Section II also reports that firm with 
more OC/PPE is likely to be in introduction, shake-out and decline stage, while firm 
with less OC/PPE is likely to be in mature stage. Thus, the regression results and 
associated marginal effects imply that OC/TA and OC/PPE have a significant impact 
in shaping the FLC stages. 
Panel C: Marginal Effect Results 
 
I. Margin effect of OC/TA - Estimated from Regression Results in Panel A 





dy/dx Std. Err. Z P>Z 
OC/TA     
Introduction 
 
0.008 0.000 8.82 0.000 
Growth 
 
-0.014 0.001 -7.47 0.000 
Mature 
 
-0.005 0.001 -2.79 0.000 
Shake-out 
 
0.005 0.001 5.17 0.000 
Decline 0.006 0.001 12.19 0.000 
 
Note: dy/dx = marginal effect 
 
II. Margin effect of OC/PPE - Estimated from Regression Results in Panel B 
  





dy/dx Std. Err. Z P>Z 
OC/PPE     
Introduction 
 
0.0003 0.000 7.89 0.000 
Growth 
 
0.0001 0.001 0.95 0.340 
Mature 
 
-0.0007 0.000 -7.59 0.000 
Shake-out 
 
0.0002 0.000 5.79 0.000 
Decline 0.0001 0.000 6.44 0.000 
 




The regression results and marginal effect results in Table 2.4 are also 
consistent with the theory and prior empirical findings. The positive and significant 
coefficient of the introduction stage with OC/TA (OC/PPE) provides support to the 
argument that organization capital is directly related to the future productivity and 
efficiency of firms, especially for those firms in the early stages of the life cycle. 
These regression results also reveal that introduction-stage firms invest more in R&D 
and advertising for capacity development. These results are consistent with prior 
studies that document that firms should invest more in the early stages of the life 
cycle to create sustainable competitive advantage, maximize growth opportunities 
and deter potential entrants (Porter, 1980; Spence, 1979). The negative and 
significant coefficients of the growth and mature stages with OC/TA (OC/PPE) are 
in line with the argument that growth- and mature-stage firms invest more in physical 
capital compared with organization capital, while at the same time maximize the 
benefit from the existing stock of organization capital. The findings of Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou (2013) that low OC/TA firms have higher investment rates in physical 
capital (12.6% vs. 10.1%) also lend support to my findings. The positive association 
between the decline stage and OC/TA (and OC/PPE) is somewhat interesting in the 
sense that it provides valuable insights into the contribution of OC/TA (OC/PPE) in 
reviving the FLC. This result lends support to the argument that firms in the decline 
stage of the life cycle are more likely to invest in organization capital as a means of 
deepening or refreshing the organization process, system and know-how. This 
finding is also consistent with those of prior studies (e.g., Greiner, 1972) that firms 
without adequate learning abilities can move from the later part of the success stage 
to the decline stage and that these crises can be solved by introducing new structures 
and programs that help employees revitalize them. Dickinson (2011) also finds that 
decline firms increase their investment in R&D as a turnaround attempt. 
In sum, the multinomial logistic regression results reveal that high OC/TA 
(and OC/PPE) firms are more likely to be in the introduction or decline stage, while 
low OC/TA (and OC/PPE) firms are likely to be in the growth or decline stage. This 
regression result is consistent with the view that a firm’s investment in organization 
capital in the early stages (decline stage) provides it with a sustainable resource base 
(restoration of organization practices, processes and systems), which enables firms to 
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take advantage in the subsequent years and thereby move to the growth and mature 
stages. These results largely concur with the findings of Adizes (1979) who argues 
that management practice, style and process influence the life and effectiveness of an 
enterprise (see Masurel & Montfort, 2006). Further, the recent findings of Lev et al. 
(2009) that organization capital captures fundamental efficiency attributes affecting 
long-term performance also support the findings. 
2.4.4 Additional Analysis 
2.4.4.1 Contribution of Organization Capital to Moving Introduction and 
Decline Firms to the Growth and Mature Stages 
The results in the previous section show that firms with more organization capital are 
likely to be in the introduction and decline stages (compared with the likelihood of 
being in the shake-out stage). However, Dickinson (2011) observes that around 57% 
of introduction firms are likely to move to the growth or mature stages at the end of 
five years. Moreover, she notes that only a small proportion of decline firms (18%) 
remain in the decline stage after five years. I attribute this movement in life cycle 
stages to organization capital. It is my view that firms with a higher organization 
capital in these two stages tend to move to the growth and mature stages (desired 
stages in the life cycle) in subsequent years. Table 2.5 reports results that support my 
view. 
Table 2.5, Panel A reports an overall (unrestricted) transitional probabilities 
matrix of introduction-stage firms (Part I), a transitional probabilities matrix of 
introduction-stage firms with high OC/TA (OC/TA ≥ mean OC/TA) (Part II), that 
with low OC/TA (OC/TA< mean OC/TA) (Part III) in the next five-year period and a 
comparison of transitional probabilities between firms with high OC/TA and low 
OC/TA (Part IV). For comparison purposes, I estimate mean OC/TA for each 
industry
14
 (based on the Fama–French 48-industry classification) and year, and group 
                                                             
14 Carlin et al. (2012) argue that firms in rapidly changing industries are less likely to invest in 
organization capital because such industries have a greater technology obsolescence risk, which 
reduces the usefulness of a firm’s organization capital in the future. Hence, I estimate mean OC/TA 
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introduction-stage firms based on their OC/TA into the respective years. To ensure 
the availability of five years of data subsequent to the initial introduction stage 
classification, I need to collapse the sample into an overlapping five-year window 
over the sample period; as a result, the sample size is further reduced to n = 5999. 
The overall (i.e., unrestricted) transition shows that on average 54.7% (i.e., 28.0% + 
26.7%) of introduction firms shift to the growth and mature stages in the next five 
years. On the other hand, as expected, on average 71.6% (69.7%) of high (low) 
OC/TA introduction-stage firms move to the growth and mature stages in the next 
five years. The comparison of the transitional probabilities between firms with high 
and low OC/TA shows that introduction-stage firms with more OC/TA stay in (move 
to) the introduction (decline) stage at a lower rate (p<.05 and p<0.10, respectively) 
than that of firms with low OC/TA. Moreover, compared with low OC/TA, high 
OC/TA firms move to the mature stage more frequently (p<0.10). Thus, organization 
capital helps firms progress in the transition of life cycle stages. 
 As in Panel A, Panel B of Table 2.5 presents a similar set of tables but for 
decline-stage firms only. Consistent with the findings for the introduction stage in 
Panel A, 70.7% (66.4%) of high (low) OC/TA decline-stage firms move back to the 
growth and mature stages. The table shows that decline-stage firms with high OC/TA 
stay in (move to) the decline (introduction) stage at a significantly lower rate (both at 
p<.01), while these firms move to the growth and mature stage at a significantly 
higher rate (at p<.001 and p<0.05, respectively).
15
 Several observations are worth 
noting from this analysis. In general, 19.2% of introduction firms are likely to stay in 
the introduction stage at the end of five years. However, for high OC/TA 
introduction firms, only 12.5% of introduction-stage firms remain in the same stage. 
By the same token, 11.90% of decline-stage firms normally stay in the same stage at 
the end of five years. Nonetheless, only 6.0% of decline-stage firms with high 
OC/TA remain in the same stage at the end of five years. High OC/TA firms in the 
introduction stage are less likely to move to the decline stage in the subsequent five 
years because the mean percentage is just 6.1.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
for each industry and year, and use this mean to classify firms into two groups: high OC/TA (if 
OC/TAi,t ≥ mean OC/TAj,t) and low OC/TA (if OC/TAi,t < mean OC/TAj,t). 
15 Untabulated results also show that growth and shake-out firms  with more OC/TA are more likely 
(p<0.10) to move to the mature stage in the subsequent years, while mature-stage firms with more 
OC/TA are less likely to move to the decline stage. 
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Table 2.5: Transition of Introduction- and Decline-Stage Firms in the Next Five 
Years 
Panel A: Transition of Introduction-Stage Firms in the Next Five Years 
I. Overall Transition of Introduction-Stage Firms in the Next Five Years 
Existing Stage  
Transition in 
Future Period 
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 Mean 
 
Introduction 0.336 0.262 0.236 0.212 0.192 0.247 
 
Growth 0.240 0.271 0.290 0.294 0.305 0.280 
Introduction  Mature 0.208 0.247 0.269 0.299 0.315 0.267 
(n = 5,999 ) Shake-out 0.096 0.107 0.105 0.105 0.102 0.103 
 
Decline 0.120 0.113 0.101 0.092 0.086 0.103 
II. Transition of Introduction-Stage Firms with OC/TA>= Mean OC/TA 
 
Existing Stage  
Transition in 
Future Period 
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 Mean 
 
Introduction 0.123 0.131 0.141 0.128 0.125 0.130 
 
Growth 0.330 0.345 0.315 0.328 0.340 0.332 
Introduction Mature 0.398 0.371 0.391 0.393 0.368 0.384 
( n = 2,298) Shake-out 0.089 0.092 0.092 0.094 0.104 0.094 
 
Decline 0.060 0.061 0.061 0.057 0.064 0.061 
III. Transition of Introduction-Stage Firms with OC/TA< Mean OC/TA 
Existing Stage  
Transition in 
Future Period 
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 Mean 
 
Introduction 0.153 0.151 0.133 0.143 0.136 0.143 
 
Growth 0.315 0.325 0.336 0.332 0.341 0.330 
Introduction Mature 0.370 0.363 0.369 0.370 0.364 0.367 
(n = 3,701) Shake-out 0.101 0.098 0.098 0.092 0.095 0.097 
  Decline 0.061 0.062 0.065 0.063 0.064 0.063 
IV. Comparative Transition of Introduction-Stage Firms with OC/TA>= Mean 




Movement of % of firms  
 




Introduction 0.130 0.143 -2.731  0.026 
 
Growth 0.332 0.330 0.277  0.789 
Introduction  Mature 0.384 0.367 2.679  0.055 
 
Shake-out 0.094 0.097 -0.982  0.364 






Panel B: Transition of Decline-Stage Firms in the Next Five Years 
I. Overall Transition of Decline-Stage Firms in the Next Five Years 
Existing Stage  
Transition in 
Future Period 
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 Mean 
 
Introduction 0.249 0.233 0.211 0.195 0.174 0.212 
 
Growth 0.165 0.228 0.255 0.279 0.296 0.244 
Decline Mature 0.155 0.201 0.230 0.263 0.277 0.225 
(n = 2,786) Shake-out 0.148 0.127 0.141 0.131 0.135 0.137 
 
Decline 0.283 0.211 0.162 0.132 0.119 0.181 
II. Transition of Introduction-Stage Firms with OC/TA>= Mean OC/TA 
 
Existing Stage  
Transition in 
Future Period 
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 Mean 
 
Introduction 0.127 0.108 0.113 0.120 0.128 0.119 
 
Growth 0.332 0.318 0.344 0.330 0.331 0.331 
Decline Mature 0.380 0.398 0.361 0.365 0.378 0.376 
(n = 1,187 ) Shake-out 0.098 0.110 0.110 0.123 0.103 0.109 
 
Decline 0.063 0.066 0.072 0.062 0.060 0.065 
III. Transition of Introduction-Stage Firms with OC/TA< Mean OC/TA 
Existing Stage  
Transition in 
Future Period 
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 Mean 
 
Introduction 0.125 0.148 0.136 0.133 0.141 0.137 
 
Growth 0.310 0.317 0.297 0.310 0.311 0.309 
Decline Mature 0.366 0.344 0.365 0.341 0.358 0.355 
(n = 1,599) Shake-out 0.109 0.110 0.110 0.133 0.117 0.116 
 
Decline 0.090 0.081 0.091 0.083 0.073 0.084 
IV. Comparative Transition of Decline-Stage Firms with OC/TA>= Mean OC/TA and 




Movement of % of firms  
 
                            High OC/TA     Low OC/TA t-stat.  p value 
 
Introduction 0.119 0.137 -3.925  0.002 
 
Growth 0.331 0.309 5.067  0.000 
Decline Mature 0.376 0.355 3.074  0.012 
 
Shake-out 0.109 0.116 -1.359  0.204 
 Decline 0.065 0.084 -5.796  0.000 
 
Taken together, these observations suggest that high OC/TA firms in both the 
introduction and decline stages tend to improve their position in subsequent periods, 




2.4.4.2 Changes in Organization Capital across Life Cycle 
My results show that firms with high (low) organization capital are likely to be in 
introduction and decline (growth and mature) stages compared with the likelihood of 
being in the shake-out stage. Now, I investigate whether the changes in organization 
capital across the life cycle stages show a similar pattern. Multinomial logistic 
regression results tabulated in Appendix 2.2 show that changes in the organization 
capital are significantly (p<.01) positive (negative) in decline (growth and mature) 
stages. Result for introduction stage is negative but insignificant. I argue that higher 
organization capital in introduction and decline stage originates from different 
premises. In introduction stage, there is relatively small portion of tangible asset 
compared to organization capital and hence the change in organization capital in this 
stage is not statistically significant. However, in decline stage, firms invest 
substantial amount in organization capital, which causes changes in organization 
capital to be positive and significant.   
2.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Checks 
2.4.5.1 Alternative FLC Stages as Benchmark 
Recall that the regression results are interpreted with reference to shake-out stage as 
it is used as the benchmark. To ensure that the results are not specific to any 
benchmark FLC stage, I repeat estimations in Equation 2.1 for the association 
between organization capital and firm life cycle using other FLCs as benchmark. 
Table 2.6, Panel A shows that compared to introduction firms - growth, mature and 
shake-out (decline) firms are associated with significantly lower (higher) OC/TA and 
OC/PPE. Moreover, when mature stage is used as a benchmark, regression results 
suggest that OC/TA and OC/PPE are significantly higher in the introduction and 
decline (growth) stages, while evidence for shake-out stage is mixed. Furthermore, 
compared to any other stage, decline firms are associated with significantly higher 
(p<.01 mostly) OC/TA and OC/PPE. Overall, regression results corroborate the 




Table 2.6: Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Checks 
Panel A: Association between OC/TA (and OC/PPE) and Life Cycle Stages 
 
 
                Life Cycle Stage 
 
Benchmark stage 
Model 1 (OC/TA) Model 2 (OC/PPE) 
Introduction Growth Mature Shake-Out Decline Introduction Growth Mature Shake-Out Decline 
Introduction - -0.148*** -0.114*** -0.036** 0.072*** - -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.001* 0.000 
 
- (-11.249) (-8.169) (-2.395) (5.010) - (-6.518) (-9.159) (1.729) (0.727) 
Growth 0.148*** - 0.034*** 0.112*** 0.220*** 0.003*** - -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.004*** 
 
(11.249) - (3.030) (7.760) (13.680) (6.518) - (-4.359) -3.680 (5.456) 
Mature 0.114*** -0.034*** - 0.078*** 0.186*** 0.006*** 0.002*** - -0.005*** 0.006*** 
 
(8.169) (-3.030) - (6.359) (12.285) (9.159) (4.359) - -8.100 (8.952) 
Shake-Out 0.036** -0.112*** -0.078*** - 0.108*** 0.001* -0.002*** -0.005*** - 0.001** 
 
(2.395) (-7.760) (-6.359) - (7.554) (1.729) (-3.680) (-8.100) - (2.435) 
Decline -0.072*** -0.220*** -0.186*** -0.108*** - -0.000 -0.004*** -0.006*** 0.001** - 
 
(-5.010) (-13.680) (-12.285) (-7.554) - (-0.727) (-5.456) (-8.952) (2.435) - 
 
Robust z-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Controls and industry and year fixed effects are included but not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Variable definitions are provided in appendix 2.1. 
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2.4.5.2 Alternative Specification of FLC 
To mitigate the concerns that the results are driven by the choice of life cycle 
proxies, I use the two alternative measures of FLC proposed by DeAngelo et al. 
(2006), namely Retained Earnings to Total Assets (RE/TA) and Retained Earnings to 
Total Equity (RE/TE). DeAngelo et al. (2006) observe that firms with high RE/TA 
and RE/TE are typically more mature or old with declining investment, while firms 
with low RE/TA and RE/TE tend to be young and growing. Therefore, they argue 
that RE/TA and RE/TE are appropriate FLC proxies. Panel B of Table 2.6 reports the 
OLS estimates
16
 of the relationship between organization capital (OC/TA or 
OC/PPE) and these two new alternative FLC measures. The coefficient of RE/TA 
(RE/TE) is negative and statistically significant (at p<0.001), regardless of whether 
organization capital is measured as OC/TA or OC/PPE. This suggests that 
organization capital decreases as RE/TA and RE/TE increases. More specifically, 
since firms in the mature stage tend to have more RE/TA and RE/TE, the regression 
results indicate that mature firms have a lower level of OC/TA and OC/PPE. 
Regression results also reveal that mature firms (firms with higher RE/TA and 
RE/TE) are large, profitable, efficient and incur more cost for capital expenditure and 
advertising (the coefficients of SIZE, ROE, ATO, CAPEX and ADVERT are 
positive and statistically significant). On the other hand, the coefficients of MTB and 
ΔSALE are negative and statistically significant. In sum, the coefficients of OC/TA 
and OC/PPE (main variable of interest) and the control variables have the predicted 
signs and significance. Thus, the results using RE/TA and RE/TE (alternative 
measures of FLC) are similar to those obtained in the main analysis (Table 2.4) and 





                                                             
16 Multinomial logistic regression is used to predict the probabilities of the different possible outcomes 
of a categorically distributed dependent variable. Since RE/TA and RE/TE (dependent variables) in 
Table 2.6, Panel B are continuous measures (not categorically distributed), I use OLS to estimate the 
association between the life cycle proxies (RE/TA and RE/TE) and organization capital. 
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Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets.  
Standard errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 





2.4.5.3 Alternative Specification of Organization Capital 
To mitigate the concerns as to whether the main results are sensitive to the 
specification of organization capital, I use several alternative specifications. 
Organization Capital Measure by Lev et al. (2009) 
Lev et al. (2009) develop a firm-specific measure of organization capital that 
captures the contribution of organization capital to revenue growth and cost saving. 
They posit that firm-level efficiency in resource usage depends on organization 
capital. Therefore, in estimating organization capital, they compare the efficiency of 
using resources across companies in generating revenues as well as in cost 
containment. More clearly, Lev et al. (2009) assume a constant returns-to-scale 
production function and estimate the following equation annually and cross-




) = 𝑏0𝑡 + 𝑏0𝑠𝑡 log (
𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑖𝑡−1







) + log (
𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑖𝑡−1
)                              (2.6) 
 
The coefficient estimates indicate industry-average contributions of organization 
capital (i.e., 𝑏0𝑠𝑡 log (
𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
)) to revenue growth. These coefficient estimates are 
used to predict revenues without organization capital. Then, the predicted firm’s 
revenues without firm-specific organization capital are subtracted from the firm’s 
actual revenues to get AbSALEit, which is the contribution of organization capital to 
the revenue of firm i in year t. A similar process is applied to compute the 
contribution of organization capital to cost containment; the difference between the 
predicted cost and actual cost, AbCOSTit, is the contribution of organization capital 
to cost containment. The contribution of organization capital to operating profits is 
thus given by AbProfitit = AbSALEit + AbCOSTit. Consistent with Lev et al. (2009), 
I capitalize and amortize AbProfitit over five years to estimate organization capital 
from the annual contributions and scale the capitalized contributions of organization 
capital by total assets in year t.  
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Panel C: Alternative Specification of Organization Capital (Lev et al. 2009) 
  
 




Growth Mature Decline RE/TA RE/TE 
       
OC/TA 0.013 -0.620*** -0.466*** 0.744*** -0.311*** -0.291*** 
 
(0.230) (-11.536) (-9.106) (10.789) (-16.505) (-6.228) 
SIZE -0.151*** 0.163*** 0.188*** -0.181*** 0.123*** 0.350*** 
 
(-10.575) (14.451) (17.199) (-10.479) (28.737) (27.979) 
MTB 0.026*** -0.004 -0.006 0.009 -0.021*** -0.401*** 
 
(3.266) (-0.559) (-0.774) (0.941) (-9.140) (-32.829) 
LEV 2.772*** 2.240*** 0.284*** 1.240*** -0.492*** -0.065 
 
(22.877) (19.67) (2.671) (8.255) (-15.623) (-1.100) 
ROE -0.410*** 0.185*** 0.411*** -0.399*** 0.256*** 1.883*** 
 
(-9.705) (4.819) (9.88) (-8.065) (20.535) (33.202) 
ΔSALE 0.632*** 0.536*** -0.373*** 0.194** 0.073*** 0.107*** 
 
(9.019) (8.242) (-5.606) (2.385) (4.945) (2.82) 
CAPEX 14.686*** 17.872*** 10.187*** 3.817*** 0.448*** 1.943*** 
 
(17.259) (21.283) (12.482) (3.455) (7.963) (12.657) 
AGE -0.441*** -0.217*** 0.005 -0.219*** 0.013* -0.083*** 
 
(-14.919) (-8.938) (0.208) (-5.929) (1.853) (-4.726) 
ATO 0.366*** 0.549*** 0.520*** -0.649*** 0.109*** 0.258*** 
 
(8.107) (13.549) (13.668) (-9.564) (10.041) (8.972) 
ADVERT 1.384** -1.614*** -0.744 1.457** -0.652*** 2.476*** 
 
(2.397) (-2.882) (-1.428) (2.174) (-3.398) (6.364) 
R&D 0.284*** 0.110*** -0.702*** 0.325*** -0.269*** 0.091*** 
 
(6.766) (2.754) (-11.398) (7.912) (-14.800) (2.863) 
Constant -0.333 -1.301*** -0.366 1.007* -0.327*** -1.092*** 
 
(-0.639) (-3.432) (-0.842) (1.764) (-2.588) (-3.591) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70,754 70,754 70,754 70,754 69,791 69,791 
Pseudo R
2
/ Adj. R-squared                                                    0.176            0.293     0.409 
 
Notes: Model 1 to Model 4 estimate Equation (2.1) on the sample partitioned by life cycle stage as 
defined in Dickinson (2011). For Model 1 to Model 4, the indicator of the shake-out stage is omitted 
and thus the intercept term captures the effect of the shake-out stage. Other life cycle stage 
coefficients are compared thus with the shake-out stage. Model 5 and Model 6 show the regression 
estimates for DeAngelo et al. (2006)’s life cycle proxies and OC/TA. 
Robust z-statistics/t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Variable definitions are provided in appendix 2.1. 
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Table 2.6, Panel C shows that my results are qualitatively similar when 
organization capital is estimated by using the methodology of Lev et al. (2009).
17
 In 
particular, the coefficient of OC/TA has the expected signs for the different life cycle 
proxies and is mostly statistically significant. Moreover, marginal effect results 
reported in Panel D supports that introduction, shake-out and decline (growth and 
mature) firms are likely to be associated with more (less) organization capital, which 
also corroborate the marginal effect results reported earlier in the main analysis. 
  
Panel D: Margin Effect of OC/TA - Estimated from Regression Results in Panel C 
  





dy/dx Std. Err. Z P>Z 
OC/TA      
Introduction 
 
0.033 0.003 9.63 0.000 
Growth 
 
-0.075 0.006 -12.47 0.000 
Mature 
 
-0.027 0.006 -4.36 0.000 
Shake-out 
 
0.026 0.003 7.46 0.000 
Decline  0.042 0.002 17.83 0.000 
 
Note: dy/dx = marginal effect 
 
Organization Capital Measure Using 30% of SG&A Expenses 
Considering the view that not all SG&A expenses contribute to generate organization 
capital, Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2014) use 30%
18
 of SG&A expenses to construct 
firm-level proxies for the book stock of organization capital, which is: 
𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1(1 − 𝛿0) +  
𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝜃      (2.7) 
where 𝜃 = 30%, initial stock is set as 𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡0 =
𝜃𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑖,𝑡0
𝑔+𝛿0
 and the other variables are as 
discussed in section 3.4. Results reported in appendix 2.3 show that the results are 
robust to the use of 30% of SG&A expenses in constructing the stock of organization 
capital. 
                                                             
17 In the regression estimates, I use non-negative values of organization capital. 
18 Corrado et al. (2009) also find that organization capital is the single largest category of business 
intangible capital, which accounts for about 30% of all intangible assets in the United States. 
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Exclusion of First Five Years of the Stock of Organization Capital 
I also drop the first five years of data for every firm to mitigate the effect of the 
initialization scheme in the perpetual inventory method, and test the association 
between organization capital and FLC. Regression results reported in appendix 2.4 
show that the signs and significance of the regression estimates remain unchanged 
even after excluding five years of organization capital data. 
Excluding Advertising Expenses from SG&A Expenses 
As a part of the robustness check, I also exclude advertising expenses from SG&A 
expenses to estimate the stock of organization capital. Belo, Lin, & Vitorino (2014) 
argue that advertising expenses may contribute to the accumulation of brand capital, 
which Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) view as a different type of intangible capital 
to organization capital. Results reported in appendix 2.5 remain qualitatively similar 
to those obtained in the main analysis. 
Overall, the results using alternative FLC benchmark, FLC specification and 
organization capital measures provide estimates that are similar to those obtained in 
the main analysis, confirming that the main results are not driven by the choice of 
specific life cycle proxy and organization capital estimate. 
2.4.5.4 Endogeneity 
My analysis so far suggests that organization capital is positively associated with the 
introduction and decline stages, while negatively associated with the growth and 
mature stages. However, the sign, magnitude and statistical significance of these 
estimates may be biased due to endogeneity, i.e., if organization capital (OC/TA) and 
the error term ( ) are correlated. Endogeneity can arise due to unobservable 
heterogeneity when unobservable firm-specific factors affect both organization 
capital and life cycle stages. In addition, there is a possibility of reverse causality 
between life cycle stages and organization capital. To mitigate these concerns, I 
adopt a Two-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) approach to multinomial logistic 
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regression for Dickinson (2011)’s life cycle proxy and Two-Stage Least Squared 
(2SLS) instrumental variable approach for DeAngelo et al. (2006)’s life cycle proxy 
because the 2SLS approach is only suitable for linear regression, while the 2SRI 
approach is more appropriate for nonlinear regression such as multinomial logistic 
regression. 
 Motivated by Terza, Basu, and Rathouz (2008), I adopt 2SRI, an alternative 
implementation of the two-stage IV approach, for the multinomial logistic regression 
model. Terza et al. (2008) show that in a nonlinear modeling framework, 2SRI is 
generally statistically consistent in this broader class and overwhelmingly 
outperforms two-stage predictor substitution (2SPS), a method that is commonly 
used to deal with endogeneity issues in linear regression frameworks. Similar to the 
2SPS method, the first stage of the 2SRI procedure involves regressing the 
endogenous variable (organization capital) on selected instruments and the 
exogenous variables from the main analysis in Table 2.4, and the results are used to 
generate predicted values for the endogenous variables. In the second stage, residuals 
(rather than predicted values) from the first-stage are included as additional 
regressors with the endogenous and exogenous variables from the main analysis. To 
allay the concern with standard errors problem associated with two-stage estimation I 
use bootstrap method of standard error estimation approach.
19
  
 Contemporary studies extensively adopt the two-stage IV approach to address 
endogeneity concerns. However, this approach is appropriate only if the instrumental 
variables are correlated with the endogenous regressor but uncorrelated with the error 
term in the second-stage regression. In this context, good instruments are exogenous 
variables that are economically related to the organization capital variable proxy but 
are uncorrelated with the error term of the second-stage regression relating FLC to 
organization capital. Taking these views into account, I use three instrumental 
variables in the first-stage regression estimates: firm-level risk (proxied by the 
standard deviation of monthly stock return – STD_RET and standard deviation of 
Return on Equity (ROE) over the last three years – STD_ROE), one year ahead 
market share (Market Sharet+1) and growth in physical capital (proxied by growth in 
                                                             
19
 I use 1000 replications to generate the bootstrap standard errors. 
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property, plant and equipment - % ΔPPE). Motivated by the study of Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou (2013), I use STD_RET and STD_ROE as instrumental variables. 
Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) argue that since both shareholders and key talents 
have a claim to the cash flows accruing from organization capital, firms with high 
organization capital are more risky. I use one year ahead market share for two 
reasons. First, Lev et al. (2009) empirically show that organization capital is a source 
of future benefit and is associated with future operating performance. Second, 
Brynjolfsson et al. (2002) note that firms that put in place more organization capital 
experience greater output in subsequent years. Market share is defined as the sales of 
firm i in year t scaled by total industry sales in the same year, where an industry is 
defined in terms of the Fama–French 48-industry classification. Investment in 
organization processes, structures, worker knowledge, reporting, training, monitoring 
and incentive systems is costly (Brynjolfsson et al., 2002) and the firm’s ability to 
invest in organization capital thus largely depends on its existing resources. Carlin et 
al. (2012) suggest that resource constraints may require a firm to substitute 
alternative forms of productive resources with organization capital. Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou (2013) empirically show that firms with high organization capital have 
lower investment rates in physical capital (10.1% vs. 12.6%). Therefore, I also use 
growth in PPE as an instrumental variable. 
Table 2.7, Panel A (Section I) reports the first-stage regression results in 
which the endogenous variable, OC/TA, is regressed on the selected instruments and 
the exogenous variables from the analyses in Table 2.4. Consistent with the 
expectations, the coefficients of the instrumental variables (STD_RET, STD_ROE, 
Market Sharet+1 and % ΔPPE) are significant at p<.01, suggesting that organization 
capital (OC/TA) is positively associated with firm-level risk and future firm 
performance and negatively related to growth in PPE. Panel A of Table 2.7 (Models 
1 to 4 in Section II) shows the results from the instrumental variable approach and 
suggests that the positive association between organization capital (OC/TA) and the 
introduction and decline stages and the negative association between organization 
capital (OC/TA) and the growth and mature stages remain robust after accounting for 
the endogeneity problem. Moreover, Models 5 and 6 also confirm the robustness of 
the result using DeAngelo et al. (2006) life cycle proxies (RE/TA and RE/TE). The 
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estimated coefficients of the introduction (0.734), growth (-1.015), mature (-1.277) 
and decline (0.973) stages are significant (at p< .001) in the 2SRI model. 
Furthermore, the estimated coefficients for RE/TA and RE/TE are -1.292 and -1.635, 
respectively (both significant at p<0.001). These results suggest that endogeneity 
cannot explain the results in the main analysis that organization capital has a vital 
role in shaping the life cycle pattern. 
In support of these instruments, I also conduct underidentification, weak 
identification, Hansen’s overidentifying restrictions and Hausman’s endogeneity 
tests. In Table 2.7, the underidentification test results (LM statistic) reveal that the 
excluded instruments are ‘relevant’. The weak instrument test is performed to test 
whether the excluded instruments are sufficiently correlated with the included 
endogenous regressors—the goodness-of-fit of the ‘first stage’. The test results show 
that the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors because 
the Cragg–Donald Wald F-statistic is greater than is the Stock and Yogo (2005) 
critical value.
20
 The results of Hansen’s overidentifying restrictions test do not reject 
the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term (p>0.10), 
suggesting that they are correctly excluded from the second-stage regression and the 
validity of the instruments used for the 2SLS regression. Finally, for Model 1 to 4 
(Models 5 and 6), I include (perform) the estimated residuals (Hausman, 1978 test) to 
ascertain whether the endogeneity problem is really a concern for the estimates. For 
my analysis, included residuals and Hausman’s test strongly rejects (at p<0.001) the 








                                                             
20 When the instrument is only weakly correlated with the regressor, IV methods provide highly 
biased estimates (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010). 
21 As a robustness check, I use the 2SRI model to test the endogeneity problem with DeAngelo et al. 
(2006)’s life cycle measures (RE/TA and RE/TE) and find that the results are qualitatively similar to 
those obtained by using 2SLS models. 
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Table 2.7: Endogeneity Test 
Panel A: 2SRI/2SLS Regression  
 
I: First-Stage Regressions 




(DeAngelo et al., 
2006’s FLC) 
Instruments     
STD_RET   6.860*** - 
   (6.74)  
STD_ROE    0.014*** 
    (4.25) 
Market Sharet+1   1.896*** 3.463*** 
   (3.32) (4.34) 
% ΔPPE   -0.020*** -0.018*** 
   (-3.49) (-3.97) 
Unreported Control Variables Included in Regression 
All Variables in Main Specification  Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes 
Industry FE   Yes Yes 
Observation (N)   58,703 59,105 
Adjusted R
2
   0.172 0.330 
Underidentification Test     
Kleibergen-Paaprk LM statistic  91.372 33.981 
p-value   0.000 0.000 
Weak Identification Test     
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  192.372 176.718 
Stock and Yogo (2002) Critical  value    22.3 22.3 
Test of Overidentifying Restrictions   
Hansen’s J-statistic                     3.370 1.665 
p-value                                          0.113 0.435 
 















Potentially Endogenous Variable 
OC/TA 0.734*** -1.015*** -1.277*** 0.973*** -1.292*** -1.635*** 
 
(4.63) (-6.74) (-10.60) (5.84) (-11.494) (-4.497) 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hausman Test for the Effect of the Life Cycle (Coefficient 2SLS = Coefficient OLS) 
Estimated residuals/              
Cluster-robust     -0.699 
F-statistic                      
0.928 1.221 -0.871 67.683 44.309 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000     0.000   0.000 
Observation 
(N) 





Finally, I estimate the marginal effect of OC/TA for the second stage 
multinomial logistic regression results. Panel B reports that one unit increase in 
OC/TA may increase the likelihood of firms being stayed in the introduction stage 
(11.9%), shake-out stage (6.2%) and decline stage (5.9%) but it may reduce the 
likelihood of firms being stayed in the growth stage (-6.9%) and mature stage (-
17.1%), respectively. Thus, the reported marginal effect of OC/TA in affecting the 
FLC stages are stronger than the effects presented in main analysis, implying robust 
role of OC/TA after controlling for endogeneity.   
Panel B: Marginal Effect Results 
    





dy/dx Std. Err. Z P>Z 
OC/TA     
Introduction 
 
0.119 0.014 8.58 0.000 
Growth 
 
-0.069 0.026 -2.69 0.007 
Mature 
 
-0.171 0.025 -6.94 0.000 
Shake-out 
 
0.062 0.010 5.99 0.000 
Decline 0.059 0.007 8.75 0.000 
 
Note: dy/dx = marginal effect 
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
This paper provides evidence of the association between organization capital and 
FLC. In this study, I posit that organization capital (e.g., business practices, 
processes, systems, designs and unique corporate culture) develops the resource base 
for the firm, which serves as a source of sustainable competitive advantage. Thus, 
firm-specific organization capital performs as one of the drivers of a firm’s transition 
across different life cycle stages. My empirical results show that a firm’s 
organization capital, indeed, contributes to its life cycle progression. In particular, the 
study reveals that compared with the shake-out stage, firms in the introduction 
(decline) stage are more likely to  have more organization capital that equips them to 
move to (move back to) the growth and mature stages. Moreover, firms in the growth 
and mature stages tend to have less organization capital, as firms in these stages 
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focus more on capitalizing the benefits from the existing stock of organization capital 
and acquiring tangible assets. My additional analysis shows that introduction- 
(decline-) stage firms with more organization capital tend to have a higher chance of 
moving to the growth and mature stages in subsequent years. These results concur 
with the findings of Lev et al. (2009) that organization capital is a source of future 
benefit and that it is associated with future firm performance. I triangulate the results 
by using different measures of organization capital and FLC proxies, and eventually 
find that they are robust. 
Overall, the empirical evidence of the paper contributes to the growing body 
of literature that focuses on organization capital. My primary contribution is to 
extend this body of research by documenting the role of organization capital as a key 
determinant of the FLC progression. My findings strongly support the RBV of 
competitive advantage as well as FLC theory. The RBV suggests that the general 
patterns and paths in the evolution of organization capabilities depend on the 
existence and application of the bundle of valuable, interchangeable, immobile and 
imitable resources that generate the basis of the competitive advantage of a firm. I 
show that organization capital, as a source of competitive advantage, is associated 
with the progression of firms across different life cycle stages. My results also 
largely concur with the findings of Adizes (1979) that management practice, style 
and process influence the life and effectiveness of an enterprise. From a 
practitioner’s perspective, the results have direct implications for the financial 
management and strategic direction of the firm. My results provide evidence 
suggesting that organization capital could be the channel through which managers 
can lead firms to attain and maintain growth and mature stages, the prime stages of 
the FLC. Overall, this study contributes to the area of research that stresses the 







Appendix 2.1: Variable Definition and Measurement 
 
Variables  Definition and Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
OC/TA  Organization capital measured as the stock of organization capital (for 
details, see section 2.3.4) scaled by lagged real total assets (AT). 
OC/PPE  Organization capital estimated as the stock of organization capital scaled by 
lagged real PPE (PPENT).  
FLC Proxies 
FLC  Categorical variables that capture firms’ different stages in the life cycle 
(introduction =1, growth =2, mature =3, shake-out =4 and decline = 5). 
RE/TA  Retained earnings as a proportion of total assets. Measured as: retained 
earnings(RE)/lagged total assets (AT).  
RE/TA  Retained earnings as a proportion of total assets. Measured as: retained 
earnings(RE)/lagged total assets (AT).  
Control Variables 
SIZE  Natural logarithm of market value of equity (PRCC_F X CSHO) at the 
beginning of the year. 
MTB  Market-to-book ratio at the beginning of year, measured as the market value 
of equity (PRCC_F X CSHO) scaled by the book value of equity (CEQ). 
LEV  Leverage, measured as total short-term and long-term debt (DLC + DLTT) 
scaled by lagged assets (AT). 
ROE  Return on equity, measured as operating income (PI - XI) scaled by lagged 
equity (CEQ). 
ΔSALE  Changes in sales (SALE) scaled by lagged sales (SALE). 
CAPEX  Capital expenditure (CAPEX) scaled by lagged assets (AT). 
AGE  Age is measured as the number of years since the firm was first covered by 
the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) (DATADATE – 
BEGDAT). For the regression analysis, I measure AGE as the natural log of 
(1+ age of the firm) . 
ATO  Asset turnover ratio, measured as net sales (SALE) scaled by lagged total 
assets (AT). 
ADVERT  Advertising expenses (XAD) scaled by lagged sales (SALE). I replace any 
missing values of XAD with 0.  
R&D  R&D expenses (XRD) scaled by lagged PPE (PPEGT). I replace any missing 
values of XAD with 0. 
Year  Dummy variables to control for fiscal year effect. 
IND  Industry dummy (Fama–French 48-industry classification) to control for 
industry fixed effect. 
Instrumental Variables 
STD_RET  Standard deviation of monthly stock return (RET). 
STD_ROE  Standard deviation of ROE over the last three years. 
Market 
Sharet+1 
 One year ahead market share, measured as the sales of firm i in year t 
(SALE) scaled by total industry sales in the same year, where an industry is 
defined in terms of the Fama–French 48-industry classification. 















          
∆ OC/TA -0.026 -0.129*** -0.009** 0.007*** 
 
(-1.466) (-4.096) (-2.013) (2.605) 
SIZE -0.174*** 0.207*** 0.225*** -0.210*** 
 
(-11.375) (17.254) (19.865) (-11.475) 
MTB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(1.254) (1.402) (1.307) (1.471) 
LEV 2.176*** 2.499*** 0.519*** 0.216 
 
(14.268) (17.741) (4.146) (1.029) 
ROE -0.475*** 0.099*** 0.267*** -0.494*** 
 
(-10.132) (2.849) (7.010) (-9.711) 
ΔSALE 0.724*** 0.827*** 0.094 0.386*** 
 
(6.538) (7.793) (0.947) (3.027) 
CAPEX 3.863*** 3.500*** 1.027* 2.827*** 
 
(6.443) (5.820) (1.853) (4.775) 
AGE -0.590*** -0.366*** -0.067** -0.421*** 
 
(-16.125) (-12.419) (-2.405) (-9.791) 
ATO 0.682*** 0.789*** 0.643*** -0.564*** 
 
(11.417) (14.293) (12.627) (-6.896) 
ADVERT 1.429** -1.703*** -1.386*** 1.780** 
 
(2.445) (-2.899) (-2.620) (2.568) 
R&D 0.050*** 0.006 -0.238*** 0.048*** 
 
(3.140) (0.398) (-9.628) (3.523) 
Constant 1.274*** -0.551 0.168 2.244*** 
 
(2.736) (-1.273) (0.366) (4.122) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
    0.138 
Log pseudo-
likelihood    -68979.989 
Observations 60,747 60,747 60,747 60,747 
 
Notes: This table estimates the association between changes in OC/TA and firm life cycle stages  on 
the sample partitioned by life cycle stage as defined in Dickinson (2011). The indicator for the shake-
out stage is omitted and thus the intercept term captures the effect of the shake-out stage. Other life 
cycle stage coefficients are compared with the shake-out stage. 
Robust z-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 





















       
OC/TA 0.119** -0.374*** -0.261*** 0.360*** -1.065*** -0.802*** 
 (2.395) (-7.760) (-6.359) (7.554) (-16.615) (-9.058) 
       
SIZE -0.215*** 0.147*** 0.195*** -0.186*** 0.104*** 0.344*** 
 (-14.035) (12.065) (16.627) (-10.404) (14.461) (21.288) 
       
MTB 0.027*** -0.004 -0.013** 0.000 -0.026*** -0.413*** 
 (4.056) (-0.641) (-1.962) (0.032) (-7.062) (-26.579) 
       
LEV 2.763*** 2.516*** 0.419*** 0.783*** -0.683*** -0.036 
 (20.330) (19.377) (3.713) (4.441) (-12.665) (-0.413) 
       
ROE -0.404*** 0.081** 0.284*** -0.448*** 0.246*** 1.966*** 
 (-9.868) (2.500) (8.155) (-9.793) (11.410) (25.229) 
       
ΔSALE 0.578*** 0.440*** -0.173** 0.354*** -0.175*** -0.066 
 (7.304) (5.887) (-2.304) (4.211) (-8.845) (-1.641) 
       
CAPEX 16.918*** 18.996*** 11.139*** 4.459*** 0.468*** 1.954*** 
 (21.993) (25.207) (15.308) (4.003) (5.258) (9.795) 
       
AGE -0.515*** -0.234*** -0.023 -0.338*** 0.109*** -0.002 
 (-16.247) (-9.053) (-0.933) (-9.320) (9.397) (-0.086) 
       
ATO 0.333*** 0.574*** 0.542*** -0.770*** 0.237*** 0.316*** 
 (6.327) (12.896) (12.973) (-9.928) (12.153) (9.348) 
       
ADVERT 1.356*** -1.094** -0.689 1.170** 0.992*** 3.800*** 
 (2.588) (-2.221) (-1.469) (2.054) (3.219) (8.317) 
       
R&D 0.194*** 0.116** -0.719*** 0.167*** -0.178*** 0.161*** 
 (3.457) (2.210) (-9.688) (3.216) (-6.596) (4.888) 
       
Constant 0.006 -1.388*** -0.595 1.191** -0.146 -0.582* 
 (0.014) (-3.904) (-1.476) (2.385) (-1.118) (-1.839) 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






    0.167 0.341 0.385 
Log pseudo-
likelihood    -75663.24    
Observations 68,048 68,048 68,048 68,048 67,244 67,244 
 
Notes: 
Robust z/t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 























       
OC/TA 0.044** -0.124*** -0.102*** 0.136*** -0.378*** -0.295*** 
 (2.428) (-6.829) (-6.914) (7.701) (-15.032) (-7.673) 
       
SIZE -0.242*** 0.118*** 0.177*** -0.179*** 0.081*** 0.332*** 
 (-13.068) (8.480) (13.374) (-7.986) (9.552) (16.388) 
       
MTB 0.030*** -0.004 -0.008 -0.001 -0.029*** -0.450*** 
 (3.135) (-0.479) (-1.045) (-0.071) (-5.597) (-20.425) 
       
LEV 2.863*** 2.576*** 0.321** 0.880*** -0.761*** 0.088 
 (16.940) (16.640) (2.371) (4.031) (-10.655) (0.677) 
       
ROE -0.467*** -0.023 0.216*** -0.464*** 0.251*** 2.103*** 
 (-8.390) (-0.561) (4.898) (-7.771) (8.664) (18.846) 
       
ΔSALE 0.902*** 0.854*** 0.220** 0.439*** -0.181*** -0.361*** 
 (6.736) (6.866) (1.961) (2.617) (-5.230) (-4.860) 
       
CAPEX 18.127*** 21.338*** 13.240*** 1.224 0.474*** 1.966*** 
 (17.500) (21.459) (14.113) (0.717) (3.192) (5.980) 
       
AGE -0.501*** -0.266*** -0.040 -0.330*** 0.211*** 0.190*** 
 (-9.454) (-6.956) (-1.119) (-5.584) (10.771) (4.899) 
       
ATO 0.329*** 0.565*** 0.531*** -0.716*** 0.271*** 0.396*** 
 (4.851) (10.332) (10.662) (-6.945) (9.908) (8.264) 
       
ADVERT 0.806 -0.825 -0.489 1.807** 1.954*** 4.463*** 
 (1.005) (-1.238) (-0.789) (2.106) (3.177) (5.675) 
       
R&D 0.188** 0.137* -0.805*** 0.157** -0.237*** 0.092 
 (2.094) (1.662) (-7.971) (1.985) (-4.709) (1.348) 
       
Constant 0.307 -0.993** -0.156 1.625*** -0.470*** -1.261*** 
 (0.547) (-2.047) (-0.322) (3.091) (-3.323) (-3.502) 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






    0.155 0.353 0.350 
Log pseudo-
likelihood    -47536.21   
Observations 43,747 43,747 43,747 43,747 43,289 43,289 
 
Notes: This table estimates the association between OC/TA and firm life cycle stages on the sample 
partitioned by life cycle stage as defined in Dickinson (2011) and DeAngelo et al. (2006). The 
indicator for the shake-out stage is omitted and thus the intercept term captures the effect of the shake-
out stage. Other life cycle stage coefficients are compared with the shake-out stage. 
Robust z-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 





Appendix 2.5: Organization Capital Estimated after Excluding Advertising 















       
OC/TA 0.044*** -0.114*** -0.083*** 0.120*** -0.346*** -0.261*** 
 [2.804] [-7.453] [-6.220] [7.993] [-17.069] [-9.258] 
       
SIZE -0.214*** 0.147*** 0.194*** -0.181*** 0.100*** 0.341*** 
 [-13.904] [12.046] [16.495] [-10.152] [13.953] [21.103] 
       
MTB 0.027*** -0.004 -0.013* 0.000 -0.025*** -0.414*** 
 [4.045] [-0.635] [-1.945] [0.002] [-6.983] [-26.581] 
       
LEV 2.764*** 2.514*** 0.413*** 0.779*** -0.693*** -0.055 
 [20.310] [19.328] [3.655] [4.410] [-12.844] [-0.620] 
       
ROE -0.403*** 0.080** 0.284*** -0.448*** 0.240*** 1.957*** 
 [-9.830] [2.461] [8.145] [-9.790] [11.191] [25.088] 
       
ΔSALE 0.576*** 0.446*** -0.167** 0.354*** -0.161*** -0.055 
 [7.294] [5.970] [-2.234] [4.215] [-8.250] [-1.360] 
       
CAPEX 16.976*** 19.058*** 11.216*** 4.447*** 0.478*** 1.985*** 
 [21.987] [25.187] [15.348] [3.972] [5.381] [9.909] 
       
AGE -0.516*** -0.233*** -0.021 -0.342*** 0.113*** 0.001 
 [-16.263] [-9.004] [-0.864] [-9.409] [9.747] [0.021] 
       
ATO 0.329*** 0.572*** 0.543*** -0.771*** 0.240*** 0.320*** 
 [6.241] [12.830] [12.975] [-9.928] [12.205] [9.397] 
       
ADVERT 1.364*** -1.584*** -1.079** 1.203** -0.010 3.072*** 
 [2.592] [-3.201] [-2.297] [2.139] [-0.036] [7.080] 
       
R&D 0.193*** 0.117** -0.715*** 0.166*** -0.173*** 0.166*** 
 [3.442] [2.229] [-9.630] [3.190] [-6.405] [5.027] 
       
Constant 0.008 -1.361*** -0.563 1.219** -0.129 -0.559* 
 [0.017] [-3.820] [-1.392] [2.443] [-0.990] [-1.765] 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






    0.167 0.347 0.387 
Log pseudo-
likelihood    -75509.70   
Observations 67,894 67,894 67,894 67,894 67,094 67,094 
 
Robust z/t-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 





MANAGEMENT-SPECIFIC ORGANIZATION CAPITAL VS. 
FIRM-SPECIFIC ORGANIZATION CAPITAL – ARE THEY 
THE SAME? EVIDENCE FROM AN ANALYSIS OF FIRM 
RISKS 
3.1 Introduction 
Despite considerable evidence that organization capital improves the productivity, 
efficiency and performance of the firm (Corrado et al., 2009; Fredrickson, 1986; Lev 
et al., 2009), there remains a clear divergence of opinion about the adhesiveness of 
such organization capital. One stream of research argues that organization capital is 
firm-specific as it is rooted in business practice, process and culture (e.g., Atkeson & 
Kehoe, 2005; Lev et al., 2009; Tomer, 1987), another stream of research argues that 
organization capital is embodied in an organization’s employees and their social 
networks (e.g., Becker, 1993; Jovanovic, 1979; Prescott & Visscher, 1980), while 
some studies suggest that efficiency of organization capital is partly firm-specific and 
is embodied in the key talents of the firm (Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013).
22
 These 
studies, however, do not empirically differentiate between management-specific 
(hereafter OC_MS) and firm-specific organization capital (hereafter OC_FS), but 
implicitly assume their identical implications on firm level outcomes, and as such, 
use both forms of organization capital interchangeably. I argue that this assumption 
is questionable. It is important to disentangle OC_FS from the OC_MS in terms of 
their differential effect on idiosyncratic, systematic and total risk.   
  Idiosyncratic risk is unique to a firm in the sense that it has little or no 
association with the market (Campbell et al., 2001; Morck, Yeung, & Yu, 2000). 
Systematic risk measures the sensitivity of a firm’s stock return to the market (Olibe, 
Michello, & Thorne, 2008). Total risk captures the overall variation in the firm's 
                                                             
 This chapter of the thesis has been accepted for presentation at AFAANZ Conference, 2015.   
22
 See Section 3.2.2.3 for a detailed discussion of this. 
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stock return arising from idiosyncratic and systematic risk. Since both idiosyncratic 
and systematic risk have important implications for portfolio management, 
diversification strategy, managerial compensation policies, and valuation of 
employee stock options (March & Shapira, 1987; Weber, 2004), it is important to 
understand the causes and remedies of such risks. I examine the role of OC_MS and 
OC_FS in this process.  
My interest in investigating the role of OC_MS in influencing firm risk stems 
from evidence that talented managers (i.e., managers with more organization capital) 
are more knowledgeable about a firm’s economics and industry dynamics, and are 
more capable of synthesizing information into reliable forward-looking estimates 
(e.g., Libby & Luft, 1993), making them more able to reduce information asymmetry 
and firm-specific risk (Baik, Farber, & Lee, 2011; Chemmanur, Paeglis, & 
Simonyan, 2009; Demerjian et al., 2013). Andreou, Ehrlich, and Louca (2013) find 
that firms with more managerial ability are associated with lower cash flow risk and 
better operating performance. Trueman (1986) suggests that more able managers 
have incentives to build reputation through more transparent and informative 
disclosure. Extensive literature suggests that disclosure quality reduces information 
asymmetry among informed and uninformed market participants (e.g., Diamond & 
Verrecchia, 1991), which reduces uncertainty about the future cash flow, and 
consequently reduce stock-return volatility (e.g., Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). These 
two streams of research together thus suggest that talented managers, by way of 
credible information disclosure, can mitigate the information asymmetry associated 
with the future cash flow, which in turn, reduces idiosyncratic volatility.  
Managerial compensation literature (e.g., Duan & Wei, 2005) suggests that 
top level management of the firm has ability and incentive to influence the 
composition of firm level risks. Individual shareholders hold diversified investment 
to reduce the firm-specific risk. Managers, on the other hand, are largely 
undiversified, as a substantial portion of their wealth is tied to the firm’s fortunes. 
Managers therefore value their firm’s stocks and option-based compensation much 
less than its market value (Meulbroek, 2001). Since undiversified managers are 
exposed to a firm's total risk, but the stock market compensates managers for bearing 
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only the systematic risk (Duan & Wei, 2005; Meulbroek, 2001), undiversified 
managers have incentives to increase the systematic risk and reduce the exposure to 
firm-specific risk, which capable managers can do more efficiently. I thus conjecture 
that managers with more organization capital increase systematic risk, but decrease 
firm-specific risk.  
My quest to examine the impact of OC_FS on firm risk came from recent 
findings that idiosyncratic OC_FS has become an increasingly important driving 
force in attaining productivity, growth and competitiveness (Corrado et al., 2009; 
Fredrickson, 1986). Since OC_FS, in the course of  accumulation, stores, retains, 
integrates and institutionalizes knowledge about business practice, process, and 
systems within databases, documents, patents and manuals (Wright et al., 2001; 
Youndt et al., 2004), it becomes a critical component that guide the future actions of 
firms (Zahra et al., 2000). OC_FS, thus, enhances a firm’s ability to cope with 
general market movement successfully, making the firm less susceptible to macro-
economic shocks (systematic risk). However, return on OC_FS is highly uncertain. 
The same level of investment in organization capital may yield very different results, 
depending on the extent of success or failure in innovation process. Empirical studies 
also document high failure rates of business process redesign (e.g., Sauer & Yetton, 
1997), and IT related organizational change projects (Kemerer & Sosa, 1991). Apart 
from this outcome uncertainty, OC_FS also suffers from estimation difficulty, as 
OC_FS is neither fully tracked nor publicly disclosed by the firm (Lev et al., 2009). 
The implicit, intangible and distinctive characteristics of OC_FS thus induce return 
uncertainty and estimation difficulty, which in turn increase valuation error and 
idiosyncratic volatility.  
It is noteworthy that OC_MS, by dint of inherent ability, can ensure the 
efficient use of codified business practice, processes and systems and thereby reduce 
the return uncertainty associated with OC_FS. OC_MS, when interacted with 
OC_FS, can therefore play a more dominant role in reducing idiosyncratic risk. On 
the other hand, since talented managers are employed and usually adequately 
compensated by firms with more OC_FS (Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013; Lev et al., 
2009), they have little incentive to increase systematic risk to enhance the value of 
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their incentive-based compensation.  OC_FS may help OC_MS to better cope with 
macroeconomic changes, and therefore OC_MS, when interacting with OC_FS, is 
likely to reduce systematic risk.  
The discussion, so far, suggests that OC_MS reduces fundamental and 
information uncertainty, which in turn attenuates the idiosyncratic risk. On the other 
hand, OC_FS induces return uncertainty and estimation difficulty, which in turn 
accentuates idiosyncratic volatility. Studies have consistently documented that 
idiosyncratic risk, rather than systematic risk, constitutes more than 80% of variation 
in the risk of an individual stock (Goyal & Santa-Clara, 2003; Lui, Markov, & 
Tamayo, 2007). Following this line of findings and discussion, I argue that the 
impact of OC_MS and OC_FS on total risk will be the same as that on idiosyncratic 
risk. 
To isolate OC_FS from OC_MS, I posit that OC_MS is determined by 
management ability. I therefore regress the management ability score, developed by 
Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012), on an overall measure of organization capital 
(Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013). The estimated residual from the regression (i.e., 
part of the overall organization capital that is not captured by the managerial talent 
(i.e., OC_MS)) is the organizational capital embodied in the firm (OC_FS). I use the 
market model, CAPM model and Fama-French (1993) three factor model to estimate 
systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk.   
Using a large sample of U.S. data, this study finds that OC_MS decreases 
(increases) idiosyncratic and total (systematic) risk, while OC_FS increases 
(decreases) idiosyncratic and total (systematic) risk. For example, the results show 
that a one decimal point (i.e., 0.10) increase in the OC_MS of the average firm 
reduces (increases) idiosyncratic risk and total risk (beta) by 0.20% and 0.60% 
(8.80%), while a one decimal point increase in the OC_FS of the average firm 
reduces (increases) beta (idiosyncratic risk and total risk) by 0.60% and 1.4% 
(5.10%). Once interaction between OC_MS and OC_FS is allowed for, regression 
results reveal that OC_MS*OC_FS reduces idiosyncratic, systematic and total risk. 
These results are robust after controlling for other determinants of respective risks as 
73 
 
well as alternative specifications of management ability and risk proxies. Additional 
analysis also indicates that OC_MS, individually and collectively (when interacted 
with OC_FS), plays an important role in increasing firm returns. To mitigate the 
endogeneity concern, I use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable 
approach and the results suggest that endogeneity cannot explain away the 
documented relationship.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to my 
knowledge, this is the first empirical study to systematically isolate OC_FS from 
OC_MS and examine their impact on a wide range of firm risks. I empirically show 
that the effect of organization capital on idiosyncratic, systematic and total risk differ 
remarkably based on whether organizational capital is management-specific or firm-
specific. This study thus makes an important contribution to resolving competing 
views of the adhesiveness and effect of different forms of organization capital. 
Second, this paper extends the organization capital literature by directly examining 
the role of OC_MS and OC_FS in influencing firm risks. While prior research 
investigates the association of organization capital with cross sectional stock return 
(Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013), future operating and stock return performance (Lev 
et al., 2009), investment-cash flow sensitivity (Attig & Cleary, 2014a), and 
production possibility (Prescott & Visscher, 1980), little attention has been paid to 
the role of organization capital in influencing idiosyncratic, systematic and total risk. 
This paper bridges this gap in the literature. 
Third, given that organization capital represents a source of productivity and 
efficiency and a key factor affecting a firm’s long-term success and competitiveness 
(Atkeson & Kehoe, 2005; Brynjolfsson et al., 2002; Prescott & Visscher,1980), 
examining the link between organization capital and firm level risks should therefore 
help managers understand the effect of different forms of organization capital on a 
firm’s riskiness. This study thus has an important implication for managerial 
strategic planning, such as portfolio formation, risk management and executive 
compensation. Finally, this study also contributes to the emerging literature on 
managerial ability. Although research efforts to understand the effect of management 
ability on information asymmetry, investment policies and financial performance are 
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numerous (Baik et al. 2011; Chemmanur et al., 2009; Demerjian et al., 2013), little is 
known about how management ability affects idiosyncratic, systematic, and total 
risk. Thus, this study extends the literature on the determinants of firm risks by 
incorporating a human side into the equation. Meulbroek (2001) is the closest paper 
that links executives (more specifically executive compensation) with firm level risk. 
This study shows that executive equity-based compensation can change the risk 
profile of a firm. My paper, in contrast, focuses on the OC_MS that captures the 
efficiency of the managers in performing knowledge-based works and in framing 
firm policy. This finding may be of interest to stakeholders who would like to 
evaluate the role of management-specific organization capital as a potential factor in 
firm level risks.    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related 
literature and develops testable hypotheses. Research design, data collection and 
sample selection are presented in Section 3. Section 4 documents the results of the 
study, while Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 3.2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 Systematic Risk, Idiosyncratic Risk and Total Risk 
Total risk at firm level can be disaggregated into two parts: systematic risk and 
idiosyncratic risk. Systematic risk measures the degree to which a firm's stock return 
co-varies with the economy as a whole. Finance and accounting research 
demonstrates that size, leverage, growth, earnings volatility and diversification 
influence a firm's systematic risk. Idiosyncratic risk, on the other end, reflects firm-
specific return volatility, which arises primarily from a firm’s actions and 
independent of the common market movement. Campbell et al. (2001) suggest a 
number of possible explanations for the existence of idiosyncratic risk, including 
leverage, a higher incidence of conglomerates spin-offs, firm life cycle and option-
based compensation. Irvine and Pontiff (2009) show that fundamental cash flow 
shocks affect idiosyncratic risk. Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) recognize that 
deteriorating financial reporting quality is correlated with idiosyncratic volatility.  
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 Prior studies consistently demonstrate that idiosyncratic risk, rather than 
systematic risk, constitutes the largest component of risk in an individual stock.  Lui, 
Markov, and Tamayo (2007) suggest that idiosyncratic risk accounts for 
approximately 80% of the variation in a firm’s stock. Likewise, Goyal and Santa-
Clara (2003) show that idiosyncratic risk makes up almost 85% of the stock variance. 
Since high idiosyncratic risk reflects high uncertainty about expected cash flows, it 
can put the survival of a firm at risk, hinder efforts to acquire or divest firm stock, 
and affect the value of stock options.     
3.2.2 Management-Specific and Firm-Specific Organization Capital 
3.2.2.1 Management-Specific Organization Capital (OC_MS) 
Management-specific organization capital, the ability of managers to comprehend the 
economies of the firm and to take prudent and timely economic decisions, has 
immense impact on firm policy and performance (e.g., Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; 
Demerjian et al., 2013; Rose & Shepard, 1997). Bertrand and Schoar (2003) suggest 
that managers differ in terms of their ability and style, which largely explains the 
heterogeneity in investment, financing and organizational practices of firms. 
Wasserman, Nohria, and Anand (2010, Chapter 2) find that CEOs have the most 
significant impact where opportunities are scarce or where CEOs have slack 
resources. Other studies also show that firms with more able managers are associated 
with less corporate tax avoidance and more favorable loan contract terms (Francis, 
Sun, & Wu, 2013; Francis, Hasan, & Zhu, 2013b), a lower likelihood and cost of 
insolvency (Leverty & Grace, 2012), and higher pay-for-performance sensitivities 
(Milbourn, 2003). These findings largely support the upper echelons theory of the 
strategic management literature (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), which suggests that 
managerial backgrounds and characteristics explain at least part of a firm’s strategic 
choices and outcomes.  
  A related, yet embryonic, line of research investigates the role of managerial 
ability in a firm’s information environment. Baik et al. (2011) find consistent 
evidence that the more able CEOs make more frequent and more accurate forecasts, 
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and the market becomes more responsive to the news in management forecasts made 
by more able CEOs. In the same vein, Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan (2009) 
suggest that better and reputable managers can convey the intrinsic value of the firm 
more credibly to outsiders, reducing the information asymmetry about the firm in the 
equity market. Nonetheless, Francis et al. (2008) show that more reputed CEOs tend 
to have poorer earnings quality. Demerjian et al. (2013, p. 463) note that, “more able 
managers are associated with fewer subsequent restatements, higher earnings and 
accruals persistence, lower errors in the bad debt provision, and higher quality 
accrual estimations”. In the context of this study, I argue that OC_MS is mostly 
driven by managerial ability to understand firm economy, industry and economic 
dynamics and to make prudent investment, financing and operational decisions. I 
therefore rely on management ability scores in estimating OC_MS.   
3.2.2.2 Firm-Specific Organization Capital (OC_FS) 
Firm-specific organization capital, “represented by the agglomeration of 
technologies—business practices, processes and designs” according to Lev et al. 
(2009, p. 277), “affects a firm’s fundamental ability to generate superior operating, 
investment and innovation performance”. The early management literature defines 
organization capital in terms of firm-specific management practice such as 
decentralization (Caroli & Reenen, 2001), high performance work systems (Bailey et 
al., 2000) and the opportunity to communicate with employees outside the work 
group, while the economics literature defines organization capital in terms of 
information assets (Prescott & Visscher, 1980) and estimates its effect on firm 
performance (e.g., Lev et al., 2009).  
Studies extensively demonstrate that organization capital, in the form of 
superior business practices, processes, culture and organization design, is associated 
with more efficient production and stable business operation and transactions, which 
leads to better firm performance (Fredrickson, 1986; Lev et al., 2009). Attig and 
Cleary (2014a) demonstrate that organization capital reduces a firm’s investment 
sensitivity to internal cash flow. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) show that firms 
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with more organization capital are more productive, have a higher Tobin’s Q and 
higher risk-adjusted returns, and display a higher level of executive compensation. 
Lev et al. (2009) also find that organization capital is positively associated with long-
term operating and stock performance. Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) demonstrate that 
organization capital represents more than 40% of the cash flow generated by all 
intangible assets in the US National Income and Product Accounts. Carlin et al. 
(2012) also recognize that organization capital is a significant source of firm value. 
In sum, OC_FS is valuable because it allows productive interaction between tangible 
and intangible resources for creating economic value and growth (Lev et al., 2009).  
3.2.2.3 Organization Capital: Management-Specific or Firm-Specific? 
Despite the overwhelming evidence that organization capital affects corporate 
productivity, performance and competitiveness, there are diverse views regarding the 
adhesiveness of such organization capital. One school of thought argues that 
organizational capital is embodied in an organization’s employees and their social 
networks (e.g., Becker, 1993; Jovanovic, 1979; Prescott & Visscher, 1980). This 
view suggests that information about employee and task characteristics forms 
organization capital, which improves the match between employees and jobs. 
Conversely, another school of thought believes organization capital embodied in the 
organization itself, since it is rooted in organization practices, processes and systems, 
which do not change even if the employees of the organization are replaced (Atkeson 
& Kehoe, 2005; Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005; Lev et al., 2009; Tomer, 1987).
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Tomer (1990, p. 253) notes that, “the key to superior productivity lies in the quality 
of a company management system, not the quality of their labor or tangible capital or 
technological knowledge”. Carlin et al. (2012) also view organization capital as an 
“intrafirm language”. Evenson and Westphal (1995) relate organization capital to a 
firm’s operating, investment, and innovation capabilities. Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) 
also follow this view and argue that organization capital is firm-specific. 
                                                             




Some studies, however, either explicitly or implicitly suggest that 
organization capital is embodied in the firm’s key talent and its efficiency is firm-
specific (Brynjolfsson et al., 2002; Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013). Therefore, both 
shareholders and managers have a claim to its cash flows. Black and Lynch (2005, 
pp. 206-207) also posit that, “organizational capital may interact with human capital 
and the ability of a firm to undertake organizational change may be a function of the 
human capital of its workforce”. Given the importance of organization capital in 
enhancing the productivity and efficiency of the firm, and ongoing debate about 
whether organization capital is firm-specific or management-specific, this paper 
disentangles OC_FS from OC_MS and investigates whether both forms of 
organization capital affect firm risks in a similar manner.   
3.2.3 Association of Management-Specific and Firm-Specific Organization 
Capital with Idiosyncratic Risk  
3.2.3.1 Management-Specific Organization Capital (OC_MS) and Idiosyncratic 
Risk (IV) 
It is well established that managerial ability improves the information environment of 
the firm and thereby mitigates the information asymmetry between insider and 
outside stockholders. Trueman (1986) and Baik et al. (2011) suggest that managers 
deploy transparency and informative disclosure mechanisms to reveal their superior 
ability and enrich their reputational capital. Demerjian et al. (2013) argue that 
superior knowledgeable of the underlying economies of the business helps more able 
managers to form more accurate judgments in corporate decision making and 
disclosure. Jiraporn, Liu, and Kim (2014) also provide consistent evidence that 
powerful CEOs are well insulated and have fewer incentives to withhold 
information, resulting in more transparency. Chemmanur et al. (2009) show that 
firms with reputable managers are associated with greater analyst followings, and 
lower forecast error and bid-ask spread, implying a lower level of information 
asymmetry. In a recent study, Andreou et al. (2013) show that during the crisis 
period firms with better management ability invest more, generate greater 
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profitability and reduce the cash flow risk, suggesting that managerial ability reduces 
fundamental risk.  
 Extensive theoretical and empirical studies (e.g., Diamond & Verrecchia, 
1991; Easley & O’Hara, 2004; O’Hara, 2003) suggest that financial disclosure 
affects the information environment (information risk) and consequently, its 
idiosyncratic volatility. Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) demonstrate that 
information risk increases market participant estimation of the variance of a firm’s 
cash flow (i.e., idiosyncratic risk). By a similar token, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 
(2011) and Bartram, Brown, and Stulz (2012) find that better quality accounting 
information reduces investor heterogeneity in future returns and thus reduces 
idiosyncratic volatility. Irvine and Pontiff (2009) show that idiosyncratic risk is 
positively associated with cash-flow volatility and economy-wide competition. 
   Studies of executive compensation (e.g., Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2006; 
Duan & Wei, 2005; Rajgopal & Shevlin, 2002; Ryan & Wiggins, 2002) also provide 
considerable evidence that compensation structure and managerial incentives 
influence the composition of firm level risks. Individual shareholders generally hold 
portfolios of stocks to diversify the firm-specific risk and obtain rewards (through 
expected returns) for the systematic component of risk. Compared to shareholders, 
managers are largely undiversified as managerial human capital and their fortune is 
mostly tied to firm performance (May, 1995). Since undiversified managers are 
exposed to the firm's total risk, but compensated for the systematic portion of that 
risk only, top level executives value stocks and options much less than its market 
value (Meulbroek, 2001). The lack of reward for bearing firm-specific risk makes 
this risk more costly to managers, motivating them to reduce idiosyncratic risk. On 
the other hand, since higher systematic risk enhances the value of the stock option 
(Duan & Wei, 2005), top executives strive to increase the systematic component of 
total risk. In sum, incentive-based compensation prompts managers to reduce 
idiosyncratic risk, and increase systematic risk.   
 These studies suggest that firms with more management-specific organization 
capital reduce information asymmetry through credible financial statements and 
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earning forecasts, which improve the information environment and reduce 
heterogeneity among the investors in the firm’s future cash flows.  Undiversifiable 
managerial wealth also prompts to adopt strategies to reduce the firm-specific risk, 
including the cash flow risk. It is therefore not unreasonable to conjecture that 
OC_MS is negatively associated with idiosyncratic risk.   
H1a: Management-specific organization capital reduces idiosyncratic risk.   
3.2.3.2 Firm-Specific Organization Capital (OC_FS) and Idiosyncratic Risk (IV)  
OC_FS is idiosyncratic in nature, yet improves a firm’s operating and innovation 
abilities (Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005).  Investment in OC_FS, of course, does not 
guarantee that a firm will realize the potential benefit inherent in this investment 
(Tomer, 1990). Brynjolfsson et al. (2002) also suggest that firms may invest in 
certain business models, practices, processes and culture, some of which turn out to 
be effective for the firm, and it may take several years to realize the desired benefits. 
The considerable failure rates of business process redesign (e.g., Sauer & Yetton, 
1997) and IT-related organizational change projects (Kemerer & Sosa, 1991) also 
signify the risk associated with OC_FS. Thus, investment in OC_FS involves 
substantial cash outflow, subjective decision making, trial and error, and unexpected 
successes and failures for a firm. In addition to the investment return uncertainty, 
shareholders in firms with high OC_FS are exposed to additional cash flow risks as 
both shareholders and key talent have a claim on the cash flow accruing from 
organization capital (Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013).  
 Firms with high OC_FS are also exposed to valuation uncertainty. Studies 
show that firms, through endogenous learning by doing, acquire and develop 
organizational practices, process, procedures, and culture over the years (Atkeson & 
Kehoe, 2005; Ericson & Pakes, 1995; Rosen, 1972) that are tacit in nature (Lev et al., 
2009). The tacit and idiosyncratic nature of such an agglomeration of organization 
practices and culture are difficult to measure and thus do not have market value 
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(Brynjolfsson et al., 2002). OC_FS is neither fully tracked by a firm
24
, nor 
completely disclosed in financial statements (Brynjolfsson et al., 2002; Lev et al., 
2009). Black and Lynch (2005) also suggest that investment in organizational 
practice, process, change or re-engineering, in an accounting sense, only results in an 
increase in expenses (especially SG&A) rather than an increase in the assets of a 
firm, although such outlays are likely to generate future cash flow for several years. 
Owing to the tacit and idiosyncratic nature, OC_FS is therefore difficult and costly 
for external investors to monitor and measure.  
   The uncertainty relating to the success of investment in OC_FS, appropriation 
of cash flow between shareholder and key talent, and valuation difficulty arising 
from the tacit and idiosyncratic nature of OC_FS has important implications for a 
firm’s idiosyncratic risk. Pástor and Veronesi (2003) show that idiosyncratic return 
volatility tends to be higher for firms with more uncertainty about future profitability 
and with more volatile profitability. Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) also 
find that firms with more corporate innovation are associated with higher firm-
specific volatility. The cash flow, return and valuation uncertainty associated with 
OC_FS thus suggests that idiosyncratic volatility is likely to be greater for firms with 
more OC_FS, leading to the following hypothesis: 
 H1b: Firm-specific organization capital increases idiosyncratic risk.   
3.2.3.3 Interaction Effect of Management-Specific and Firm-Specific 
Organization Capital on Idiosyncratic Risk 
When taken in isolation, the above discussion suggests that OC_MS (OC_FS) 
reduces (increases) idiosyncratic risk. Considering the differential role of OC_MS 
                                                             
24 For example, the cost of on-the-job training and the extensive efforts of employees to better educate 
themselves and improve the efficiency of a firm’s production, research, and selling processes are not 





and OC_FS in effecting idiosyncratic risk, a natural question arises about which form 
of organization capital plays a more dominant role in influencing idiosyncratic risk.  
I argue that since OC_MS is associated with more information disclosure 
and, therefore, with less information asymmetry, this component of organization 
capital may play a more crucial role in alleviating heterogeneity among the investors 
about the firm value and return. Even though cash flow appropriation risk and 
valuation uncertainty relating to OC_FS still prevails, management-specific 
organization capital, by dint of its superior capability, is likely to utilize OC_FS in 
more efficient manner, reducing the uncertainty regarding the success of OC_FS in 
generating expected outcome. It is therefore reasonable to conjecture that: 
H1c: Management-specific organization capital, when interacting with firm-specific  
        organization capital, plays a more dominant role in reducing idiosyncratic risk. 
 3.2.4 Association of Management-Specific and Firm-Specific Organization 
Capital with Systematic Risk 
3.2.4.1 Management-Specific Organization Capital (OC_MS) and Systematic 
Risk (BETA)  
Section 3.2.3.1 explains that since undiversified managers bear the total risk (both 
idiosyncratic and systematic risk), in order to adequately compensate them, their 
compensation would need to be commensurate with total volatility, however, since 
undiversified managers are compensated only for the systematic component of total 
risk, they value incentive-based compensation much less than its market value. This 
prompts managers to increase the systematic portion of risk to increase their 
expected return (Duan & Wei, 2005; Meulbroek, 2001; Tian, 2004).  
 In the context of this paper, I argue that managers with more OC_MS have an 
incentive to increase the operational size of the firm, as managerial pay and prestige 
are associated with firm size. In enhancing the firm size, managers opt for a 
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diversification strategy. Amihud and Lev (1981) also show that managers engage in 
conglomerate mergers to decrease their largely undiversifiable "employment risk". 
Studies show that firms with high general, financial and managerial competencies 
pursue unrelated diversification (Montgomery & Singh, 1984), which other studies 
(Montgomery & Singh, 1984; Olibe et al., 2008; Porter, 1985) suggest as a source of 
systematic risk. Thus, managerial incentives for higher pay and prestige encourage 
managers to increase the systematic risk, lending support to the following 
hypothesis: 
H2a: Management-specific organization capital is positively associated with 
systematic risk. 
3.2.4.2 Firm-Specific Organization Capital (OC_FS) and Systematic Risk 
(BETA) 
The strategic management literature (e.g., Barney, 1986; Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 
1988) has long recognized the importance of organization capital in shaping a firm’s 
competitive advantage. Traditionally, firms in the same industry competed with each 
other based on quality and price, which encouraged firms to invest mostly in physical 
capital. Firm performance, in that setting, was largely determined by the general 
market condition, leading to a positive co-movement among the firms. However, 
nowadays, firms compete intensively with unique and inimitable intangible assets, 
business practice, process, and culture (Quinn, Anderson, & Finkelstein, 2005), 
making quality and price the entry tickets to the marketplace, and making the 
industry- and economy-wide shock less pronounced for these firms.  
 Firms, in the years of their existence, accumulate organization capital though 
learning by doing (Ericson & Pakes, 1995), most of which can be documented and 
archived. Such codified, integrated, and stored firm-specific knowledge can guide the 
firm's future actions (Hansen, Nohria, & Tierney, 1999; Zahra et al., 2000). OC_FS 
therefore helps a firm to retain its leading position in the market place for long 
periods of time, despite changes in industry dynamics and economic conditions. Lev 
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et al. (2009) suggest that OC_FS enabled Wal-Mart in retail, Microsoft in software, 
Southwest among airlines, DuPont in chemicals, Exxon in oil and gas, and Intel in 
microprocessors to maintain a dominant presence in their respective industries. 
Demand for the products of firms with more organization capital is less affected by 
common risk factors. Therefore, it is reasonable to contend that OC_FS weakens the 
co-movement among the firms, leading firms with more organization capital to be 
less associated with systematic risk. The following hypothesis is developed to test 
this proposition: 
 H2b: Firm-specific organization capital is negatively associated with systematic 
risk. 
3.2.4.3 Interaction Effect of Management-Specific and Firm-Specific 
Organization Capital on Systematic Risk 
My earlier discussion suggests that OC_MS increases systematic risk, and OC_FS 
reduces this risk. One interesting question is how both OC_MS and OC_FS, when 
interacting, affect systematic risk. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) find that key 
talent accounts for a significant fraction of corporate earnings in high organization 
capital firms. They also note that talented managers in high organization capital firms 
share the cash flows accruing from organization capital. Lev et al. (2009) also show 
that executive compensation, both total compensation and pay-for-performance 
sensitivity of equity, is positively associated with OC_FS. Carlin et al. (2012) show 
that firms with more organization capital have lower employee turnover. These 
findings imply that key executives with high organization capital are usually well 
paid, reducing their incentives to enhance the value of incentive-based compensation 
by exposing firms with more systematic risk. Accumulated OC_FS helps more able 
managers to cope with industry- and economy-wide challenges. I therefore argue that 
OC_MS, in the presence of OC_FS, is likely to negatively affect systematic risk.  
H2c: Management-specific organization capital, when interacting with firm-specific 
organization capital, reduces systematic risk.  
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3.2.5 Management-Specific and Firm-Specific Organization Capital and Total 
Risk  
The total risk of a firm entails both idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk. Studies 
(e.g., Goyal & Santa-Clara, 2003; Lui et al., 2007) have shown that idiosyncratic risk 
accounts for more than 80% of the variation in a firm’s stock return. Since 
idiosyncratic risk constitutes a significantly large component of total risk, the trade-
off of OC_MS in reducing idiosyncratic risk and increasing systematic risk tends to 
support the view that OC_MS reduces the total risk of a firm. By the same token, the 
role of OC_FS in increasing idiosyncratic risk and reducing systematic risk tends to 
support the theory that OC_FS increases the total risk of a firm, leading to the 
following hypotheses:  
H3a: Management-specific organization capital reduces the total risk of a firm. 
H3b: Firm-specific organization capital increases the total risk of ae firm. 
Recall from my discussion in Section 3.2.3.3 that OC_MS, when interacting 
with OC_FS, is expected to play a more dominant role in reducing idiosyncratic risk. 
In the preceding section I noted that idiosyncratic risk constitutes the greatest 
component of total risk. Based on that argument, I thus hypothesize that OC_MS, 
when interacting with OC_FS, plays the dominant role in reducing total risk.   
H3c: Management-specific organization capital, when interacting with firm-specific 
organization capital, reduces the total risk. 
3.3 Research Design 
3.3.1 Sample and Data 
I collected data for this study from four sources: managerial ability scores from Sarah 
McVay’s website
25
, the corresponding financial information from the Compustat 
                                                             
25This data was originally used in Demerjian et al. (2012), which is used in various subsequent studies 
(e.g., Demerjian et al., 2013; 2014; Francis et al. 2013a; 2013b). This data can be accessed from 
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database, stock returns, prices and trading volume data from the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP), and finally daily factor data (e.g., SMB, HML, and UMD) 
from Kenneth R. French’s web site
26
. I begin with the managerial ability data for all 
firms from 1980 to 2012, as used in Demerjial et al. (2013). I then exclude financial 
(SIC 6000 - 6999) and utility (SIC 4900 - 4949) firms, and stock traded outside 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ (EXCHG =11, 12 and 14). I also exclude observations 
with missing values in the measurement of the key dependent, independent and 
control variables. To avoid the undesirable influence of outliers, I winsorize key 
variables in the extreme 1% of the respective distributions. Table 3.1 presents the 
sample selection (Panel A) and industry distribution of the sample (Panel B). 
Variable definitions are presented in the appendix 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Sample Selection and Distribution of the Sample 
  
Panel A: Data and Sample 
Description 
Total number of 
observations 
Management ability data available from 1980 to 2012 from 
Demergian (2012) 190,843 
Less: 
 Financial and utility firms (5,162+ 346) (5,508) 
Firms listed outside NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ  (77,314) 
Firms with missing values for organization capital variable  (22,731) 
Firms with missing values for risk variables (4,014) 
Firms with missing values for the variables used in the 
regression model (6,143) 
Final Sample 75,133 
 
 Panel A of Table 3.1 shows that there are 190,843 firm-year observations, 
initially with management ability score. The exclusion of financial and utility firms 
(5,508 firm years), firms listed outside NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ (77,314 firm 
years), and firms with missing values for the organization capital variable, risk 
variables and control variables used in the regression model (22,731, 4,014, and 
6,143 firm years, respectively) yield a final sample of 75,133 firm year observations. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
http://faculty.washington.edu/smcvay/abilitydata.html. I thank the authors for making this data 
publicly available. 
26http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Research. I thank 
Kenneth French for making this data available. 
87 
 
The number of observations in any given regression varies depending on the model-
specific data requirements. 
Panel B: Industry Distribution 
Industry name 
Total Number of 
Observations 
% of Observations 
Consumer nondurables 5,760    7.67% 
Consumer durables 2,503   3.33% 
Manufacturing 12,782 17.01% 
Oil, gas and coal extraction and products 4,897   6.52% 
Chemicals and allied products 2,857   3.80% 
Business equipment 17,912 23.84% 
Telephone and television transmission 2,172   2.89% 
Wholesale, retail and some services 9,653 12.85% 
Healthcare, medical equipment and drugs 7,289   9.70% 
Other 9,308 12.39% 
Total 75,133 100.00% 
 
Table 3.1, Panel B reports the composition of the sample by the 12 industry 
groups. The sample is unevenly distributed across industries (with the largest 
samples being in the business equipment (23.84%) and manufacturing (17.01%) 
industries, respectively). 
3.3.2 Dependent Variables: Firm Risks   
I use daily stock returns as a basis of calculating annual estimates of idiosyncratic 
and systematic risk.  I run the following market model, CAPM and Fama-French 
(1993) three-factor regressions for each firm in each year. I require at least 175 daily 
observations to compute idiosyncratic and systematic risk.     
Market Model 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡) +  𝑖,𝑡,            𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇        (3.1) 
where Ri,t is the raw stock return on day t for firm i, Rm,t is the daily return from the 
CRSP value-weighted market index, αi (or alpha) is the intercept term, βi (or beta) is 
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the slope coefficient that captures systematic risk, and εi,t is an error term. The 
standard deviation of the residuals from the above regression model is my annual 
measure of idiosyncratic risk. 
CAPM Model 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) +  𝑖,𝑡 ,            𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 (3.2) 
where Ri,t is the stock return on day t for firm i, Rf,t is the simple daily return from 
holding a 30-day risk-free treasury-bill and the remaining variables are as in 
Equation (3.1).  
Fama-French (1993) Model 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +  𝑖,𝑡 ,         (3.3)  
where SMBt and HMLt are the size premium (Small Minus Big) and the value 
premium (High Minus Low), collected from Kenneth French’s website, and the 
remaining variables are as in equation (3.1)
27
. 
 Following earlier studies (e.g., Armstrong & Vashishtha, 2012; Bargeron, 
Lehn, & Zutter, 2010; Chen, Steiner, & Whyte, 2006) I estimate total risk as the 
standard deviation of monthly stock return (STD_RET) and rolling standard 
deviation of monthly stock return over the prior three years (STD_RET_3).   
3.3.3 Independent Variable: Estimation of Management-Specific and Firm-
Specific Organization Capital 
3.3.3.1 Management-Specific Organization Capital (OC_MS) 
OC_MS is reflected in the managerial ability to efficiently generate revenues from 
given economic resources. Identifying a reliable proxy for managerial ability is 
                                                             
27 As I intend to examine the idiosyncratic risk of individual firms and relate it to firm-specific 
characteristics, consistent with Brown and Kapadia (2007), I use this methodology as opposed to that 
proposed by Campbell et al. (2001), which produces average values of idiosyncratic risk for a set of 
firms (all listed firms in their paper) and which cannot serve my purpose. 
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complex, simply because a manager’s reputational assessment is multidimensional. 
Prior literature uses media citations and industry-adjusted returns as indirect proxies 
for managerial ability (Milbourn, 2003; Rajgopal, Shevlin, &  Zamora, 2006). These 
indirect proxies have, however, been subjected to criticism, such as, prior abnormal 
stock returns include information above and beyond management’s control. 
Demerjian et al. (2012) use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to evaluate the relative 
efficiency of firm level managers in converting certain inputs (e.g., Net PP&E; Net 
Operating Leases; Net R&D; Purchased Goodwill; Other Intangible Assets; Cost of 
Inventory; and SG&A Expenses) into outputs (revenue, income, etc.). Using an 
optimization procedure incorporating these variables, the authors calculate firm 
efficiency, and then regress it on six firm characteristics that affect firm efficiency: 
firm size, firm market share, cash availability, life cycle, operational complexity, and 
foreign operations. The residual term derived from this regression is the component 
reflecting managerial ability.
28
 Given its superior power to capture managerial ability 
and operational efficiency relative to their industry peers, I use Demerjian et al.’s 
(2012) score as my primary proxy for OC_MS. Since OC_MS is mostly driven by 
managerial ability, I use OC_MS and managerial ability interchangeably.  
3.3.3.2 Firm-Specific Organization Capital (OC_FS) 
To derive OC_FS, I first estimate overall organization capital (OC) at firm level, and 
then regress this overall organization capital on OC_MS. The residual term from this 
regression (i.e., part of the overall organization capital that is not captured by the 
OC_MS) is my estimate of OC_FS. 
I follow Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) to estimate overall organization 
capital based on SG&A expenses. Lev et al. (2009) argue that SG&A expenses 
include costs relating to developing information systems, employee training, R&D, 
consultant fees and brand promotion, which aid in building organization capital. I 
                                                             
28 For a detailed exposition of the measurement of managerial talent using DEA, please refer to 
Demerjian et al. (2012, pp. 1235-1238). 
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calculate the stock of overall organization capital each year by accumulating the 
deflated value of SG&A expenses based on the following equation: 
𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1(1 − 𝛿0) +  
𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡
      (3.4) 
where 𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡 (and 𝛿0) denote the stock of organization capital at time t (and 
depreciation rate of OC), while SGA and 𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 are SG&A expenses and the consumer 
price index, respectively. 




,        (3.5) 
Following Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), I use a depreciation rate of 15%. 
Growth (𝑔) in the flow of organization capital is estimated as the average real growth 
of firm-level SG&A expenses. I replace any missing values of SG&A with zero. 
 Finally, firm-specific organization capital (OC_FSi,t) is estimated as the 
residual from the following regression model: 
𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡   = 𝑂𝐶_𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐸𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐸𝑆    (3.6) 




                                                             
29
 Carlin et al. (2012) argue that firms in rapidly changing industries are less likely to invest in 
organization capital because such industries have a greater technology obsolescence risk, which 
reduces the usefulness of a firm’s organization capital in the future. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) 
show that firms accumulate stocks of organization capital over the years. Therefore, I include industry 
and year dummies to control for the effects of industry and time in the regression model, however, 




3.3.4 Control Variables 
My regression models incorporate a number of control variables that prior studies 
suggest affect idiosyncratic, systematic and total risk. Large firms tend to diversify 
their businesses more efficiently and are less prone to bankruptcy (Titman & 
Wessels, 1988), therefore these firms experience lower return volatility (Pástor & 
Veronesi, 2003). Olibe et al. (2008) contend that large firms are associated with less 
systematic risk due to economics of scale and superior ability to cope with economic 
changes. Hence, I control for firm size (SIZE) in the regression model. Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam (2011) suggest that leverage (LEV) increases stockholder risk 
associated with a firm’s cash flow, suggesting a positive relationship between stock 
return volatility and financial leverage. Hong and Sarkar (2007) and Hamada (1972) 
also argue that systematic risk is an increasing function of leverage ratio. Cao, Simin, 
and Zhao (2008) and Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) show that firms with more 
growth opportunities are likely to experience higher idiosyncratic volatility. 
Unexpected earnings associated with growth opportunities are riskier than normal 
earnings which generate a positive association between growth and risk (Botosan & 
Plumlee, 2005). I control for firm growth by using the market to book (MTB) ratio. 
Studies (e.g., Pástor & Veronesi, 2003; Wei & Zhang, 2006) have shown that a 
decrease in corporate earnings and an increase in earnings volatility account for the 
growth in idiosyncratic volatility. With respect to systematic risk, Hong and Sarkar 
(2007) show that equity beta is an increasing function of earnings volatility. These 
studies generally argue that high profitability and stock return, and lower volatility in 
profit can enhance a company’s ability to lower financial instability and thus lessen 
idiosyncratic and systematic risk, and therefore, in the regression models, I control 
for firm profitability (PM), stock return (RET) and cash flow risk (STD_CFO).   
Irvine and Pontiff (2009) suggest that competition among firms has important 
implications for idiosyncratic risk. Irvine and Pontiff (2004) also show that 
increasing competition leads to increasing cash flow variability, which increases 
idiosyncratic risk. I therefore control for market competition using Herfildile Index 
(HINDEX). Cao et al. (2008) argue that the future cash flows of younger firms are 
more uncertain than those of older firms, indicating that a firm’s age (AGE) affects 
firm-specific volatility. Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes (1970) show the negative 
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impact of dividend payout on systematic risk. In the regression model, I therefore 
control for firm age (AGE) and dividend (DIV).   
 
3.3.5 Empirical Model 
I test the association of OC_FS and OC_MS with firm risks with the following 
regression models:  
𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝐶_𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝐶_𝐹𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑂𝐶_𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝐶_𝐹𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑇𝐵 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑇𝐷_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽10𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐸𝑆 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐸𝑆 + 𝑖,𝑡                                    (3.7)  
 
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝜏1𝑂𝐶_𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏2𝑂𝐶_𝐹𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏3𝑂𝐶_𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝐶_𝐹𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝜏4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏7𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏8𝑆𝑇𝐷_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏9𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡  +
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐸𝑆 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐸𝑆 + 𝑖,𝑡                                                                                (3.8)  
 
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛼0 + 𝛾1𝑂𝐶_𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑂𝐶_𝐹𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑂𝐶_𝑀𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝐶_𝐹𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛾4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑀𝑇𝐵 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝑆𝑇𝐷_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾9𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾10𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾11𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐸𝑆 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐸𝑆 + 𝑖,𝑡                                (3.9)  
3.4 Empirical Findings and Discussion 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.2, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the key variables used in the 
study. The results indicate that the annual estimates of mean idiosyncratic volatility 
based on market model and CAPM model are 3.2% and 3.2% whereas the volatility 
measure based on the Fama-French three factor model is 3.1%. Moreover, the mean 
(median) systematic volatility - BETA is 0.859 (0.878). The mean (median) of total 
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risk (STD_RET) is 13.6% (11.7%). The mean values of OC_MS and OC_FS are -
0.005 and 0.000 respectively. Owing to regression residuals, as in Demerjian et al. 
(2012, 2013), these values are close to 0.  Descriptive statistics show that the average 
firm has a SIZE of 5.603, leverage (LEV) ratio of 16.9% of total assets, market to 
book (MTB) ratio of 2.603, profit margin (PM) of -3.30%, cash flow volatility 
(STD_CFO) of 6.70%, AGE of 16.63 years, stock return (RET) of 18.80% and 
dividend payout (DIV) of 10.5%.  
Table 3.2:   
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
25% Median 75% 
Risk Related 
Variables       
IV_MKT 75133 0.032 0.018 0.019 0.027 0.039 
IV_CAPM 75133 0.032 0.018 0.019 0.027 0.039 
IV_FF3 75133 0.031 0.018 0.019 0.027 0.039 
BETA 75133 0.859 0.591 0.425 0.801 1.224 
STD_RET 75133 0.136 0.076 0.083 0.117 0.166 
STD_RET_3 71884 0.136 0.065 0.046 0.090 0.122 
       
OC Variables       
OC_MS
a
 75133 -0.005 0.136 -0.090 -0.011 0.072 
OC_FS
a
 75133 0.000 1.652 -0.907 -0.336 0.333 
       
Control Variables 
      
SIZE 75133 5.603 1.968 4.178 5.47 6.912 
LEV 75133 0.169 0.177 0.009 0.127 0.267 
MTB 75133 2.603 3.364 1.119 1.827 3.051 
PM 75133 -0.033 0.882 0.005 0.058 0.119 
STD_CFO 75133 0.067 0.115 0.014 0.03 0.069 
HINDEX 75133 0.442 0.150 0.322 0.405 0.513 
AGE 75133 16.633 15.144 5.879 12.055 21.858 
RET 75133 0.188 0.643 -0.196 0.083 0.403 
DIV 75133 0.105 0.287 0.000 0.000 0.141 
       
       
 
Note: aFor the regression analysis I use decile values for these variables. In the descriptive statistics I 
present the untransformed variable for ease of interpretation. 




Panel B: Correlation Matrix  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
IV_CAPM (1) 1.000 
              IV_FF3 (2) 0.999 1.000 
             BETA (3) 0.003 -0.011 1.000 
            STD_RET (4) 0.731 0.724 0.210 1.000 
           OC_MS (5) -0.112 -0.112 0.016 -0.077 1.000 
          OC_FS (6) 0.170 0.173 -0.129 0.086 0.034 1.000 
         SIZE (7) -0.494 -0.497 0.288 -0.314 0.028 -0.273 1.000 
        LEV (8) -0.060 -0.059 -0.024 -0.041 -0.113 -0.155 0.246 1.000 
       MTB (9) -0.019 -0.022 0.134 0.054 0.106 0.011 0.022 -0.068 1.000 
      PM (10) -0.193 -0.192 -0.032 -0.179 0.140 -0.053 0.103 -0.006 -0.032 1.000 
     STD_CFO (11) 0.343 0.342 0.094 0.340 -0.046 0.166 -0.223 -0.072 0.111 -0.213 1.000 
    HINDEX (12) -0.066 -0.064 -0.072 -0.081 -0.023 -0.023 -0.033 0.020 -0.046 0.036 -0.064 1.000 
   AGE (13) -0.349 -0.347 -0.028 -0.312 0.008 0.098 0.350 0.038 -0.085 0.101 -0.200 0.095 1.000 
  RET (14) -0.011 -0.011 0.066 0.162 0.057 -0.021 -0.034 -0.029 0.223 0.060 0.033 0.000 -0.011 1.000 
 DIV (15) -0.227 -0.225 -0.068 -0.212 0.019 -0.003 0.172 0.045 -0.001 0.059 -0.110 0.034 0.173 -0.021 1 
 
Notes: 
All numbers except those in italics are significant at p<0.01  




Table 3.2, Panel B reports the pair-wise correlation between the variables included in 
the regression models. As expected, OC_MS is negatively correlated (p<0.01) with 
idiosyncratic volatility and total volatility, while significantly positively correlated 
with systematic risk (BETA). On the other hand, OC_FS is positively correlated 
(p<0.01) with idiosyncratic risk and total risk, while this is significantly (p<.01) 
negatively correlated with systematic risk (BETA). As consistent with Demerjian et 
al. (2012) SIZE, RET and PM are positively correlated (p<.01) with the OC_MS. 
Furthermore, consistent with prior findings (Jiang, Xu, & Yao, 2009; Fu, 2009) 
idiosyncratic risk (IV_CAPM and IV_FF3) is negatively correlated (p<.01) with 
SIZE, LEV, RET and MTB). Conversely, systematic risk (BETA) is positively 
(negatively) correlated (p<.01) with SIZE, MTB, STD_CFO and RET (PM, 
HINDEX, AGE and DIV), implying that large and growth firms with volatile cash 
flow and returns are associated with more systematic risk, while mature firms with 
more market share and dividend payouts are associated with less systematic risk. 
Overall, the correlations reported in the table are in the expected direction and thus 
provide strong support for the validity of my key measures and constructs. 
3.4.3 Regression Results 
3.4.3.1 Association of Management-Specific (OC_MS) and Firm-Specific 
(OC_FS) Organization Capital with Idiosyncratic Risk (IV) 
Panel A of Table 3.3 presents the regression results for the association of OC_MS 
and OC_FS with idiosyncratic risk (proxied by IV_MKT, IV_CAPM and IV_FF3 
and labeled as Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3, respectively) with clustered standard 
errors at the firm level (Equation 3.7). I also examine the impact of interaction 
between OC_MS and OC_FS (OC_MS*OC_FS) on idiosyncratic volatility. Note 
that I create decile ranks of OC_MS and OC_FS by year and industry to make the 
score more comparable across time and industries and to mitigate the influence of 
extreme observations. These ranked OC_MS and OC_FS are used in the regression 
analysis. As expected, the regression coefficients on OC_MS in Model 1 to Model 3 
are negative (β1 = -0.002, -0.002 and -0.002, respectively) and significant (p<.01), 
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while that on OC_FS are positive (β2 = 0.006, 0.006, and 0.006, respectively) and 
significant (p<.01). Thus, the regression coefficients for OC_MS and OC_FS do not 
reject H1a and H1b, implying that management (firm) specific organization capital 
reduces (increases) idiosyncratic volatility of the firm. In terms of economic 
significance, regression results suggest that controlling for other firm characteristics, 
a one decimal point (i.e., 0.10) increase in the OC_MS (OC_FS) of the average firm 
reduces (increases) idiosyncratic volatility by 0.20% (0.60%). Negative and 
significant coefficients for OC_MS support the view that managerial talents can 
reduce information asymmetry and uncertainty about future cash flow, causing a 
reduction in investor heterogeneity about future returns. Positive and significant 
coefficients for OC_FS support the assertion that OC_FS, owing to its high outcome 
and valuation uncertainty, induces heterogeneity among investors about future return, 
causing an increase in idiosyncratic volatility. 
Coefficients for OC_MS*OC_FS (β3 = -0.005, -0.005, and -0.005, 
respectively) suggest the dominant and significant (p<0.01) role of OC_MS in 
reducing idiosyncratic risk, lending support to H1c. Thus, the above base effects and 
interaction effects, overall, indicate that the role of OC_MS in reducing idiosyncratic 
risk accentuates in the presence of OC_FS, while the role OC_FS in increasing 
idiosyncratic risk attenuates in the presence of OC_MS. In particular, the role of 
OC_MS in reducing idiosyncratic risk is expected to accentuate from -0.002 to -
0.007 when OC_FS moves from the lowest (10%) to the highest decile (100%). 
However, the impact of OC_FS in increasing idiosyncratic risk attenuates from 0.006 
to 0.001 when OC_MS moves from the lowest to the highest decile. These results 
support my conjecture that when OC_FS and OC_MS are interacting, OC_MS play a 
more dominant role in reducing idiosyncratic risk.  
The regression results in Table 3.3, Panel A show that the coefficients for the 
most of the control variables have the predicted signs and statistical significance. For 
example, consistent with the empirical findings (e.g., Brown & Kapadia, 2007; Chen, 
Huang, & Jha, 2012; Ferreira & Laux, 2007; Rajgopal & Venkatachalam, 2011) 
SIZE, PM, AGE (LEV, STD_CFO) are negatively (positively) associated with the 
idiosyncratic risk, implying that large, profitable and mature (levered and volatile 
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cash flow) firms are exposed to less (more) idiosyncratic risk. The positive (negative) 
coefficient of RET (MTB) is consistent with the findings of Brown and Kapadia 
(2007) and Chen et al. (2012), respectively.  
Table 3.3: Regression Results  
Panel A:  Association of Management- and Firm- Specific Organization Capital with 
Idiosyncratic Risk  
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
Dep. Var. IV_MKT IV_CAPM IV_FF3 
        
OC_MS -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(-3.58) (-3.60) (-3.55) 
OC_FS 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 
(8.15) (8.11) (8.26) 
OC_MS  * OC_FS -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 
(-4.99) (-4.97) (-4.95) 
SIZE -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 
(-47.33) (-47.43) (-47.34) 
LEV 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(12.75) (12.74) (12.84) 
MTB -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-11.32) (-11.32) (-11.85) 
PM -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(-8.81) (-8.80) (-8.73) 
STD_CFO 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 
(27.01) (26.97) (26.52) 
HINDEX -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-0.84) (-0.86) (-0.82) 
AGE -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(-17.88) (-17.89) (-17.50) 
RET 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(4.19) (4.14) (3.95) 
Constant 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 
 
(22.05) (22.33) (22.02) 
YEAR FE Yes  Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY FE Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 75,133 75,133 75,133 
Adj. R-squared 0.49 0.49 0.49 
 
Notes: 
Robust t-statistics in brackets.  
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 




3.4.3.2 Association of Management-Specific (OC_MS) and Firm-Specific 
(OC_FS) Organization Capital with Systematic Risk (BETA) 
Next I examine the association of OC_MS and OC_FS with systematic risk (BETA) 
and test whether OC_MS and OC_FS, when interacting, strengthen or weaken the 
relationship. As argued before, undiversifiable talented managers (i.e., OC_MS) 
pursue strategies (e.g., conglomerate mergers (Amihud & Lev, 1981)) to decrease 
their "employment risk", which in turn increases systematic risk (Porter, 1985) and 
managerial payoff. Conversely, codified, integrated and institutionalized firm-
specific knowledge about business practice and process (OC_FS) assist a firm to 
successfully cope with general market shock, making the firm less susceptible to 
systematic risk. Since OC_FS are associated with higher compensation (Eisfeldt & 
Papanikolaou, 2013; Lev et al., 2009) and lower employment risk (Carlin et al., 
2012), managerial incentives for increasing the systematic risk should attenuate for 
these firms. Since accumulated OC_FS assists talented managers to cope with 
macro-economic movement, the interaction of OC_MS and OC_FA should decrease 
the systematic risk.   
Table 3.3, Panel B reports regression results for Equation (3.8), where I use 
three proxies for systematic risk. The regression results show that the coefficients on 
OC_MS (OC_FS) are positive (negative) and statistically significant for systematic 
risk (the coefficients on OC_MS (OC_FS) are 0.088 (-0.051) with an associated t-
statistic of 3.68 (-2.10) for BETA). These coefficients for OC_MS and OC_FS lend 
support to H2a and H2b. These results are also economically significant: controlling 
for other firm characteristics, a one standard deviation increase in the OC_MS 
(OC_FS) of the average firm in Model 1increases (reduces) systematic risk by 






Panel B:  Association of Management- and Firm-Specific Organization Capital with 
Systematic Risk  
  (Model 1) 
Dep. Var. BETA 































YEAR FE Yes 
INDUSTRY FE Yes 
Observations (N) 75,133 
Adj. R-squared 0.26 
 
Notes: 
Robust t-statistics in brackets.  
Now, I concentrate on the coefficient for the interaction variable (OC_MS * 
OC_FS) which indicates the combined effect of OC_MS and OC_FS in influencing 
systematic risk. The coefficients for the interaction variable are negative (𝜏3 = -0.169 
and significant (at p<.01), suggesting that interaction between OC_MS and OC_FS 
reduces systematic risk. The base coefficient and interaction coefficient, together, in 
Model 1 imply that the effect of OC_MS on systematic risk is expected to decrease 
from 0.071 to -0.081 when OC_FS moves from the lowest (10%) to the highest 
decile (100%), however, the impact of OC_FS on systematic risk is expected to 
increase from -0.068 to -0.220 when OC_MS moves from the lowest to the highest 
decile. The interaction coefficients thus imply that OC_MS, when interacted with 
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OC_FS, play a more crucial role in reducing the systematic risk of the firm. Overall, 
my analysis as shown in Table 3.3 lends support to the findings of Teece et al. (1997) 
that managerial and organizational process and abilities determine a firm’s ability to 
react and adapt to ever-changing business environments. 
3.4.3.3 Association of Management-Specific (OC_MS) and Firm-Specific 
(OC_FS) Organization Capital with Total Risk 
Table 3.3, Panel C reports the regression results for Equation 3.9. Model 1 (Model 2) 
shows the association of OC_MS and OC_FS with respect to STD_RET 
(STD_RET_3). As expected, OC_MS reduces (ϒ1 = -0.006 and -0.005) total risk 
significantly (both at p<.05), while OC_FS increases (ϒ2 = 0.014 and 0.005) total 
firm risk. Interaction between OC_MS and OC_FS reduces (ϒ3 = -0.019 and -0.010) 
total risk significantly (both at p<0.01). The sign and significance of the variables in 
this regression table (Panel C) are largely consistent with the results reported in Panel 
A of Table 3.3, lending support to the findings of Lui et al. (2007) and Goyal and 
Santa-Clara (2003) that idiosyncratic risk makes up the dominant part of total stock 
variance and thus the results reported in Panel C are driven mostly by the 
idiosyncratic risk.  
The coefficients for most of the control variables have the predicted signs and 
statistical significance. For example, consistent with the empirical findings (e.g., 
Armstrong & Vashishtha, 2012; Chen et al., 2006) SIZE, PM, AGE (LEV, 
STD_CFO, RET) are negatively (positively) associated with the total risk, signifying 
that large, profitable and mature (levered and volatile cash flow) firms are exposed to 







Panel C:  Association of Management- and Firm- Specific Organization Capital with 
Total Risk   
  (Model 1) (Model 2) 
Dep. Var. STD_RET STD_RET_3 
      
OC_MS -0.006** -0.005** 
 
(-2.47) (-2.02) 
OC_FS 0.014*** 0.005* 
 
(5.39) (1.84) 
OC_MS * OC_FS -0.019*** -0.010*** 
 
(-4.71) (-2.58) 
SIZE -0.009*** -0.010*** 
 
(-32.22) (-31.17) 
LEV 0.028*** 0.024*** 
 
(11.55) (9.67) 
MTB -0.000*** 0.000 
 
(-3.34) -0.06 
PM -0.007*** -0.005*** 
 
(-10.03) (-9.72) 
STD_CFO 0.125*** 0.159*** 
 
(32.38) (35.57) 
HINDEX -0.009*** -0.009** 
 
(-2.61) (-2.53) 
AGE -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 
(-25.31) (-24.27) 
RET 0.023*** 0.010*** 
 
(41.68) (27.38) 
Constant 0.190*** 0.194*** 
 
(22.56) (21.22) 
YEAR FE Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY FE Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 75,133 71,884 
Adj. R-squared 0.39 0.48 
 
Notes: 
Robust t-statistics in brackets.     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10   








3.4.4 Additional Analysis 
Association of Management-Specific (OC_MS) and Firm-Specific (OC_FS) 
Organization Capital with Return 
In this section, I examine the association of OC_MS and OC_FS with return. I use 
four proxies of return: yearly stock return (RET), profitability (PM), return on equity 
(ROE), and return on assets (ROA). Regression results in Table 3.4 shows that 
OC_MS is positively and significantly (p<.01) associated with firm return, while 
OC_FS is negatively and significantly (p<.01) associated with firm return. The 
coefficients for the interaction variable (OC_MS*OC_FS) are positive and 
significant, suggesting that OC_MS, when interacting with OC_FS enhances firm 
return. For example, in Model 1 OC_MS increase stock return from 5.31% to 10.2% 
when OC_FS moves from the lowest decile to the highest decile. A similar 
interpretation holds for Model 2 to Model 4. The negative association between 
OC_FS and a firm return weaken in the presence of OC_MS. For example, in Model 
1 the negative relationship between OC_FS and RET attenuates from -11.20% to -
6.3% when OC_MS moves from the lowest to the highest decile. These results, 
together, imply that OC_MS individually and collectively (when interacted with 
OC_FS) play important role in increasing firm return. These results have important 
implications in reconciling my findings with those of prior studies. For example, 
Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) and Lev et al. (2009) found that organization 
capital is associated with superior operating and stock return performance. My 
results indicate that associations between organization capital and return reported in 




















Table 3.4: Additional Analysis 
Panel A: Association of Management- and Firm-Specific Organization Capital with 
Return 
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) 
Dep. Var. RET PM ROE ROA 
          
OC_MS 0.048*** 0.348*** 0.199*** 0.089*** 
 
(3.18) (6.59) (11.27) (12.92) 
OC_FS -0.117*** -0.182*** -0.208*** -0.165*** 
 
(-7.21) (-2.79) (-9.05) (-16.58) 
OC_MS * OC_FS 0.054** 0.208** 0.200*** 0.143*** 
 
(2.08) (2.30) (5.79) (9.72) 
SIZE -0.021*** 0.066*** 0.044*** 0.022*** 
 
(-16.09) (14.64) (21.39) (23.92) 
LEV -0.016 -0.197*** -0.160*** -0.174*** 
 
(-1.06) (-5.37) (-5.77) (-21.68) 
MTB 0.039*** -0.008*** -0.009** 0.003*** 
 
(26.94) (-3.28) (-2.46) (6.30) 
BETA 0.063*** -0.101*** -0.032*** -0.026*** 
 
(13.57) (-9.44) (-5.13) (-12.55) 
CAP_INT -0.085*** 0.271*** 0.059*** 0.035*** 
 
(-6.18) (5.97) (2.89) (4.61) 
DIV -0.025*** 0.071*** 0.074*** 0.031*** 
 
(-4.54) (10.13) (10.17) (13.63) 
Constant 0.390*** -0.364*** -0.074 -0.004 
 
(6.43) (-4.84) (-1.07) (-0.10) 
YEAR FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 75,059 75,059 75,059 75,059 
Adj. R-squared 0.19 0.06 0.07 0.22 
 
Notes: 
Robust t-statistics in brackets.     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  











3.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
3.4.5.1 Alternative Specification of Management-Specific Organization Capital 
(OC_MS) 
The main management-specific organization capital measure used in the study is the 
managerial efficiency metric developed by Demerjian et al. (2012). To mitigate 
concerns as to whether the results are sensitive to the specification of OC_MS, 
following prior studies (e.g., Fee & Hadlock, 2003; Milbourn, 2003; Rajgopal et al., 
2006), I use industry-adjusted value-weighted stock return as an alternative 
specification.
30
 When industry-adjusted stock returns are used as an alternative proxy 
to disentangle OC_FS from the OC_MS, I continue to find consistent evidence that 
OC_MS reduces (increases) idiosyncratic risk and total risk (systematic risk), while 
OC_FS increases (reduces) idiosyncratic risk and total risk (systematic risk), all of 
which are significant at p<0.01. Results in Table 3.5, Panel A, further show that, 
when OC_MS and OC_FS are interacting, they significantly (p<0.01) reduce 
idiosyncratic, systematic and total risk.  
3.4.5.2 Alternative Specification of Risks 
In my main analysis I use three measures of idiosyncratic risk: market model, CAPM 
and the Fama-French three factor model. In this section, I re-estimate my analysis 
using the three-factor Fama-French (1993) model including a momentum factor as in 
Carhart (1997). Panel B of Table 3.5 shows that regression results using alternative 
estimates of risk corroborate the conclusions of the main analyses. 
3.4.5.3 Regression Results from Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
Recall that in estimating the OC_FS, I regress OC_MS on overall organizational 
capital and the predicted values from the regression are used as a proxy for OC_FS.  
                                                             
30 Correlation between the management ability score of Demerjian et al. (2012) and industry-adjusted 
value weighted stock return is 0.191, suggesting that these two variables measure different aspects of 
management specific organization capital. 
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Table 3.5: Sensitivity Analysis 
Panel A: Alternative Specification of Management-Specific Organization Capital 
 
 
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
Variables IV_MKT IV_CAPM IV_FF3 BETA STD_RET 
OC_MS -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 0.667*** -0.009*** 
 
(-18.45) (-18.50) (-19.43) (36.97) (-3.38) 
OC_FS 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.009*** 0.005*** 
 
(10.21) (10.18) (10.29) (-3.63) (8.90) 
OC_MS *OC_FS -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.053*** -0.009*** 
 
(-3.73) (-3.75) (-3.75) (-5.74) (-4.00) 
SIZE -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.109*** -0.010*** 
 
(-43.21) (-43.31) (-43.23) (40.71) (-26.45) 
LEV 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.064*** 0.039*** 
 
(13.75) (13.71) (13.71) (-2.77) (12.93) 
MTB -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.014*** -0.000** 
 
(-9.43) (-9.41) (-9.63) (12.99) (-2.54) 
PM -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.029*** -0.010*** 
 
(-8.64) (-8.64) (-8.57) (-5.91) (-9.12) 
STD_CFO 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.771*** 0.039** 
 
(23.11) (23.11) (22.69) (20.20) (2.27) 




(-0.42) (-0.43) (-0.41) 
 
(-2.68) 




(-17.82) (-17.85) (-17.50) 
 
(-21.95) 








   
-0.179*** 
 
    
(-20.41) 




(21.35) (21.51) (21.02) (2.31) (21.80) 
YEAR FE Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY FE Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70,024 70,024 70,024 70,024 70,024 
Adj. R-squared 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.29 0.32 
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  






Panel B: Alternative Specification of Risk  
  (Model 1) 
Dep. Var. IV_FF4 




































  Constant 0.047*** 
 
(22.03) 
YEAR FE Yes 
INDUSTRY FE Yes 
Observations 75,133 
Adj. R-squared 0.49 
 
Notes: 
Robust t-statistics in brackets.     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10    
Variable definitions are provided in appendix 3.1. 
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To allay concerns regarding the standard error problem associated with two-stage 
estimation, I use the bootstrap method in the standard error estimation approach.
31
 
My regression estimates using the bootstrap method of standard error estimation are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained in the main analysis. For example, the 
coefficients (t-value) of OC_MS, OC_FS, and OC_MS*OC_FS for Model 1 in Panel 
A of Table 3 are -0.002 (-6.26), 0.006 (14.21), and -0.005 (-8.34), respectively. 
Similar results hold for other proxies of idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, and total 
risk. Thus, the regression results using the bootstrap standard error estimation 
corroborate the conclusions from the main analyses. 
3.4.5.4 Firm Fixed Effects Analysis 
Readers may be concerned that inferences about the association of OC_MS and 
OC_FS with idiosyncratic, systematic and total risk are based on a pooled cross-
section and time-series regression where multiple annual observations for the same 
firm are used. While the robust cluster estimator in the regression models mitigates 
such concerns, I examine the robustness of the results by estimating a firm fixed-
effects version of Equation (3.7), Equation (3.8) and Equation (3.9), where every 
firm and every year in the sample is assigned a dummy variable. Firm fixed-effects 
results reported in appendix 3.2 suggest that the results in the main analysis are 
robust to the use of firm fixed effect model, implying that my results are not driven 
by the omitted unknown time invariant firm characteristics. 
3.4.5.5 Continuous Value of OC_MS and OC_FS 
In my main analysis, as consistent with Demerjian et al. (2013), I create decile ranks 
of OC_MS and OC_FS by year and industry to make the score more comparable 
across time and industries. In the robustness check I re-examined the findings using 
the continuous value of OC_MS and OC_FS. Appendix 3.3 indicates that results 
using the continuous value remain significant at the conventional level with the 
expected signs.   
                                                             
31
 I use 10,000 replications to generate the bootstrap standard errors. 
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3.4.5.6 Endogeneity Test: Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Regression 
To allay concerns that the endogenous relationship between the main independent 
variables (OC_MS, OC_FS and OC_MS*OC_FS) and the error term (ε) confounds 
the findings reported in the study, I adopt a two stage instrumental variable approach 
to re-examine the findings reported in Table 3.3. 
I use industry means of OC_MS, OC_FS and OC_MS*OC_FS (i.e., 
OC_MS_IND, OC_FS_IND and OC_MS_IND*OC_FS_IND) and three firm-level 
variables (namely, PRODUCTIVITY, EMP and %∆PPE) as instruments. Industry 
mean values are estimated for each 2-digit SIC level in each year. By construction 
and in theory, these industry level variables (i.e., the industry mean of OC_MS, 
OC_FS and OC_MS*OC_FS) should have a strong positive relationship with their 
respective OC at firm level, and there is no clear reason to believe that these 
variables have any direct impact on firm level risks other than through their effect on 
the OCs at firm level. PRODUCTIVITY is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 
if the firm’s productivity (measured as sales scaled by total assets) is above the 
industry mean in the year t, and 0 otherwise. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) show 
that firms with more organization capital are more productive, implying that there is 
positive association between productivity and firm level organization capital proxies. 
Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) also demonstrate that firms with more organization 
capital are more labor intensive, suggesting a positive relationship between number 
of employees in a firm (EPM) and organization capital. A firm’s ability to invest in 
organization capital largely depends on its existing resources. Carlin et al. (2012) 
suggest that resource constraints may require a firm to substitute alternative forms of 
productive resources with organization capital. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) 
empirically show that firms with high organization capital have lower investment 
rates in physical capital (10.1% vs. 12.6%). I therefore also use growth in PPE 
(%∆PPE) as an instrumental variable.  
Table 3.6, Panel A, reports that coefficients for the instrumental variables are 
highly significant (mostly at p<.01), suggesting that industry mean values and 
included firm level variables have a significant effect on OC_MS, OC_FS and 
OC_MS*OC_FS. For example, OC_MS is positivity associated with industry mean 
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OC_MS_IND (β = 0.419, p<.01), OC_MS_IND*OC_FS_IND (β = 0.128, p<.01), 
PRODUCTIVITY (β = 0.028, p<.01), and negatively associated with OC_FS_IND 
(β = -0.068, p<.01). Instruments are also generally significantly associated with 
OC_FS and OC_MS*OC_FS. 
The results in Table 3.6, Panel B, suggest that the association of organization 
capital proxies (OC_MS, OC_FS and OC_MS*OC_FS) and firm level risks 
(idiosyncratic, beta and total risk) remain robust after accounting for the endogenous 
relationship between the organization capital proxies and firm level risks. For 
example, the estimated coefficients and p values for the association between 
idiosyncratic risk and OC_MS (-0.003 and p<.05), OC_FS (0.005 and p<.01) and 
OC_MS*OC_FS (-0.004 and p<.05) in the two stage least squares (2SLS) regression 
suggest that endogeneity cannot explain away the demonstrated relationship. Similar 
results hold for the association of organization capital proxies (i.e., OC_MS, OC_FS 
and OC_MS *OC_FS) and systematic risk and total risk in the 2SLS regression 
models. I obtain qualitatively similar results for other risk proxies (market and 
CAPM based models). In sum, the 2SLS results suggest that the demonstrated 
relationship in Table 3.3 remains robust even after addressing endogeneity concerns.  
In Table 3.6, under-identification test results (LM statistic) reveal that the 
excluded instruments are “relevant”. The weak instrument test results show that the 
excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors because the 
(corrected) Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is greater than Stock and Yogo’s (2005) 
critical value at 5% maximal IV relative bias. Results from Hansen’s over-
identifying restrictions test provide mixed evidence. Model 1 does not reject the null 
hypothesis (p>.10), suggesting that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
term, correctly excluded from the second stage regression, and therefore "valid" 
instrument for the 2SLS regression. Model 2 and Model 3 reject the null hypothesis 
(p<.01), however, implying that the included instruments are correlated with the 
error term. Note that the results of Hansen’s over-identification test cannot be 
overemphasized because in a recent study Parente and Silva (2012, p.315) note that 
tests of overidentifying restrictions “give little information on whether the 
instruments are correlated with the errors of the underlying economic model, and on 
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whether parameters of interest can be successfully identified”. Deaton (2010), in this 
regard, argued that the validity of the moment conditions implied by the economic 
model is an identifying assumption that cannot be tested. Finally, Hausman’s (1978) 
test significantly rejects (better than p<.05) the exogeneity of the management and 
firm-specific organization capital proxies, justifying the use of the 2SLS regression 
estimates. 
Table 3.6: Endogeneity 








Instruments    
I. First-Stage regressions for idiosyncratic risk and organization capital proxies 
OC_MS_IND 0.419*** -0.063*** 0.147*** 
 (148.85) (-30.67) (76.12) 
OC_FS_IND -0.068*** 0.397*** 0.138*** 
 (-30.55) (133.77) (71.61) 
OC_MS_IND * OC_FS_IND 0.128*** 0.131*** 0.228*** 
 (51.72) (58.14) (117.36) 
PRODUCTIVITY 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.026*** 
 (12.29) (13.83) (12.88) 
EMP 0.002 0.012*** 0.007*** 
 (1.03) (7.50) (4.67) 
    
II. First-Stage regressions for beta and organization capital proxies 
OC_MS_IND 0.867*** -0.074* -0.107*** 
 (20.89) (-1.78) (-3.25) 
OC_FS_IND -0.040 0.856*** -0.095*** 
 (-0.94) (22.55) (-2.80) 
OC_MS_IND * OC_FS_IND 0.036 -0.036 0.993*** 
 (0.51) (-0.53) (16.71) 
PRODUCTIVITY 0.084*** 0.138*** 0.119*** 
 (17.58) (28.59) (29.43) 
% PPE 0.143*** 0.209*** -0.039*** 
 (32.90) (50.61) (-11.88) 
    
III. First-Stage regressions for total risk (SD_RET) and organization capital proxies 
    
OC_MS_IND 0.419*** -0.064*** 0.147*** 
 (149.15) (-31.04) (76.46) 
OC_FS_IND -0.069*** 0.397*** 0.138*** 
 (-31.16) (133.96) (71.49) 
OC_MS_IND * OC_FS_IND 0.128*** 0.131*** 0.228*** 
 (52.05) (57.97) (117.53) 
PRODUCTIVITY 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.026*** 
 (12.74) (13.66) (13.07) 
EMP 0.002 0.011*** 0.007*** 
 (1.45) (7.37) (4.88) 
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Unreported Control Variables Included in 
Regression 
  
All Variables in Main 
Specification 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Under-identification Test    
Kleibergen-Paaprk LM statistic 1524.043 617.215 1524.372 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Weak Identification Test    
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 1929.564 1806.535 1930.439 
Stock and Yogo (2005) Critical 
Value [5% maximal IV relative 
bias]   
9.53 9.53 9.53 
    
Test of Over-identifying Restrictions   
Hansen’s J-statistic                   2.812 159.357 28.338 
p-value                                         0.245 0.000 0.000 
    
Panel B: Second-Stage Regressions  
    
Explanatory Variable IV_FF_3 BETA SD_RET 
OC_MS -0.003** 0.229*** -0.010* 
 (-2.10) (4.06) (-1.71) 
OC_FS 0.005*** -0.130** 0.010* 
 (3.53) (-2.30) (1.82) 
OC_MS * OC_FS -0.004** -0.283*** -0.017* 
 (-2.00) (-2.94) (-1.82) 
    
Unreported Control Variables Included in the Regression  
All Variables in Main 
Specification 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Hausman Test for the Effect of the OC_MS, OC_FS and OC_MS * OC_FS (Coefficient 
2SLS = Coefficient OLS) 
Cluster-robust F-statistic                      8.977 162.94 16.994 
p-value 0.0296 0.000 0.000 
Observation (N) 73376 74901 73376 
 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively 
(two-tailed test). OC_MS_IND, OC_FS_IND and OC_MS * OC_FS_IND are industry mean of 
OC_MS, OC_FS and OC_MS*OC_FS, respectively estimated for each 2-digit SIC level in each year. 
PRODUCTIVITY is a dummy variable that take a value of 1 if the firm’s productivity (measured as 
sales scaled by total assets) is above the industry mean in the year t, and 0 otherwise. EMP is the 
natural log of number of employee for each firm in each year and finally, % PPE is the growth in 
physical capital (proxied by growth in property, plant and equipment). 








This paper examined the impact of management- and firm-specific organization 
capital on a wide range of firm level risks. The literature relating to organization 
capital does not differentiate between management-specific (OC_MS) and firm-
specific organization capital (OC_FS), but rather uses these terms interchangeably. 
These studies, thus, implicitly assume the identical impact of different forms of 
organization capital on firm level outcome. In this paper I disentangle OC_FS from 
OC_MS and show their differential effect on firm level risks. My empirical results 
show that OC_MS reduces (increases) idiosyncratic and total (systematic) risk, while 
OC_FS increases (reduces) systematic (idiosyncratic and total) risk.  OC_MS, when 
interacting with OC_FS, negatively affects idiosyncratic, systematic and total risk, 
suggesting the dominant role of OC_MS in reducing the risks of the firm.  Additional 
analysis shows that OC_MS also plays dominant role in improving the stock return 
and operating performance of a firm. I triangulate my results by using different 
measures of management-specific organization capital and proxy for different types 
of risk, and eventually find that they are robust. 
Overall, the empirical evidence contributes to the growing body of literature 
that focuses on organization capital. My primary contribution is to extend this body 
of research by systematically isolating OC_FS from OC_MS and demonstrating their 
differential role on a wide range of firm risks. This study thus contributes to 
resolving the competing views on the embodiments and effect of different forms of 
organization capital. While prior studies examine the relationship of organization 
capital with cross sectional stock return (Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013), future 
operating and stock return performance, production possibility (Prescott & Visscher, 
1980),  little attention has been paid to the role of organization capital in influencing 
firm risks. This paper bridges this gap in the literature by linking OC_MS and 
OC_FS with idiosyncratic, systematic and total risk. My study also extends the 
emerging literature on managerial ability by providing empirical evidence that 
managerial ability (i.e., OC_MS) increases (decreases) systematic (idiosyncratic and 
total) risk. Even though a good number of studies examine the effect of management 
ability on information asymmetry and financial performance (Baik et al., 2011; 
Chemmanur et al., 2009; Demerjian et al., 2013), little is known about how this 
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influences idiosyncratic, systematic and total risk. In this paper, I contribute to the 
literature on the determinants of firm level risks by incorporating a human side into 
the equation. Overall, my study contributes to the area of research that stresses the 
importance of organization capital and managerial ability as two major drivers of a 

























Appendix 3.1: Variable Definition and Measurement 
Variables  Definition and Measurement 
Dependent Variable – Idiosyncratic Risk 
𝐼𝑉_𝑀𝐾𝑇   Idiosyncratic volatility estimated from market model (Equation 3.1). 
IV_CAPM  Idiosyncratic volatility estimated from CAPM model (Equation 3.2). 
IV_FF3  Idiosyncratic volatility estimated from Fama-French (1993) model 
(Equation 3.3). 
  Systematic Risk 
BETA  Systematic risk estimated from market model (Equation 3.1). 
   
  Total Risk 
STD_RET  Standard deviation of stock return, estimated as standard deviation of 
firm-specific monthly returns over the fiscal year. 
STD_RET_3  Rolling standard deviation of stock return, estimated as standard 
deviation of firm-specific monthly returns over the prior three years. 
Main Independent Variable – Firm Specific and Management Specific Organization 
Capital 
OC_MS  The decile rank (by industry and year) of the management ability 
score, which is from Demerjian et al. (2012). 
OC_FS  The decile rank (by industry and year) of the firm specific organization 
capital, which is estimated from the residual from Equation (3.9). 
OC_MS*OC_FS  Interaction between OC_MS and OC_FS. 
Control Variables 
SIZE  Natural logarithm of total assets. 
LEV  Leverage, measured as total long-term debt scaled by lagged assets. 
MTB  Market-to-book ratio, measured as the market value of equity scaled by 
the book value of equity. 
PM  Profitability, measured as operating income scaled by sales. 
STD_CFO  Standard deviation of cash flow from operation scaled by total assets 
over the prior three years.  
HINDEX  Herfindahl index, a measure of competition among firms in the 
industry.  
AGE  Age is measured as the number of years since the firm was first 
covered by the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP). For 
the regression analysis, I measure AGE as the natural log of (1+ age of 
the firm).  
RET  Yearly holding period return. 
DIV  Dividend payout ratio, measured as dividend to common stock scaled 
by operating income. I replace missing values of dividend to common 
stock with 0.  
Year  Dummy variables to control for fiscal year effect 




Appendix 3.2: Firm Fixed Effects Analysis 
Panel A:  Association of Management- and Firm-Specific Organization Capital with 
Idiosyncratic Risk  
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
Variables IV_MKT IV_CAPM IV_FF3 
        
OC_MS -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(-3.01) (-3.03) (-3.10) 
OC_FS 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(9.94) (9.95) (10.14) 
OC_MS * OC_FS -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 
(-5.03) (-5.01) (-4.97) 
SIZE -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(-17.89) (-17.89) (-18.21) 
LEV 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 
(12.12) (12.13) (12.23) 
MTB -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-9.53) (-9.52) (-10.07) 
PM -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(-6.26) (-6.27) (-6.20) 
SD_CFO 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 
(14.79) (14.76) (14.51) 
HINDEX 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 
(2.40) (2.38) (2.25) 
AGE -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(-7.11) (-7.17) (-6.76) 
RET 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(4.77) (4.73) (4.59) 
Constant 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 
 
(34.98) (35.34) (34.81) 
YEAR FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 75,133 75,133 75,133 
Adj. R-squared 0.65 0.65 0.65 
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 









Panel B:  Association of Management- and Firm-Specific Organization Capital with 
Systematic Risk  
  (Model 1) 
Variables BETA 































YEAR FE Yes 
Observations (N) 75,133 
Adj. R-squared 0.48 
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 













Panel C:  Association of Management- and Firm-Specific Organization Capital with 
Total Risk  
  (Model 1) (Model 2) 
Variables STD_RET STD_RET_3 
      
OC_MS -0.005* -0.000 
 
(-1.79) (-0.04) 
OC_FS 0.023*** 0.006* 
 
(7.02) (1.88) 
OC_MS * OC_FS -0.018*** -0.006* 
 
(-4.22) (-1.67) 
SIZE -0.006*** -0.008*** 
 
(-7.57) (-10.98) 
LEV 0.035*** 0.024*** 
 
(11.69) (8.83) 
MTB -0.000*** 0.000* 
 
(-2.77) (1.65) 
PM -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.50) (-0.38) 
SD_CFO 0.066*** 0.099*** 
 
(16.40) (23.34) 
HINDEX 0.012** 0.011** 
 
(2.06) (2.01) 
AGE -0.019*** -0.016*** 
 
(-13.89) (-10.80) 
RET 0.022*** 0.006*** 
 
(40.97) (17.59) 
Constant 0.185*** 0.195*** 
 
(37.16) (39.65) 
YEAR FE Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 75,133 71,884 
Adj. R-squared 0.53 0.68 
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 










Appendix 3.3: Continuous Value of Management-Specific and Firm-Specific 
Organization Capital  
 
Panel A:  Association of Management- and Firm- Specific Organization Capital with 
Idiosyncratic Risk  
  (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
Variables IV_MKT IV_CAPM IV_FF3 
        
OC_MS -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 
(-14.55) (-14.52) (-14.47) 
OC_FS 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(12.23) (12.21) (12.44) 
OC_MS*OC_FS -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(-5.74) (-5.74) (-5.78) 
SIZE -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 
(-46.63) (-46.75) (-46.66) 
LEV 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(12.96) (12.93) (13.00) 
MTB -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(-11.61) (-11.59) (-12.12) 
PM -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(-8.21) (-8.22) (-8.13) 
SD_CFO 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 
(24.84) (24.82) (24.35) 
HINDEX -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-1.21) (-1.22) (-1.19) 
AGE -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(-18.95) (-18.97) (-18.57) 
RET 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(4.63) (4.60) (4.41) 
Constant 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 
 
(22.79) (23.09) (22.79) 
INDUSTRY FE Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 75,133 75,133 75,133 
Adj. R-squared 0.49 0.49 0.49 
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 








Panel B:  Association of Management- and Firm- Specific Organization Capital with 
Systemic Risk  
  (Model 1) 
VARIABLES BETA 































INDUSTRY FE Yes 
YEAR FE Yes 
Observations 75,133 
Adj. R-squared 0.27 
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 












Panel C:  Association of Management- and Firm- Specific Organization Capital with 
Total Risk  
  (Model 1) (Model 2) 
VARIABLES STD_RET STD_RET_3 
      
OC_MS -0.034*** -0.023*** 
 
(-12.41) (-8.50) 
OC_FS 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 
(7.76) (4.20) 
OC_MS* OC_FS -0.013*** -0.008*** 
 
(-5.88) (-3.64) 
SIZE -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 
(-30.94) (-30.15) 
LEV 0.029*** 0.025*** 
 
(12.05) (10.22) 
MTB -0.000*** -0.000 
 
(-3.54) (-0.10) 
PM -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 
(-9.70) (-9.47) 
SD_CFO 0.119*** 0.154*** 
 
(30.42) (34.25) 
HINDEX -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 
(-2.82) (-2.66) 
AGE -0.014*** -0.015*** 
 
(-26.57) (-25.63) 
RET 0.023*** 0.010*** 
 
(42.09) (27.90) 
Constant 0.191*** 0.192*** 
 
(23.00) (21.31) 
INDUSTRY FE Yes Yes 
YEAR FE Yes Yes 
Observations 75,133 71,884 
Adj. R-squared 0.40 0.48 
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 







CORPORATE LIFE CYCLE AND COST OF EQUITY 
CAPITAL 
4.1 Introduction 
In this paper I investigate whether firm life cycle
32
 affects the cost of equity capital. 
The firm life cycle theory suggests that firms, like living organisms, pass through a 
series of predictable patterns of development and that the resources, capabilities, 
strategies, structures, and functioning of the firm vary significantly with the 
corresponding stages of development (Miller & Friesen, 1980, 1984; Quinn & 
Cameron, 1983). Life cycle theory provides management with some parameters, 
guidelines, and diagnostic tools to assess the transition of the firm from one stage to 
the next. Hence, understanding the essence of the life cycle can help firms to utilize 
valuable resources in the most optimal way to outperform their peers (Adizes, 1979) 
and to achieve and retain the prime life stage. Recent research in financial economics 
and accounting (e.g., DeAngelo et al., 2006, 2010; Dickinson, 2011) also recognizes 
that life cycle stages have important implications for understanding the financial 
performance of firms.  
The concept of cost of equity capital is of paramount importance in 
accounting and finance research. It is frequently used in the estimation of equity risk 
premiums, firm valuation and capital budgeting, and investment management 
practices (Câmara, San-Lin, & Yaw-Huei, 2009; Hou, Van Dijk, & Zhang, 2012). 
The cost of equity depends on a firm’s economic fundamentals, industry dynamics 
and overall national economic conditions (Banz, 1981; Fama & French, 1989; 
Gebhardt, Lee, & Swaminathan, 2001). Previous research indicates that firm-specific 
                                                             

This chapter of the thesis has been published in Journal of Contemporary Accounting and 
Economics (2015), 11(1), 46-60. Before that this chapter was presented at the Financial Markets and 
Corporate Governance Conference 2014 and the Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics 
mid-year symposium 2014. 
32 I use the terms ‘firm life cycle’, ‘corporate life cycle’, and ‘organizational life cycle’ 
interchangeably throughout this paper.  
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determinants of the cost of equity include size, leverage, financial strength, level of 
disclosure, and overall riskiness of the firm. As the resource base and corresponding 
competitive advantages of the firm vary across the life cycle, the investors’ demand 
for a risk premium could potentially vary accordingly. Together, these two streams 
of research suggest that the firm life cycle has important implications for attracting 
investors, which eventually increases the liquidity of shares and lowers the cost of 
equity capital. However, there has been little research on the interrelationship. 
Hence, I make a significant contribution to the literature by investigating the 
association between corporate life cycle and cost of equity to reveal whether, and 
how, the cost of equity capital of the firm varies with the corresponding change in 
the stage of the firm’s life cycle. 
This study is primarily motivated by the ‘dynamic resource-based view’ of 
the firm, which articulates that the general patterns and paths in the evolution of 
organizational capabilities change over time. This resource-based view analyzes 
firms from the resource side rather than from the product side, and posits that the 
existence and application of the bundle of valuable, interchangeable, immobile, and 
imitable resources generate the basis of the competitive advantage of a firm and of 
the heterogeneity in organizational capabilities (Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). Dynamic resource-based theory incorporates the founding, 
development, and maturity of capabilities and thereby suggests that the competitive 
advantages and disadvantages in terms of resources and capabilities evolve over time 
in important ways (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). Thus, the evolution of the firm’s 
competitiveness, in terms of its resource base and capabilities, is the foundation of 
the firm’s life cycle.  
The essence of firm life cycle theory suggests that investment and financing 
decisions and operating performance of the firm are greatly influenced by the change 
in the firm’s organizational capabilities (life cycle stages). Management accounting 
literature (Rappaport, 1981; Richardson & Gordon, 1980) provides evidence that 
performance measures differ across life cycle stages. In a recent study, DeAngelo et 
al. (2010) demonstrated that  corporate life cycle has a significant influence on the 
probability that a firm will engage in secondary equity offerings. Other studies 
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(Bulan, Subramanian, & Tanlu, 2007; Coulton & Ruddock, 2011; DeAngelo et al., 
2006; Fama & French, 2001) acknowledge the role of the firm life cycle in 
determining the dividend payout policy of the firm. Berger and Udell (1998), in a 
related study, document that different capital structures are optimal at different points 
in the cycle. Evidence in accounting literature also suggests that investors’ valuation 
of firm is a function of the life cycle stage of the firm (Anthony & Ramesh, 1992). 
Based on those studies, I also posit that the life cycle has significant influences on 
the firm’s ability to attract investors, which eventually affects the ex-ante cost of 
equity capital of the firm.  
Using a sample of Australian listed companies, I find that compared to the 
shake-out stage, the cost of equity is significantly higher in the introduction and 
decline stages, while it is lower in the growth and mature stages of the firm life 
cycle. Moreover, my results show that the cost of equity decreases as the retained 
earnings as a proportion of total assets (RE/TA) increase. These results conform with 
the findings of Bender and Ward (1993) showing that financing strategy and 
structures of firms evolve over the firm’s life cycle. My results are robust to 
alternative measures of the cost of equity, firm life cycle, and potential endogeneity 
concerns.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I extend life 
cycle literature by directly examining the role of firm life cycle in influencing the 
cost of equity. While prior research investigates the role of the firm life cycle in 
dividend and capital structure decisions, little attention has been paid to the role of 
the firm life cycle in determining the cost of equity capital. Although Easley and 
O’Hara’s (2004, p. 1574) model predicts that the “…life cycle of a firm may also 
influence its cost of capital. In particular, it seems reasonable that a firm with a long 
operating history will be better known by investors …the greater the prior precision, 
the lower the cost of capital”, they did not examine the validity of this prediction 
empirically. In this paper I attempt to fill this gap in the literature and in doing so 
augment our understanding of the role of the corporate life cycle in major financial 
policies. Second, the cost of equity represents the return that the investors require on 
their investment in the firm and thus it is a key factor in long-term investment 
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decisions. Examining the link between the firm life cycle and the cost of equity, 
therefore, should help managers to understand the effect of the life cycle on the 
financing costs of firms, and hence this study has important implications for strategic 
planning. Indeed, the cost of equity capital could be the channel through which 
capital markets encourage firms to reach and maintain maturity, the prime stage, in 
their life cycle. Third, given the importance of the firm life cycle and the cost of 
equity capital in the literature, and the longstanding interest in trying to understand 
their determinants, an empirical study of the association between corporate life cycle 
and cost of equity is timely. 
The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections. In Section 4.2, I 
review prior related studies and develop testable hypotheses. Section 4.3 focuses on 
the research design, data sources, and sample selection. Section 4.4 documents 
results of the study, while Section 4.5 concludes this chapter. 
4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
4.2.1 Corporate Life Cycle: Theory   
The corporate life cycle theory suggests that firms, like the organic body, tend to 
progress in a linear fashion through predictable stages of development sequentially 
from birth to decline and that their strategies, structures, and activities correspond to 
their stages of development (Gray & Ariss, 1985; Miller & Friesen, 1980, 1984; 
Quinn & Cameron, 1983). Strategy and management researchers have adopted the 
firm life cycle model from the biological sciences (Van De Ven & Poole, 1995) and 
have incorporated it into business research since the 1960s. Penrose (1959) provided 
a general theory of growth for firms and argues that it depends on the firm’s 
resources and productive opportunities. Chandler (1962) argued that organizational 
structure follows the growth strategy of the firm to avail itself of external 
opportunities. Subsequent studies in organizational science reveal the grounds behind 
the existence of the firm life cycle. For example, the resource-based theory of 
Wernerfelt (1984) suggests that resources are the ultimate source for establishment 
and maintenance of competitive advantage. He argued that a firm possesses 
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resources, a subset of which allows it to achieve competitive advantage over other 
firms, and a subset of those helps it to attain superior long-term performance. In a 
more recent study, Helfat and Peteraf (2003) argued that the resource-based view 
must incorporate the emergence, development, and progression of organizational 
resources and capabilities over time and hence they introduced a more 
comprehensive and vibrant view, ‘the dynamic resource-based theory’. This view 
suggests that the resource base that forms the foundation of competitive advantage 
and disadvantage comes about over a period of time and also may shift over time. 
They explained that portfolios of resources and capacities and the characteristics of 
firms change over time, and this variation results in different stages in the firm life 
cycle.   
The firm life cycle has important implications in management and business 
strategy. Each stage in the firm life cycle enforces unique characteristics and 
demands which entail organizational structures, personnel, leadership styles, and 
decision-making processes appropriate to meet the requirements (Kazanjian, 1988). 
Koberg, Uhlenbruck, and Sarason (1996) documented that the effect of 
organizational and environmental attributes on innovation is moderated by the firm’s 
life cycle stage. However, much of the work in the field of management, 
entrepreneurship, and strategy is conceptual rather than empirical. 
There are some recent empirical studies that investigate the effect of the firm 
life cycle on corporate financial decisions. Bender and Ward (1993) reported that the 
financial structure of firms changes over the life cycle. Berger and Udell (1998) 
argued that small and young firms generally resort to private equity and debt 
markets, while larger and more mature firms mainly rely on public markets. 
Richardson (2006) suggested that a firm is more likely to undertake relatively larger, 
growth-oriented investments in the initial stage while, in the mature stage, its 
investments are more likely to be geared towards maintenance of assets-in place. 
Fama and French (2001), Grullon et al. (2002), DeAngelo et al. (2006), and Coulton 
and Ruddock (2011) documented that mature and profitable firms are more likely to 
pay dividends, while young firms with higher growth options are less likely to do so. 
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These archival studies suggest that the firm life cycle has important implications for 
corporate financing decisions, especially in the area of the cost of equity capital.  
4.2.2 Cost of Equity: Theory   
Cost of equity is the return that shareholders require on their investment in the firm 
and is extensively used in the valuation of investment projects and estimation of 
equity risk premiums (Câmara et al., 2009).  
Firm-specific factors such as firm size, age, riskiness, liquidity of stock, 
leverage, and disclosure quality determine the cost of equity. Moreover, other factors 
such as the industry and the economy also influence the cost of equity. Transparency 
and availability of information about management and potential earnings of large 
firms reduce uncertainty levels. Hence, investors in larger firms require less return on 
their investment, which effectively reduces the cost of equity (Banz, 1981; Berk, 
1995; Witmer & Zorn, 2007). Firm age or maturity affects equity price and thereby 
the cost of equity (Pástor, Sinha, & Swaminathan, 2008). Transaction cost (e.g., 
commission, fees, and other charges) is higher for less liquid stock and hence 
investors require more return for these securities. Shareholders are the residual 
claimants and hence an increase in the financial leverage also increases the risk to the 
shareholders. This effectively increases the cost of equity (Witmer & Zorn, 2007).  
Firms in different industries have different costs of equity depending on the nature of 
their business (Gebhardt et al., 2001). Moreover, the cost of equity is higher under 
weak economic conditions, while it is lower under strong economic conditions 
(Fama & French, 1989).  
4.2.3 Association between Corporate Life Cycle and Cost of Equity Capital  
Firms in different life cycle stages differ in their ability to raise funds from the 
market (Berger & Udell, 1998). Firms at the earlier stage of the life cycle are 
relatively small, unknown, and are less closely followed by analysts and investors. 
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Hence, these firms suffer from substantial information asymmetry. This information 
asymmetry may cause equity mispricing (Myers & Majluf, 1984), which is positively 
related to riskiness and the cost of capital (Armstrong et al., 2011). On the other 
hand, mature firms have a longer existence in the market and they are more closely 
followed by analysts and investors. Hence, these firms suffer from less information 
asymmetry and are less risky. Easley and O’Hara (2004) also noted that firms with a 
long operating history are better known by investors, improving the precision of 
information about the firm and lowering the cost of capital. Investors generally prefer 
securities with low estimation risk, low transaction costs, and/or less information 
asymmetry (Botosan, 2006). A greater demand for securities with these 
characteristics enhances the liquidity of the stocks (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991), 
which influences the cost of equity (O’Hara, 2003). Prior studies (Gebhardt et al., 
2001) overwhelmingly showed that firm maturity is associated with a decline in 
systematic risk.  
In addition, resource-based theory assumes that firms differ in terms of their 
bundle of resources (e.g., financial, physical, human capital, technological, 
reputation, and organizational resources) and capabilities (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989), and that these firm-specific resources and capabilities are crucial in 
explaining the firm’s growth and performance (Penrose, 1959). According to this 
view, the resource base and capabilities of mature firms are large, diverse and rich, 
while those of young and declining firms are small, concentrated, and limited. This 
resource base and its accompanying superior competitive advantages and capacities 
help mature firms to benefit from cheaper and easier sources of finance. More 
specifically, as the life cycle affects the perceived riskiness of the firm, mature stage 
firms should be in a better position to raise adequate capital at a lower cost. I 
therefore hypothesize that:   
H1: Compared to the shake-out stage of the firm life cycle
33
, the cost of equity is 
lower in the mature stage of the firm life cycle. 
                                                             
33 As Dickinson (2011) remarks, the literature clearly spells out the role of different stages of the firm 
life cycle except for the shake-out stage. As a result, the expected sign of this stage is unclear. Thus, in 
developing my hypothesis, I use the shake-out stage as a basis of comparison with other stages of the 
firm life cycle. 
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Although firms in the growth stage of the life cycle have an insufficient 
resource base, these firms are promising and have strong potential. Organizational 
theory suggests that growth firms maintain greater information asymmetry, 
benefiting from product development and market movement (Aboody & Lev, 2000; 
Barth, Kasznik, & McNichols, 2001; Smith & Watts, 1992). However, prior studies 
also suggest that characteristics of growth firms attract greater analyst coverage, 
attaining potential benefits from private information acquisition (Barth et al., 2001; 
Lehavy, Li, & Merkley, 2011). Greater analyst coverage in turn reduces mispricing 
and information asymmetry (Barth et al., 2001; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995). 
Furthermore, growth firms are more likely to receive coverage in the business press 
(Bentley et al., 2013). Bushee et al. (2010) show that firms with greater press 
coverage are associated with lower levels of information asymmetry. Moreover, 
growth firms have greater incentives to reduce information asymmetry via voluntary 
disclosure to possibly attract ‘strategic investors
34
, who intend to invest in growth 
firms to benefit from the future success of the firm. In summary, greater analyst 
following, press coverage, and voluntary disclosures reduce the information 
asymmetry of growth firms, which eventually reduces the cost of capital. Hence, I 
hypothesize that:   
H2: Compared to the shake-out stage of the firm life cycle, the cost of equity is lower 
in the growth stage of the firm life cycle. 
Firms in the introduction stage have limited resources and resource 
combinations, while those in the decline stage have downgraded resources. 
Dickinson (2011) provides empirical evidence that both introduction and decline 
stages are associated with negative earnings per share, return on net operating assets, 
and profit margin. As investments in these firms are relatively less attractive, 
analysts are reluctant to cover these firms. Hence, introduction and decline firms 
cannot raise capital unless investors are properly compensated (Nickel & Rodriguez, 
2002), which effectively increases the cost of equity. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
                                                             
34 Strategic investors invest in young companies that have the potential to bring something of value to 
investors or to create synergy with the existing business of the investor. An independent venture 
capitalist only cares about financial gain, while the strategic investor also cares about the new 
venture’s strategic effect (Hellmann, 2002). 
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H3: Compared to the shake-out stage of the firm life cycle, the cost of equity is higher 
in the introduction and decline stages of the firm life cycle. 
4.3 Research Method 
4.3.1 Sample and Data 
The sample for this study is drawn from the population of companies listed on the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) and covered by the I/B/E/S International 
database for the period 1990–2012. This yields an initial sample of 8020 firm-year 
observations. Data for the control variables, except beta, are extracted from the 
Aspect Financial Analysis databases. Data for beta and fiscal year end stock price are 
collected from DataStream and DatAnalysis Morningstar, respectively. Moreover, 
the risk-free rate (10-year Treasury note rates) is collected from the Reserve Bank of 
Australia website.
35
 To avoid the undesirable influence of outliers I winsorize 




 percentiles. I exclude the financial sector as 
the accounting practice, risk, and complexity characteristics of financial institutions 
are substantially different from those of other firms. I also exclude observations with 
missing values in the computation of cost of equity and control variables and lose 
545, 189, and 196 firm years for price/earnings to growth ratio (PEG), modified PEG 
ratio (MPEG), and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) (OJ) models, respectively. 
This produces a final sample of 3888, 3563, and 3482 firm-year observations for the 
PEG (Easton, 2004) model, MPEG (Easton, 2004) model, and OJ model (Ohlson & 
Juettner-Nauroth, 2005), respectively. Table 4.1, Panel A presents the sample 
distribution by cost of equity models.  
Panel B of Table 4.1 shows that sample size increases over the sample period, 
with the largest samples of 292 and 289 in the years 2008 and 2011, respectively. 
Panel C shows that the sample is unevenly distributed across industries with the 
largest samples being in industrial (24.72%) and consumer discretionary (21.04%) 
sectors.   





Table 4.1: Sample Selection and Distribution of the Sample 













I/B/E/S forecasted EPS (fiscal year 
1990-2012) 
8020 8020 8020 8020 
Less firm years dropped due to:     
     Model’s specific requirement36 2250 2250 2250 2342 
     Absence of forecasted DPS1 N/A N/A 707 703 
     Financial sector and delisted    firms 1337 1337 1311 1297 
     Missing values on control   valuables 545 545 189 196 





Panel B: Distribution by Year (Pooled) 
 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
N 35 46 46 43 46 87 120 118 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
N 127 145 162 230 223 188 191 231 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
































     
                                                             




Panel C: Distribution by Sectors and Cost of Equity Models 
 









Consumer Discretionary 818 818 770 765 
Consumer Staples 362 362 322 320 
Energy 283 283 246 231 
Health Care 266 266 250 243 
Industrials 961 961 918 912 
Information Technology 273 273 263 258 
Materials 776 776 656 621 
Telecommunication 
Services 
79 79 69 65 
Utilities 70 70 69 67 
Total 3888 3888 3563 3482 
 
4.3.2 Empirical Model  
I test the relationship between the cost of equity and the firm life cycle using four 
measures of cost of equity and three measures of firm life cycle proxies. To control 
for individual firm heterogeneity, I use the following fixed effect model:   
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐿𝐶_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡
4
𝑗=1 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
                            𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝑡𝛼𝑡𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡    
         (4.1) 
My main variable of interest is CLC_DUM. Based on the dynamic resource-based 
view and the life cycle theory, I predict 𝛽1 and 𝛽4 to be positive for H3 and 








4.3.3 Measurement of Variables  
4.3.3.1 Estimation of Corporate Life Cycle  
Assessing the life cycle stage at the firm level is difficult because an individual firm 
is composed of many overlapping, but distinct, product life cycle stages. Moreover, 
firms can compete in multiple industries and their product offerings can be fairly 
diverse (Dickinson, 2011). To overcome this estimation problem, I follow the 
methodologies of Dickinson (2011) and DeAngelo et al. (2006) to develop proxies 
for the firms’ stage in the life cycle.
37
 Dickinson (2011) deployed data from the 
firm’s cash flow statement. She argued that cash flow captures differences in a firm’s 
profitability, growth, and risk and, hence, that one may use the cash flow from 
operating (CFO), investing (CFI), and financing (CFF) to group firms in life cycle 
stages such as ‘introduction’, ‘growth’, ‘mature’, ‘shake-out’, and ‘decline’. The 
methodology is, introduction, if CFO<0, CFI<0, and CFF˃0; growth, if CFO˃0, 
CFI<0, and CFF˃0; mature, if CFO˃0, CFI<0, and CFF<0; decline, if CFO<0, 
CFI˃0, and CFF≤ or ≥0; and the remaining firm years are classified under the shake-
out stage. Identification of life cycle stages based on Dickinson (2011) combines the 
implications from diverse research areas such as production behavior, 
learning/experience, investment, market share, and entry/exit patterns. As a result, 
this process can capture the performance and allocation of resources of the firm.  
 Following DeAngelo et al. (2006), I use retained earnings as a proportion of 
total assets (RE/TA) as a proxy for corporate life cycle. This proxy measures the 
extent to which a firm is self-financing or reliant on external capital. A high RE/TA 
implies that the firm is more mature or older with declining investment, while firms 




                                                             
37 Anthony and Ramesh (1992) provided one of the first empirical procedures for classifying firms in 
different life cycle stages. However, I do not use their method for several reasons, (1) this 
classification scheme requires at least six years of data availability for each firm, which reduces my 
sample size significantly, (2) the life cycle proxy in this procedure is ‘ad hoc’ and relies on portfolio 
sorts to classify the firm in different life cycle stages, and (3) Dickinson (2011) showed that life cycle 
classification based on Anthony and Ramesh’s (1992) procedure leads to an erronous classification of 
firm life cycle stages.   
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4.3.3.2 Estimation of Cost of Equity   
Cost of equity can be measured using both the implied approach and the realized 
approach. Estimation of implied cost of equity involves calculating the internal rate 
of return that equates the stock prices to the present value of forecasted cash flows 
(Hou et al., 2012). On the other hand, the realized approach uses ex-post stock 
returns to estimate the cost of equity. However, estimates based on ex-post realized 
stock returns suffer from measurement errors such as imprecise estimates of factor 
risk premium and risk loading (Fama & French, 1997)
38
. Hence, researchers are 
increasingly relying on the implied cost of equity capital
39
. In line with previous 
studies, I use implied approaches to estimate the cost of equity. In particular, I use 
Easton (2004) and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) models, as modified by Gode 
and Mohanram (2003). I choose these measures because Botosan and Plumlee (2005) 
documented that Easton’s (2004) PEG ratio model and the target price (or dividend 
discount) method, introduced by Botosan and Plumlee (2002), are preferable 
measures of the cost of equity as both dominate the other alternatives in the sense 
that they are consistently and predictably related to various risk measures
40
. In 
addition, I use the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) (OJ) model modified by Gode 
and Mohanram (2003) because this model is theoretically rigorous yet parsimonious, 
and provides a simple closed form solution for the implied cost of capital. Consistent 
with prior studies (Chen, Chen, & Wei, 2009; Hail & Leuz, 2006; Hou et al., 2012), I 
also use a simple average of three models due to the lack of consensus on precision 
of the estimation of implied cost of equity capital.  
 
 
                                                             
38 Pástor et al. (2008) documented that estimation of the cost of equity that uses forward estimates of 
earnings outperforms measures based on realized returns. 
39 Most Australian studies on the cost of equity adopt the realized approach to estimate the cost of 
equity. For example, Gray, Koh, and Tong (2009) used industry-adjusted earnings-to-price ratios and 
Monkhouse (1993) used the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to estimate the cost of equity. 
However, Azizkhani, Monroe, and Shailer (2010) used the PEG approach. Moreover, some cross-
country studies (Gray et al., 2009; Hail & Leuz, 2006; Khurana & Raman, 2004) used the implied 
approach to estimate the cost of equity with a limited sample size. 
40 The necessary forecasted data for the target price (or dividend discount) method are not available 
for Australian companies. Using forecasted eps4 and eps5 for Australian companies to calculate the 
cost of equity would significantly reduce the sample size. 
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4.3.4 Control Variables 
I control for a number of risk factors and firm characteristics likely to determine the 
cost of equity capital. Firm size reduces the cost of equity capital because large firms 
have a lower probability of default (Berger & Udell, 1995), are followed more by 
analysts, and are more liquid (Witmer & Zorn, 2007). I use the natural log of total 
assets to measure firm size (SIZE). I control for the effect of systematic risk 
(BETA)
41
, as this is positively associated with the cost of equity capital (Harris & 
Marston, 1992; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966; Sharpe, 1964). Growth opportunity is 
characterized by uncertainty and risk and, therefore, is expected to be positively 
associated with the cost of equity capital (Boone, Khurana, & Raman, 2008; Chan, 
Hamao, & Lakonishok, 1991; Fama & French, 1992; Khurana & Raman, 2004). I 
use book-to-market ratio (BM) as growth proxy. I also control for loss as the 
continuous negative earnings stream of a firm could influence investors to consider 
that the firm will abandon its resources (Collins, Pincus, & Xie, 1999). I include an 
indicator variable coded 1 for firm-year observations with negative earnings in the 
previous year, and 0 otherwise. I include leverage (LEV) as a proxy for riskiness of 
the firm. The higher the level of leverage, the greater the perceived risk associated 
with the firm and, consequently, the higher the cost of equity capital (Fama & 
French, 1992; Gebhardt et al., 2001; Modigliani & Miller, 1958; Petersen & Rajan, 
1994). I measure financial leverage as (short-term debt + long-term 
debt)/shareholders’ equity. Finally, I include Altman’s (1968) Z score (ZSCORE) to 
control for the bankruptcy risk.
42
 Altman’s Z score is an unsystematic risk factor and 
Dichev (1998) suggested that it is separate from the size and book-to-market factors. 
However, I acknowledge the inherent limitation of Altman’s model in using 
historical information to predict current bankruptcy.  
 
                                                             
41 Datastream calculates beta over a five-year period by regressing the share price against the 
respective Datastream total market index, using log changes of the closing price on the first day of 
each month. 
42 Altman’s Z score = 1.2(Working Capital/Total Assets) + 1.4(Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 
3.3(Earnings Before Interest & Tax/Total Assets) + 0.6(Market Value of Equity/Total Liabilities) + 
0.999(Sales/Total Assets). A higher score indicates better financial health and hence lower probability 
of financial distress.  
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4.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the key variables included in the 
regression models. Panel A shows that the mean (median) cost of equity (simple 
average of the three cost of equity estimates) for the sample is 17.8% (14.0%) with a 
standard deviation of 12.9%. Owing to limited study of Australian listed firms using 
the same models for calculating the cost of equity capital, a reliable comparison of 
this estimate is difficult. The closest possible comparison is with Khurana and 
Raman (2004) and Azizkhani et al. (2010). Using a sample of Australian firms, 
Khurana and Raman (2004) found that the mean costs of equity, estimated by the 
PEG (Easton, 2004) model, are 10.3% and 10.7% and that the median costs of equity 
are 9.1% and 9.7% for the firms audited by Big and non-Big Auditors, respectively. 
Furthermore, using a sample of 2,170 Australian firms during the period 1995–2005, 
Azizkhani et al. (2010) found that the mean costs of equity, estimated by the same 
model, are 10.8% and 14.3% for the firms audited by Big and non-Big Auditors, 
respectively.
43
 The reported mean (median) cost of equity for this paper estimated by 
the PEG (Easton, 2004) model with a sample of 3888 firm years from 1990–2012 is 
15.6% (11.8%).
44
 Botosan (1997) used a US sample to estimate the cost of equity 
based on Ohlson (1995) and showed that the cost of equity is 20.1%. Therefore, an 
average cost of equity of 17.8% for this study is consistent with prior studies. Table 
4.2 shows that there is a large dispersion among the sample firms in terms of control 
variables, and this dispersion indicates a considerable diversity in the sample.  
 
Panel A also shows that the mean (median) RE/TA is 0.038 (0.089). The 
mean values of SIZE (19.903), ZSCORE (3.893), and LOSSt-1 (0.105) suggest the 
presence of large and financially sound firms in the sample. Moreover, the mean 
(0.805) and median (0.566) BM suggest that the sample firms have valuable growth 
                                                             
43
 Moreover, the cost of equity estimates of Truong and Partington (2007) for Australian firms are in 
the range of 10% to 17%. 
44 My results differ from those of Azizkhani et al. (2010) for several reasons. (a) My sample size and 
sample period differ from that of their study. More specifically, my sample covers the period of the 
global financial crisis, which is associated with increased risk and cost of equity. (b) I winsorize the 
cost of equity estimates at the 1% level (both sides), while they exclude the extreme values. (c) 
Azizkhani et al. (2010) used the square root of the numerator only, while I use the square root of both 
numerator and denominator, which is consistent with Easton’s (2004) original model.  
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opportunities. The mean BETA (0.954) is slightly lower than that of Azizkhani et al. 
(2010) (1.02) and higher than that of Chen, Jorgensen, and Yoo (2004) (0.75).  
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Pooled Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
25% Median 75% 
RAverage 3888 0.178 0.129 0.105 0.140 0.202 
RE/TA 3888 0.038 0.338 0.009 0.089 0.184 
SIZE 3888 19.903 1.680 18.706 19.775 21.082 
BM  3888 0.805 0.905 0.311 0.566 0.942 
BETA 3888 0.954 0.779 0.474 0.857 1.305 
LOSSt-1 3888 0.105 0.307 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LEV 3888 0.544 0.588 0.150 0.420 0.720 
ZSCORE 3888  3.893 4.071 1.899 2.835 4.401 
 
Note: Variables are in appendix 4.1. 
 
 
Panel B: Life Cycle-wise Cost of Equity Using Different Models 
 







RPEG    
(Easton 
2004) 
Mean 0.156 0.267 0.154 0.132 0.178 0.339 
Median 0.118 0.204 0.119 0.108 0.133 0.268 




Mean 0. 185 0.310 0.179 0.162 0.204 0.369 
Median 0. 147 0.229 0.144 0.137 0.161 0.277 





Mean 0.187 0.295 0.185 0.167 0.204 0.359 
Median 0.154 0.227 0.154 0.144 0.164 0.259 
Std. Dev. 0.119 0.200 0.113 0.089 0.124 0.229 
RAverage  Mean 0.178 0.291 0.174 0.154 0.199 0.368 
Median 0.140 0.217 0.140 0.129 0.154 0.293 




Panel B of Table 4.2 exhibits the life cycle-wise (Dickinson, 2011) cost of 
equity under different models. All the models show that the cost of equity is lowest 
at the mature stage, while it is comparatively higher at the introduction and decline 
stages. The lowest cost of equity at mature stage firms indicates that they are, on 
average, the least risky compared to firms at other stages.  
Panel C of Table 4.2 shows that the cost of equity under all models shows a 
U-shaped pattern across the life cycle stages.    
Panel C: Life cycle-wise Mean Cost of Equity Using Different Models 
 
 
Panel D of Table 4.2 reports life cycle-wise descriptive statistics for the 
sample firms. Firms in the mature stage are characterized by stability, while firms in 
the decline stage are in a transition phase (Dickinson, 2011). Consistent with 
Dickinson (2011), I find that highest (lowest) observations belong to the mature 
(decline) stage with 47.07% (1.52%) of observations. The overall results of Panel D 
of Table 4.2 show that mature firms, consistent with their lower riskiness, have the 
lowest BETA, lowest rate of LOSSt-1, and highest ZSCORE. Moreover, the 
descriptive statistics show that firms in the introduction and decline stages are 
relatively more risky, with BETA of 1.154 and 1.425 as opposed to 0.978 and 0.895 
in the growth and mature stages. Hence, as shown in Panel B, investors demand a 
relatively higher risk premium, with an average cost of equity of 29.1% and 36.8%, 
for firms in these stages compared to 17.4% and 15.4% in the growth and mature 


















move from the introduction to mature stage and that these estimates then decline as 
firms move from the mature to the decline stage. The opposite pattern is observed for 
the average cost of equity, BETA, and LOSSt-1. The estimates in Panel D of Table 
4.2 are also consistent with Dickinson (2011), signifying the reliability of my 
estimates. 
Panel D: Life Cycle-wise Descriptive Statistics 





Mean -0.280 0.049 0.103 -0.003 -0.482 
Median -0.072 0.077 0.120 0.081 -0.300 
Std. Dev. 0.551 0.236 0.292 0.360 0.728 
SIZE 
Mean 18.884 20.033 19.979 19.936 18.999 
Median 18.831 19.926 19.875 19.832 19.070 
Std. Dev. 1.478 1.573 1.712 1.722 1.828 
BM 
Mean 0.775 0.780 0.782 1.003 0.979 
Median 0.571 0.560 0.538 0.725 0.704 
Std. Dev. 0.931 0.850 0.905 0.990 1.239 
BETA 
Mean 1.154 0.978 0.895 0.932 1.425 
Median 1.063 0.888 0.808 0.825 1.255 
Std. Dev. 1.012 0.767 0.710 0.861 1.004 
LOSSt -1 
Mean 0.500 0.097 0.046 0.156 0.407 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Std. Dev. 0.493 0.297 0.209 0.363 0.495 
LEV 
Mean 0.700 0.636 0.480 0.472 0.559 
Median 0.470 0.520 0.350 0.340 0.230 
Std. Dev. 0.797 0.582 0.531 0.575 0.866 
ZSCORE 
Mean 3.477 3.323 4.393 3.835 3.773 
Median 1.959 2.579 3.231 2.657 1.611 
Std. Dev. 5.665 3.295 4.019 4.489 7.275 
 N 271 1356 1830 372 59 
 
Note: Variables are in appendix 4.1. 
4.4.2 Correlation Analysis 
Table 4.3 reports the Pearson correlations among the cost of equity, life cycle 
proxies, and control variables. As expected, the cost of equity is positively correlated 
(at p<0.01) with introduction, shake-out, and decline stages and negatively correlated 




Table 4.3: Correlation Matrix 
 
 R_Average Introduction Growth Mature 
Shake-
out 
Decline RETA SIZE BM BETA LOSS LEV ZSCORE 
R_Average 1.00             
Introduction 0.239*** 1.000            
Growth -0.021 -0.200*** 1.000           
Mature -0.178*** -0.258*** -0.690*** 1.000          
Shake-out 0.053*** -0.089*** -0.238*** -0.307*** 1.000         
Decline 0.182*** -0.034** -0.091*** -0.117*** -0.040** 1.000        
RETA  -0.416*** -0.258*** 0.022 0.181*** -0.040** -0.191*** 1.000       
SIZE -0.319*** -0.166*** 0.057*** 0.043*** 0.006 -0.067*** 0.239*** 1.000      
BM  0.271*** -0.009 -0.020 -0.024 0.071*** 0.024 -0.019 0.021 1.000     
BETA  0.196*** 0.07*** 0.023 -0.071*** -0.009 0.075*** -0.169*** -0.040**  -0.008 1.000    
LOSS 0.327*** 0.272*** -0.019 -0.182*** 0.054*** 0.122*** -0.430*** -0.207*** 0.006 0.157*** 1.000   
LEV 0.006 0.065*** 0.114*** -0.119*** -0.04** 0.003 -0.100*** 0.254*** -0.019 -0.097*** -0.020 1.000  
ZSCORE -0.145*** -0.028* -0.102*** 0.116*** -0.005 -0.004 0.191*** -0.255*** -0.213*** 0.015 -0.011 -0.331*** 1.000 
This table presents the correlations among cost of equity, life cycle proxies, and control variables. The values in the matrix are Pearson correlation 




expectations, the cost of equity estimates is also negatively correlated (p<0.01) with 
RE/TA. Finally, the correlations among cost of equity estimate and BM, BETA, and 
LOSSt-1 are positive and significant (p<0.01), while the correlation of cost of equity 
with SIZE and ZSCORE is negative and significant (p<0.01). Overall, the 
correlations among estimates of cost of equity, life cycle proxies, and the control 
variables are all in the expected direction. 
4.4.3 Univariate t-test 
Table 4.4 reports the mean difference test of cost of equity capital for different stages 
of the firm life cycle. It shows that all cost of equity estimates significantly decrease 
(p<0.01) from the introduction to growth stage, from the growth to mature stage, 
from the introduction to mature stage, and from the introduction to the shake-out 
stage of the firm life cycle. However, the mean cost of equity increases significantly 
from the mature to the shake-out stage (p<0.01), from the shake-out to the decline 
stage (p<0.01), from the introduction to the decline stage (p<0.05 mostly), from the 











Table 4.4: Mean Difference Test of Cost of Equity 
Mean Difference Test Of Cost Of Equity Using Dickinson’s (2011) Life Cycle Proxies 
Estimates 
Cost of Equity 
(stage 1) 
Cost of Equity 
(stage 2) 
t statistics for 
differences 
p-values 
 Introduction Growth   
RPEG 0.267 0.154 -9.153 0.000 
RMPEG 0.309 0.178 -8.783 0.000 
ROJ 0.295 0.185 -7.855 0.000 
RAverage 0.291 0.174 -8.822 0.000 
 Growth Mature   
RPEG 0.154 0.132 -5.969 0.000 
RMPEG 0.178 0.162 -4.137 0.000 
ROJ 0.185 0.167 -4.694 0.000 
RAverage 0.174 0.154 -5.309 0.000 
 Mature Shake-out   
RPEG 0.132 0.178 6.253 0.000 
RMPEG 0.162 0.204 5.033 0.000 
ROJ 0.167 0.204 4.847 0.000 
RAverage 0.154 0.199 5.884 0.000 
 Shake-out Decline   
RPEG 0.178 0.338 5.404 0.000 
RMPEG 0.204 0.369 4.567 0.000 
ROJ 0.204 0.359 4.698 0.000 
RAverage 0.199 0.368 5.347 0.000 
 Introduction Mature   
RPEG 0.267 0.132 -11.078 0.000 
RMPEG 0.309 0.162 -10.057 0.000 
ROJ 0.295 0.167 -9.284 0.000 
RAverage 0.291 0.154 -10.540 0.000 
 Introduction Shake-out   
RPEG 0.267 0.178 -6.387 0.000 
RMPEG 0.309 0.204 -6.326 0.000 
ROJ 0.295 0.204 -5.919 0.000 
RAverage 0.291 0.199 -6.194 0.000 
 Introduction Decline   
RPEG 0.267 0.338 2.286 0.025 
RMPEG 0.309 0.369 1.559 0.123 
ROJ 0.295 0.359 1.833 0.071 
RAverage 0.291 0.368 2.312 0.023 
 Growth Shake-out   
RPEG 0.154 0.178 3.165 0.001 
RMPEG 0.178 0.204 2.911 0.004 
ROJ 0.185 0.204 2.341 0.019  
RAverage 0.174 0.199 3.085 0.002   
 Growth Decline   
RPEG 0.154 0.338 6.371 0.000 
RMPEG 0.178 0.369 5.394 0.000 
ROJ 0.185 0.359 5.363 0.000 





4.4.4 Association between Cost of Equity and Firm Life Cycle 
4.4.4.1 Firm fixed effect estimation 
Table 4.5 reports the fixed effect estimates of the relationship between the cost of 
equity and the firm life cycle. As firm fixed effects and year dummies are specified 
in the regressions, their estimates are constant at firm level and year level, 
respectively. All other control variables (such as SIZE, BM, BETA, LOSSt-1, LEV, 
and ZSCORE) are measured at firm-year level. The regression coefficients on 
control variables remain constant in the sample.  
Table 4.5, Panel A, shows the regression results for different measures of the 
cost of equity and Dickinson’s (2011) life cycle proxies. The life cycles of firms are 
categorized into five stages, introduction, growth, mature, shake-out, and decline. 
Five dummy variables are thus created for each of the five stages. However, to avoid 
the problem of dummy variable trap multicollinearity in the regression model, one of 
the stages is dropped. As the shake-out stage of the life cycle is ambiguous in theory 
(Dickinson, 2011), I drop this stage in the regression model. The regression results 
suggest that, compared to the shake-out stage, the introduction and decline stages of 
the firm life cycle are significantly positively associated with the cost of equity, 
while the growth and mature stages of the life cycle are negatively associated with all 
estimates of the cost of equity (p<.01). The results also reveal that investors demand 
less risk premium for large and financially sound firms (the coefficients on SIZE and 
ZSCORE are both negative and significant at p<.01). On the other hand, demand for 
risk premium is higher for growth and risky firms, with positive and statistically 
significant coefficients for BM, BETA, LOSSt–1, and LEV.  
Table 4.5, Panel B, shows the results for different measures of the cost of 
equity and RE/TA, a life cycle proxy proposed by DeAngelo et al. (2006). The 
coefficients on RE/TA are negative and significant (p<.01) across all cost of equity 
measures, suggesting that investors’ demand for the cost of equity decreases as 
RE/TA increases
45
. Moreover, the coefficients on most of the control variables, for 
                                                             
45 I also test the association between retained earnings as a proportion of total equity (RE/TE - another 
life cycle proxy of DeAngelo et al. (2006)) and cost of equity. My results are robust with the use of 
RE/TE. For brevity, results are tabulated in appendix 4.2. 
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example, SIZE, BM, LEV, and ZSCORE have the predicted signs and significance, 
suggesting that the model specification is reasonable.    
Table 4.5: Association between Cost of Equity and Firm Life Cycle 
Panel A: Association Between Cost of Equity and Life Cycle Proxies Using 













      
Intercept ? 0.503*** 0.458*** 0.438*** 0.475*** 
  (6.72) (5.75) (5.86) (6.11) 
 
Introduction + 0.017 0.032*** 0.024** 0.019* 
  (1.57) (2.65) (2.32) (1.68) 
 
Growth - -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.017*** 
  (-2.84) (-2.89) (-2.68) (-3.08) 
 
Mature - -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.016*** 
  (-3.13) (-2.89) (-3.00) (-3.28) 
 
Decline + 0.076*** 0.061** 0.055** 0.069*** 
  (2.96) (2.12) (1.99) (2.62) 
 
SIZE - -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 
  (-4.76) (-3.78) (-3.57) (-4.13) 
 
BM + 0.033*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 
  (7.46) (7.89) (8.14) (7.63) 
 
BETA + 0.006* 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.007* 
  (1.75) (3.06) (3.04) (1.93) 
 
LOSSt-1 + 0.031*** 0.014* 0.012 0.025*** 
  (3.44) (1.66) (1.46) (2.77) 
 
LEV + 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 
  (3.36) (3.16) (3.47) (3.70) 
 
ZSCORE - -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
  (-6.25) (-5.76) (-5.40) (-6.40) 
 
Year Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.761 0.783 0.770 0.757 
Observations (N)  3,888 3,564 3,483 3,888 
Number of Firms  704 679 656 704 
Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 




Table 4.5: Association between cost of equity and firm life cycle 














      
Intercept ? 0.415*** 0.364*** 0.377*** 0.392*** 
  (5.47) (4.95) (5.50) (5.09) 
 
RE/TA - -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.034** -0.056*** 
  (-4.14) (-3.10) (-2.41) (-3.81) 
 
SIZE - -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
  (-3.31) (-2.88) (-3.09) (-2.94) 
 
BM + 0.032*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.037*** 
  (6.86) (7.52) (7.88) (7.19) 
 
BETA + 0.004 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.005 
  (1.23) (2.61) (2.68) (1.43) 
 
LOSSt-1 + 0.027*** 0.011 0.011 0.020** 
  (3.14) (1.29) (1.35) (2.34) 
 
LEV + 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 
  (2.84) (2.87) (3.29) (3.24) 
 
ZSCORE - -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
  (-4.85) (-4.75) (-4.68) (-5.23) 
 
Year Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.759 0.781 0.767 0.755 
Observations (N)  3,888 3,563 3,482 3,888 
Number of Firms  704 679 656 704 
 
Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Variable definitions are provided in appendix 4.1. 
Overall, my evidence is consistent with the resource-based theory and life 
cycle explanation for the cost of equity of the firm. Controlling for known 
determinants of the cost of equity (SIZE, BM, BETA, LOSSt–1, LEV, and ZSCORE) 
and individual firm heterogeneity, I find that the cost of equity is negative and 
significant in the growth and mature stages, while it is positive and significant in the 
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introduction and decline stages when compared to the shake-out stage. The reported 
results support the notion that, in the early stages of the life cycle, firms have a 
limited resource base. These firms do not have a long-term relationship with the 
financial market and consequently do not enjoy the opportunity to raise capital at the 
same cost as firms in the growth and mature stages. Growth firms have good 
potential, disclose more information to reduce information asymmetry, and hence 
can attract growth and strategic investors, thereby enabling capital to be raised at a 
lower cost. Moreover, mature firms have positive goodwill and good credit history. 
Thus, these firms have access to less expensive capital. The cost of equity is higher 
in the decline stage because potential investors do not want to invest money into a 
declining firm unless they are properly compensated for the risk. The important 
bottom line of the analysis is that all the life cycle proxies and cost of equity 
estimates uniformly and strongly support the view that firms’ cost of equity varies 
significantly with the stages in the firms’ life cycle.  
4.4.5 Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Regression 
The fixed effect estimation suggests a significantly negative association between the 
growth and mature stages and the cost of equity, while there is a positive association 
between the introduction and decline stages and cost of equity. However, the sign, 
magnitude, or statistical significance of these estimates may be biased due to 
endogeneity. That is, if the life cycle proxy and the error term in Equation (4.1) are 
correlated. To address this concern, I adopt a two-stage instrumental variable 
approach to re-examine the fixed effect panel regression findings reported in Table 5. 
However, this approach is appropriate only if the instrumental variables are 
correlated with the endogenous regressor but uncorrelated with the error term of the 
second-stage regression. In this context, good instruments are exogenous variables 
that are economically related to the life cycle proxy but are uncorrelated with the 
error term of the second stage regression relating the cost of equity to the life cycle. 
Hence, I use the average cost of equity (simple average of all non-missing 
observations), industry life cycle stages and firm-level variables (e.g., AGE, LOSS - 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm has a net loss in the current year, 
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and 0 otherwise, and number of analysts following a firm) as instruments for firm life 
cycle proxies.  
 
 I use the average cost of equity because it is expected to exhibit lower 
measurement error than any of the individual measures (Chen et al., 2009; Hou et al., 
2012). Use of industry life cycle stages as instruments can be justified on the premise 
that industry level life cycle has a profound effect on the firm level life cycle 
stages
46
. Lumpkin and Dess (2001) suggested that the industry life cycle affects a 
firm’s strategy on proactiveness or competitive aggressiveness. Therefore, it is 
expected that industry-level growth, performance, and financial solvency of the firm 
have a direct effect on the overall performance of the firm, eventually shaping the 
life cycle stages. Firm-level operating performance is one of the key indicators of the 
firm’s stage in the life cycle (Dickinson, 2011). Firms in the introduction and decline 
stages generally have negative operating performance, while firms in the growth and 
mature stages have strong operating performance. Hence, I use a dummy variable for 
loss of the firm, which reflects stages of the firm life cycle. I use firm age and 
number of analysts following a firm on the basis that these variables provide good 
indications for the firm stage in life cycle. Prior studies (Lang & Lundholm, 1996) 
documented that analysts prefer to follow large companies with high visibility and 
lower performance volatility. Pástor and Pietro (2003) suggested that firm age is a 
“natural proxy” for investors’ uncertainty about profitability of the firm. 
 
Table 4.6, Panel A, reports that coefficients on the instrumental variables are 
significant at the conventional level, suggesting that industry life cycle and included 
firm level variables have a significant effect on firm life cycle stages. Firm age is 
positively associated with the mature stage, but negatively associated with the 
introduction and growth stages. Furthermore, results show that introduction and 
decline firms are positively related with loss, while growth and mature firms are 
negatively related with loss. The coefficient on RE/TA and the number of analysts 
following a firm show that analysts follow large and mature firms.  
 
 
                                                             
46
 I use firm level life cycle stages data to calculate industry level life cycle stage. 
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Table 4.6: Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Regression 




Introduction Growth Mature Decline RE/TA 







































































      
Unreported Control Variables Included in Regression 
 
 
All Variables in 
Main Test 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation (N) 3069 3069 3069 3069 3069 
Adjusted R
2 
 0.066 0.109 0.100 0.065 0.521 
      
Underidentification Test     
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic                                                               57.948 38.468 
p-value                                                                            0.000  0.000 
  
Weak Identification Test  
Corrected Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic
 
                                         34.960                                                                36.924 
Stock and Yogo (2005)10% maximal IV size (Critical Value)                31.50 
 
22.30 
Test of Overidentifying Restrictions    
Hansen’s J- 
statistic 
                                                                         5.743 2.911 









                                                             
47
 ILC stands for Industry life cycle 
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Panel B. Second-Stage Regressions of Cost of Equity on Life Cycle Proxy  
Explanatory Variable  
Potentially endogenous instrumented variable    
Life cycle proxy 0.175*** -0.090** -0.134*** 0.229** -0.483*** 
 (2.90) (-2.04) (-3.03) (2.18) (-5.04) 
      
Unreported Control Variables Included in Regression 
All Variables in 
Main Test 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Hausman Test for the Effect of Life Cycle (coefficient 2SLS = coefficient OLS) 
Cluster-robust F-statistic                                                                           45.545 40.731 
p-value                                                                             0.000  0.000 
 
 
Results in Table 4.6, Panel B, suggest that the relationship between life cycle 
proxies and the cost of equity remain robust after accounting for the endogenous 
relationship between the life cycle proxies and the implied cost of equity capital. The 
estimated coefficients (and p values) of introduction (0.175 and p<.01), growth (-
0.090 and p<.05), mature (-0.134 and p<.01), decline (0.229 and p<.05), and RE/TA 
(-0.483 and p<.01) in the fixed effect two stage least squares (2SLS) regression 
suggest that endogeneity cannot explain away the expected relationship between the 
life cycle and the cost of equity capital
48
.  
In support of the instruments, I also conduct underidentification, weak 
identification, Hansen’s overidentifying restrictions and Hausman’s endogeneity 
tests. In Table 4.6, underidentification test results (LM statistic) reveal that the 
excluded instruments are “relevant”. The weak instrument test results show that the 
excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors because the 
(corrected) Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic (34.96) is greater than Stock and Yogo’s 
(2005) critical value (i.e., 31.5) at 10%. It is worth noting that Stock and Yogo 
(2005) provided critical values only for a range of possible circumstances up to three 
endogenous regressors. However, there are four endogenous regressors (proxies for 
four life cycle stages) in Dickinson (2011) life cycle measures and thus, Stock and 
                                                             
48 I perform Hausman’s (1978) specification test  to examine whether the fixed effect and random 
effect instrumental variable approaches are suitable. Test results suggest that the data support the fixed 
effect model in estimating the relationship.  
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Yogo (2005) cannot provide critical value in this circumstance. To address this 
problem, I follow the approach proposed by Angrist and Pischke (2008) and recently 
modified by Sanderson and Windmeijer (2013) and estimate a corrected version of 
the first stage F statistic that is suitable for my setting of more than three endogenous 
variables. The corrected Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic shows that a weak instrument 
is not a concern with my estimates. Results from Hansen’s overidentifying 
restrictions test do not reject the null hypothesis (p>.10), suggesting that instruments 
are uncorrelated with the error term and are correctly excluded from the second stage 
regression, which reflects the validity of the instruments used for the 2SLS 
regression. Finally, Hausman’s (1978) test significantly rejects (p<.001) the 
exogeneity of the firm life cycle proxies, justifying the use of the 2SLS regression 
estimates. 
4.4.6 Additional Analysis and Robustness Check 
4.4.6.1 Alternative Measure of Cost of Equity  
To mitigate the concerns that the results are driven by the choice of cost of equity 
estimates, I adopt an alternative approach to measure the cost of equity. For this 
purpose, I use the Easton and Monahan (2005) model to calculate the ex-ante cost of 
equity:  
𝑃𝑖𝑡 =
𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑖 𝑡+1 + 𝑟 × 𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑖 𝑡+2
(1 + 𝑟)2 − 1
                                                              (4.2) 
where, p, eps, r, and dps denote price, earning per share, cost of equity, and 
dividend per share, respectively. Table 4.7 reports the results of the sensitivity 
analysis with RPE as the dependent variable and two alternative measures of firm life 
cycle proxies, Dickinson’s (2011) measure and RE/TA, as the key independent 
variables along with control variables. As reported in the table, my inferences on the 
role of the firm life cycle on the cost of equity remain unaltered when the new 
empirical proxy for the cost of equity is used as the dependent variable. For example, 
in Table 7, Model 1, Dickinson’s (2011) life cycle proxies show that the cost of 
151 
 
equity is positively associated with the decline stages and negatively associated with 
the growth and mature stages. Model 2 shows that the cost of equity is negatively 
associated (significant at p<.05) with RE/TA.    
 
Table 4.7: Sensitivity Analysis   
Alternative Estimation of Cost of Equity 
 
Variables Pred. Sign 
(Model 1) (Model 2) 
RPE RPE 
    
Intercept ? 0.223 0.010 
  (0.87) (0.05) 
Introduction + 0.017  
  (0.54)  
Growth - -0.026**  
  (-2.18)  
Mature - -0.024**  
  (-2.23)  
Decline + 0.219***  
  (3.01)  
RE/TA -  -0.114** 
   (-1.97) 
SIZE - -0.008 0.003 
  (-0.55) (0.28) 
BM + 0.100*** 0.100*** 
  (5.79) (5.42) 
BETA + 0.016 0.011 
  (1.32) (0.89) 
LOSSt – 1 + -0.019 -0.030* 
  (-0.97) (-1.51) 
LEV + 0.053** 0.045** 
  (2.41) (2.05) 
ZSCORE - -0.000* -0.000 
  (-1.68) (-.77) 
Year Dummy  Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect  Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.849 0.848 
Observations (N)  4,498 4,498 
Number of Firms  798 798 
 
Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 





4.4.6.2 Alternative Measure of Firm Life Cycle  
To mitigate the concerns over whether the main results are sensitive to life cycle 
proxy, I use firm age as an alternative measure
49
. Firm age is a simple and natural 
choice as life cycle stages are naturally linked to firm age. I define AGE as the 
difference between the current year and the year of incorporation of the firm
50
. 
Results tabulated in Appendix 4.3 reveal that the association between all the 
estimates of the cost of equity and AGE are negative and statistically significant 
(p<.01). Moreover, considering that firm age can be a proxy for various time-varying 
arguments, I also use a dummy variable to distinguish between firms in old and 
young groups. I use AGE equals 1 if the firm age is greater than the median in any 
given year, and 0 otherwise. The untabulated results remain qualitatively the same. In 
summary, these findings corroborate the results reported earlier in the main analysis.  
4.4.6.3 Estimates Excluding Regulated Industries  
I repeat estimations in the main analysis by excluding utilities, telecommunications, 
and energy industries from the sample as the investment behavior of firms in these 
industries is more likely to be affected by regulations and by the nature of their 
activities (Aivazian, Ge, & Qiu, 2005). In appendix 4.4, estimates of this restricted 
sample are very similar to the estimates with the main analysis, signifying the 
robustness of the results.   
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this study I test whether the dynamic resource-based view and life cycle theory 
can explain the variation in the cost of equity across different phases of a firm’s life 
cycle. I posit that firms in different life cycle stages have different levels of resource 
base, competitive advantages, information asymmetry, and riskiness and, hence, the 
                                                             
49 Pástor and Veronesi (2003) also used firm age as a “natural proxy” for investors’ uncertainty about 
the profitability of the firm. 




cost of equity of the firm should vary systematically across the firm’s life cycle. 
Using a sample of Australian listed firms from 1990–2012, I find that the cost of 
equity of the firm significantly differs across the life cycle stages. In particular, I find 
that the cost of equity is higher in the introduction and decline stages of the firm, 
while it is lower in the growth and mature stage. Moreover, cost of equity decreases 
as the retained earnings as a proportion of total asset (RE/TA) increase. These results 
are unaffected by different estimations of the cost of equity and the firm life cycle. 
  Overall, my empirical evidence contributes to the growing body of literature 
that focuses on the financial implications of the firm life cycle. Particularly, this 
study contributes to the literature by showing evidence of the role that firm life cycle 
plays in determining cost of equity capital.  
My findings strongly support the resource-based view of competitive 
advantage and firm life cycle theory. According to the resource-based view, the 
financial capital, physical resources, human resources, intangible know-how, and 
skills and capabilities of large and mature firms are rich, diverse, and strong, while 
those of small and young firms are small, concentrated and limited. These resource 
bases and expertise help mature firms to achieve a competitive advantage, to reduce 
the risk and information asymmetry problem, and to gain easy access to finance, 
which contribute to a reduction in the cost of equity capital. The findings are also 
consistent with the life cycle theory of the firm in that different stages of the life 
cycle exhibit different levels of disclosure, analysts and investors following, liquidity 
of stock, credibility, and reputation in the market. Hence, as a consequence of the 
transition from one stage to another, the cost of equity changes accordingly. Finally, 
from a practitioner’s perspective, my results have direct implications for the financial 
management and strategic direction of the firm. An implication of my study is that 
firms should reach and maintain maturity, the prime stage of the firm life cycle, to 




Appendix 4.1: Variable Definition and Measurement 
 
Variables  Definition and Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
RPEG  Implied cost of equity, estimated by the PEG model of Easton (2004). 
RMPEG  Implied cost of equity, estimated by the MPEG model of Easton (2004). 
ROJ  Implied cost of equity, estimated by the modified Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2005) model (modified by Gode and Mohanram (2003)). 
RAverage  Implied cost of equity, estimated as the average of the above three models.   
 
Firm Life Cycle Proxies 
CLC  A vector of dummy variables that capture firms’ different stages in the life 
cycle following the Dickinson (2011) model.  
RE/TA  Retained earnings as a proportion of total assets, measured as retained 
earnings/total assets. 
AGE   The difference between the current year and the year of incorporation of the 
firm. 
Control Variables 
SIZE  Natural log of total assets of the firm at the end of the fiscal year. 
BM  Ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity at the end of the 
fiscal year.  
BETA  A measure of systematic risk, extracted from Datastream. Datastream uses a 
five-year period and regresses the share price against the respective 
Datastream total market index using log changes of the closing price on the 
first day of each month. 
LOSSt-1  An indicator variable that equals 1 if the net income before abnormal is 
negative in the previous years and 0 otherwise.  
LEV  (Short term debt + long term debt)/Shareholders’ equity. 
ZSCORE  A model, developed by Edward I. Altman in 1968, used to predict publicly 
traded manufacturing companies’ likelihood of bankruptcy. Altman’s Z 
score = 1.2(Working Capital/Total Assets) + 1.4(Retained Earnings/Total 
Assets) + 3.3(Earnings Before Interest & Tax/Total Assets) + 0.6(Market 
Value of Equity/Total Liabilities) + 0.999(Sales/Total Assets). 
Year  Dummy variables to control for fiscal year. 




Appendix 4.2: Association between Cost of Equity and RE/TE (Life Cycle Proxy 













      
Intercept ? 0.455*** 0.382*** 0.378*** 0.424*** 
  (5.77) (4.96) (5.28) (5.28) 
 
RE/TA - -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.017*** 
  (-3.15) (-3.43) (-2.96) (-3.16) 
 
SIZE - -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
  (-3.72) (-2.93) (-2.91) (-3.21) 
 
BM + 0.033*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 
  (7.22) (7.70) (7.94) (7.45) 
 
BETA + 0.005 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.005 
  (1.37) (2.58) (2.61) (1.54) 
 
LOSSt-1 + 0.031*** 0.014 0.012 0.024** 
  (3.66) (1.63) (1.44) (2.78) 
 
LEV + 0.010** 0.012** 0.011** 0.013** 
  (2.10) (1.97) (2.27) (2.43) 
 
ZSCORE - -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
  (-5.65) (-5.33) (-5.11) (-5.94) 
 
Year Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.757 0.780 0.767 0.754 
Observations (N)  3,888 3,563 3,482 3,888 
Number of Firms  704 679 656 704 
 
Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 























      
Intercept ? 0.585*** 0.547*** 0.519*** 0.564*** 
  (7.46) (7.06) (7.15) (7.02) 
 
AGE - -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
  (-3.22) (-3.47) (-3.49) (-3.25) 
 
SIZE - -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.017*** 
  (-4.87) (-3.96) (-3.69) (-4.32) 
 
BM + 0.034*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 
  (7.49) (7.90) (8.12) (7.69) 
 
BETA + 0.006* 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.007* 
  (1.70) (2.97) (2.94) (1.87) 
 
LOSSt-1 + 0.037*** 0.019** 0.016* 0.029*** 
  (4.14) (2.26) (1.96) (3.34) 
 
LEV + 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 
  (3.47) (3.28) (3.68) (3.74) 
 
ZSCORE - -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
  (-6.20) (-5.81) (-5.49) (-6.45) 
 
Year Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.754 0.778 0.765 0.751 
Observations (N)  3,886 3,561 3,481 3,886 
Number of Firms  702 677 655 702 
 
Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 











Appendix 4.4: Association Between Cost of Equity and Life Cycle Proxies Using 













     
 
Intercept ? 0.469*** 0.438*** 0.440*** 0.433*** 
  (6.33 (5.36) (5.69) (5.63) 
 
Introduction + 0.014 0.028** 0.019** 0.016 
  (1.23) (2.17) (1.77) (1.38) 
 
Growth - -0.013** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 
  (-2.37) (-2.69) (-2.82) (-2.57) 
 
Mature - -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
  (-3.18) (-3.22) (-3.31 (-3.32) 
 
Decline + 0.064** 0.054* 0.045** 0.054** 
  (2.41) (1.78) (1.62) (2.04) 
 
SIZE - -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** 
  (-4.34) (-3.38) (-3.41) (-3.60) 
 
BM + 0.032*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.037*** 
  (6.90) (7.55) (7.88) (7.11) 
 
BETA + 0.004 0.009** 0.009** 0.005 
  (1.12) (2.26) (2.51) (1.38) 
 
LOSSt-1 + 0.033*** 0.015* 0.015* 0.026*** 
  (3.68) (1.76) (1.77) (2.86) 
 
LEV + 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 
  (3.11) (2.79) (3.40) (3.31) 
 
ZSCORE - -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
  (-5.70) (-4.87) (-4.60) (-5.71) 
 
Year Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.763 0.791 0.776 0.762 
Observations (N)  3,456 3,179 3,119 3,456 
Number of Firms  600 582 560 600 
 
Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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This thesis empirically investigates a number of important and interesting questions 
related to corporate life cycle and organization capital. The impact of corporate life 
cycle and organization capital on corporate outcomes are important issues in the 
corporate finance literature. Each of these chapters is self-contained. Chapter two 
focuses on the role of organization capital in determining the corporate life cycle and 
provides evidence that organization capital has a notable effect in influencing the life 
cycle progression of the firm. The third chapter disentangles organization capital into 
two components: firm-specific organization capital and management-specific 
organization capital, and provides evidence that the impact of both forms of 
organization capital on corporate outcome (e.g., firm risks) vary substantially. The 
fourth chapter provides evidence that the corporate life cycle has important 
implications for the cost of equity capital.   
5.2 Summary of Major Findings 
The second chapter sheds light on the association between organization capital and 
the firm life cycle. The findings of this chapter suggest that firms with higher 
organization capital are likely to be in the introduction or decline stage. However, 
firms with a lower level of organization capital are more likely to be in the growth or 
mature stages. Empirical evidence in this paper also shows that firms with higher 
organization capital in the introduction and decline stages are more likely to progress 
to the growth and mature stages in the subsequent five years. Collectively, these 
results suggest that organization capital is a channel through which managers can 
lead the firm to attain and maintain the prime stages (i.e., growth and mature) in their 
life cycle.  
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This chapter makes important contributions to the literature. First, this paper 
contributes to the corporate finance literature by directly examining the role of 
organization capital in influencing corporate life cycle stages. While prior research 
has investigated the association between organization capital and cross-sectional 
stock returns (Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013), and future operating and stock return 
performance (Lev et al., 2009), little attention has been paid to the role of 
organization capital in driving firm life cycle stages. This paper attempts to fill this 
gap in the literature. Second, this paper contributes to the area of research that 
stresses the importance of organization capital as a major driver of firms’ (and 
national) growth and competitiveness (e.g., Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2014; Lev & 
Radhakrishnan, 2005; Youndt et al., 2004). While prior research shows that 
organization capital has a valuable impact on the growth, productivity and 
competitiveness of the firm, this chapter provides evidence that earlier literature on 
organization capital overlooked the important role of organization capital in 
influencing firm life cycle stages. Taken together, this paper makes an important 
contribution to the literature by demonstrating that organization capital is a indeed a 
determinant of firm life cycle stages.   
The third chapter in this thesis focuses on the adhesiveness of organization 
capital and outlines the importance of isolating firm-specific organization capital 
from management-specific organization capital in determining the role of 
organization capital in relation to the firm level outcomes (e.g., idiosyncratic risk, 
systematic risk, and total risk). The findings of this chapter suggest that 
management-specific organization capital reduces (increases) idiosyncratic and total 
(systematic) risk, whereas firm-specific organization capital reduces (increases) 
systematic (idiosyncratic and total) risk. Moreover, management-specific 
organization capital, when interacted with firm-specific organization capital, 
negatively affects idiosyncratic, systematic, and total risk, suggesting the dominant 
role of management-specific organization capital in reducing wide range of firm 
risks. Finally, additional analysis shows that management-specific organization 
capital can improve stock returns and firm performance in the presence of firm-
specific organization capital. Overall, this chapter shows that the impact of 
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organization capital on firm outcomes (e.g., risks and return) depends on whether the 
organization capital is firm-specific or management-specific. 
 This chapter contributes to the corporate finance literature by directly 
examining the role of management-specific and firm-specific organization capital in 
influencing idiosyncratic, systematic, and total risk. Despite considerable evidence 
that organization capital improves the productivity, efficiency, and performance of 
the firm (Corrado et al., 2009; Fredrickson, 1986; Lev et al., 2009;), there remains a 
clear divergence of opinion regarding the adhesiveness of such organization capital. 
This study provides evidence that disentangling firm-specific organization capital 
from management-specific organization capital is important in examining the impact 
of organization capital on firm-level outcomes (e.g., idiosyncratic, systematic, and 
total risk). A further contribution of this chapter is that, to the best of my knowledge, 
it is the first to isolate firm-specific organization capital systematically from 
management-specific organization capital and examine whether both forms of 
organization capital affect firm-level outcomes identically. It shows empirically that 
the effect of organization capital on idiosyncratic, systematic, and total risk differ 
considerably, depending on whether the organizational capital is management-
specific or firm-specific. Thus, this study makes an important contribution in 
resolving the competing views of the embodiments and effects of different forms of 
organization capital. Finally, this chapter contributes to the corporate finance 
literature on the determinants of firm risks by incorporating a human dimension into 
the equation. 
The fourth chapter investigates the effect of the corporate life cycle on the 
cost of equity capital. The findings of this chapter show that the cost of equity capital 
varies over the life cycle of the firm. In particular, compared to the shake-out stage of 
the firm life cycle, the cost of equity is higher in the introduction and decline stages, 
but lower in the growth and mature stages, resembling a U-shaped pattern. 
Furthermore, the cost of equity decreases as retained earnings as a proportion of total 
assets increase after controlling for other firm characteristics and unobserved 
heterogeneity. This chapter extends the corporate finance literature by providing 
empirical evidence that the firm life cycle has significant implications for the cost of 
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equity of the firm. While prior research has investigated the role of the firm life cycle 
in decision making regarding dividends (DeAngelo et al., 2006; Fama & French, 
2001) and capital structure (Berger & Udell 1998), little attention has hitherto been 
paid to the role of the firm life cycle in determining the cost of equity capital. This 
chapter aims to fill this gap in the literature. It thus augments our understanding of 
the role of the corporate life cycle in major financial policies.   
5.3 Directions for Future Research 
The findings of the thesis add to our understanding of the implications of the 
corporate life cycle and organization capital for the cost of equity and firm-level 
risks. It also provides a good framework for future research. More research is needed 
to gain a better understanding of the implications of the firm life cycle for the 
informational environment (analyst following, voluntary disclosure, etc.), the cost of 
debt and firm-specific crash risk. Future research in the area of the corporate life 
cycle may also focus on the association between the firm life cycle and idiosyncratic 
return volatility. 
 This thesis also provides a good framework for future research in the area of 
organization capital. It provides evidence that the impact of organization capital on 
corporate outcome (e.g., risks and return) depends on whether organization capital is 
firm-specific or management-specific. Further research may be done to ascertain 
whether similar findings can be found for other corporate outcomes. Future research 
in the area of organization capital may also concentrate on the implications of 
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